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Abstract 
 
Racial profiling remains a controversial societal issue due in part to difficulties in 
determining its prevalence.  Some analysts have proposed that criminological theories 
should be used to explain racial profiling.  Using the minority group threat hypothesis, 
this dissertation analyzes the effects of Black population increases on race-based 
pretextual stops in 113 Missouri municipalities with sizable Black populations.  The 
research also analyzes the effects of the growth and size of the Black population on 
traffic stop outcomes, including searches, contraband found, arrests, and citations.  Other 
variables that might explain pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes, including violent 
crime rates and socioeconomic differences between the Black and White populations, are 
assessed.  The study finds support for the minority group threat hypothesis in explaining 
racial profiling based on the relative growth and size of the Black population.  The 
hypothesis is refined by results showing the thresholds in the relative size of the Black 
population at which racially disparate stop rates and outcomes emerge and recede.  
Community accountability theory also helps to explain the effects of municipal 
government structure on race differences in traffic stops and outcomes.  Although 
policies that affect population growth would be questionable, policy makers and police 
organizations should make genuine efforts to reduce profiling by scrutinizing pretextual 
stops more closely, revising racial profiling forms to reflect more explicit police activity, 
taking away the ability for officers to make easy outstanding warrant and traffic violation 
arrests, and requiring documentation of departmental responses to disproportionate stop 
rates to accompany yearly racial profiling reports to the Attorney General. 
    
Key Words: racial profiling, pretextual stop, minority threat, population ratio, 
disproportionate searches, disproportionate arrests for outstanding warrants, contraband, 
traffic violations, and citations issued 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL REVIEW 
 
     When people are asked about whether racism still exists in America, they almost 
unanimously confirm its presence and view it repulsively (Quillian, 2006).  Some believe 
that while it is not as conspicuous as in the past, it could be more dangerous today as 
some hide their hatred to avoid violating political correctness.  This is not to assume that 
racism only reflects an individual‟s conscious prejudices toward others.  It can also be 
subconsciously triggered by the presence or mention of a minority group (Quillian, 
2006).  This subconscious activation may come from “stereotypical beliefs associated 
with a racial category” and could subsequently influence an individual‟s or group‟s 
actions (Quillian, 2006: 314-15).  Although racism is prevalent in the eyes of many, few 
seem to confess their true feelings.  Many even justify its existence by making the claim 
that everyone is “prejudiced” to some extent.  Yet the majority maintains that they have 
never mistreated another or used the “n” word because the use of that word was not 
allowed in their homes (Walker et al., 2004). 
     It is difficult to deny that individuals learn behaviors mostly from what their parents 
have taught (Siegel, 2005).  Going back to days of slavery in the United States, children 
were taught that Blacks were inferior to Whites, which kept slaves in subservient 
positions.  African captives were treated as animals by many civilians and government 
officials.  In fact, Africans were only considered three-fifths of a person during early 
United States history.  This principle was simply the sign of the times.  As things 
changed, American born Africans gained more freedoms, but not without resistance.  
Historically, Blacks maintained a subordinate position in American society, 
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economically, educationally, politically, and even within the criminal justice system.  
Blacks received the death penalty under conditions that would not have elicited capital 
punishment if the perpetrators were White (Walker et al., 2004).  Historical accounts 
from the early 1900s until the early 1960s show how White children accompanied their 
parents to witness and celebrate hangings of Blacks.   
     It causes one to wonder whether today‟s corporate CEO‟s might have been in these 
audiences and now teach or have taught their sons and daughters the traditions they 
learned growing up.  Additionally, today‟s religious leaders may have stood in these 
crowds and currently may hold views similar to their parents.  Furthermore, politicians 
who learned from past experiences may now teach their children these perspectives.  
There could also be law enforcement officials who maintain racial prejudices taught by 
their mothers and fathers.  This racist past is not very distant, and the vestiges may still be 
present.   
     After Civil Rights laws were put in place in the mid 1960s, attitudes did not 
necessarily change, but tactics did (Quillian, 2006).  Those who remained opposed to 
allowing racial equality continued to hood themselves to hide their identities as they 
terrorized Black communities.  These individuals most likely passed down their ideas and 
attitudes to subsequent generations who now continue this trend, but in different ways 
(Quillian, 2006).   
     In reality, individuals will maintain their own beliefs and attitudes toward other 
groups.  Authorities will only need to deal with these convictions as they become 
pertinent to the welfare of other individuals.  For that matter, it becomes more alarming 
when agents of trust act on these sentiments passed down from previous generations.  
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While there are those who belong to groups that proudly tout their superiority over 
others, few admit having racist postures (Quillian, 2006).  In some instances racist 
attitudes are only revealed because of an unfortunate slip of the tongue that exposes a 
person‟s true character.  These clandestine positions make it difficult for scientific 
research to prove to what magnitude racism exists in the minds of agents of trust.  Yet 
history has shown that Blacks have been put to death at higher rates than Whites, 
sentenced more harshly, arrested at higher rates, and are several times more likely than 
Whites to come under the control of the criminal justice system (Walker et al., 2004).  
While many acknowledge that racism is still prevalent in America, no matter whether one 
is a politician, minister, or an agent of the criminal justice system, some believe that 
Black overrepresentation in the criminal justice system has more to do with crime 
patterns than racism (Walker et al., 2004).  Some are even more reluctant to believe that 
police, whom we trust to protect our daily quality of living, act in racist ways that would 
affect an entire population.  Since the police are in a powerful position to make life 
changing decisions, the importance of analyzing police behaviors is paramount in 
administering criminal justice equally.  
     Criminological research consistently reports that police treat Blacks and Hispanics 
more harshly than Whites in most contacts.  Police arrest and use lethal and non-lethal 
force more often against Blacks and Hispanics than Whites.
1
  The FBI‟s Uniform Crime 
Report arrest statistics indicate that minorities are disproportionately more involved in 
criminal activity than Whites, which may partially explain the differential treatment by 
                                                 
1
 (Binder and Scharf, 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Sparger and Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Jacobs and 
O‟Brien, 1998; Crawford, 2000; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Terrill and Reisig, 2003) 
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police.
2
  However, arrest statistics do not tell the entire story when other data collection 
methods, such as victimization and self report surveys, are taken into account (Walker et 
al., 2004).   
     Victimization and self report studies indicate that the frequency by which Blacks and 
Hispanics engage in criminal activity is not as high as arrest statistics suggest.  Aside 
from serious felonies, Blacks and Hispanics violate the law approximately at the same 
rate as Whites (Hindelang et al., 1979; Powell, 1990; Tonry, 1995; Donohue and Levitt, 
2001; Eitle et al., 2005).  In fact, when it comes to traffic stops, some research suggests 
that Whites violate traffic laws at higher rates than Blacks and Hispanics (Lamberth, 
1996).   Nevertheless, most studies reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are still more likely 
than Whites to be stopped and searched by the police. 
     While debates on differential treatment of Blacks and Hispanics versus Whites 
continue, traffic stop data and the circumstances surrounding police stops have gained 
more attention.  As a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), a 
2002 national study on citizen contacts with police indicates that Blacks and Hispanics 
were no more likely than Whites to be subjected to traffic stops.  However, Blacks were 
significantly less likely to feel the stops were legitimate (Durose et al., 2005).  The study 
acknowledges methodological concerns with the study results.  For instance, respondents 
to the NCVS might use selective memory, misinterpret, or simply forget circumstances 
(Siegel, 2005).  There is also growing debate that involves the denominator used to 
measure minority overrepresentation in traffic stops (Durose et al., 2005).  Nevertheless, 
the national study displayed results that cannot be ignored. 
                                                 
2
 (Hindelang et al., 1979; Moyer, 1982; Smith et al., 1984; Powell, 1990; Sealock and Sampson, 1998; 
Avakame et al., 1999; Crawford, 2000; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Walker, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004) 
  
7 
 
     Given these results, this dissertation provides a descriptive analysis of municipalities 
in the State of Missouri with populations of 90 or more Black residents.  This study 
further used explicit theoretical assessments of police differential treatment of minorities 
in Missouri traffic stops and particularly the outcomes of those stops.  One might 
speculate that as the minority population increases, police use aggressive law 
enforcement tactics, such as traffic stops, more often against minorities than Whites.  The 
circumstances surrounding these traffic encounters may provide a more in-depth look at 
whether there is differential treatment of minorities, whether these differences are a 
function of some legal factor that puts minorities at a higher risk of police scrutiny than 
Whites, or whether the complexities of this issue simply hinder any concrete evidence of 
racial profiling.  To that end, traffic stop outcomes are examined.  Additionally, 
extralegal factors such as poverty, unemployment, household income, and property 
values are assessed to test the extent that minority population increases contribute to 
differential treatment.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
     Differential police treatment between minorities and White citizens is examined in 
studies that address various police activities.
3
   While extralegal factors may play a role in 
some police behavior, it is not clear whether race is the exclusive explanation of why 
Blacks and Hispanics are treated more harshly than Whites.  This section will examine 
                                                 
3
 (Correll et al., 2002; Hindelang et al., 1979; Binder and Scharf, 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Moyer, 1982; Erez, 
1984; Smith et al., 1984; Bursik, 1986; Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986; Powell, 1990; Sparger and 
Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Tonry, 1995; Klinger, 1996, 
1997; Jacobs and O‟Brien, 1998; Levin and Alexander, 1997; Sealock and Sampson, 1998; Avakame et al., 
1999; Mastrofski et al., 2000; Rogers and Johnson, 2000; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Brandl et al., 2001; 
Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Garner et al., 2002; Smith and Holmes, 2003; Terrill and Reisig, 2003; Schuck, 
2004; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Eitle et al., 2005)   
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the effects of race on lethal and non-lethal use of force, arrests for serious and minor 
offenses, and traffic stops.  When it comes to the use of force, some studies have found 
no evidence that suggests that race plays a role in police actions (Brandl et al., 2001; Eitle 
et al., 2005).  However, if we get more specific by examining deadly force, there might 
be indications that race, indeed, influences police decisions to shoot. 
 
Lethal Force 
     Some studies reveal that police kill Blacks overwhelmingly more often than they do 
Whites.
4
  Fyfe (1982) conducted a study of the Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department 
and found that even in less threatening situations, Blacks are shot more often than 
Whites.  While studies acknowledge that the police subject Blacks to lethal force more 
often than Whites, it is still not clear to what extent race of the offender plays a major 
role in police decisions to use lethal force (Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Correll et al., 
2002).   
     Police shootings were more likely to occur in situations when officers felt that 
suspects posed a high risk of danger.  Since Blacks and Hispanics make up a 
disproportionately large number of individuals who participate in high risk activity 
(Smith et al., 1984; Walker et al., 2004), it follows that they will become victims of 
police shootings more often.  Does this complicate the issue and possibly explain police 
shootings as a function of situational factors rather than racial discrimination?  In 
response to this rhetorical question, Michael Donohue (1983) showed that Black officers 
are disproportionately more likely than White officers to shoot Black suspects.  Donohue 
                                                 
4
(Binder and Scharf 1982; Fyfe, 1982; Sparger and Giacopossi, 1992; Sorensen et al., 1993; Jacobs and 
O‟Brien, 1998; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Terrill and Reisig, 2003)  
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noted that Black officers are often assigned to predominantly disadvantaged minority 
areas.  This might suggest that Black police have a tendency to be tougher than White 
police on Black suspects.  Furthermore, studies that use Firearm Training Systems 
simulating field situations to safely analyze an officer‟s decision to shoot armed versus 
unarmed subjects show that White officers are no more likely to use deadly force than 
Black officers (Doerner and Ho Tai ping, 1994; Ho Tai ping, 1994; Correll et al., 2002).  
If nothing else, maybe neighborhood characteristics, such as the high general rate of 
violence in inner cities, mediate police use of deadly force against minorities.  It might 
not be that minorities are shot at different rates solely because of race (Binder and Scharf, 
1982; Terrill and Reisig, 2003).  Studies that analyze the use of police non-deadly force 
might provide a clearer depiction of police action as it pertains to race and neighborhood 
characteristics.  
 
Non-lethal Force 
     Police use of deadly force is a rare event (Garner et al., 2002) and generally occurs as 
a result of an officer perceiving a threat.  However, the justifications for using non-deadly 
force are not as transparent when analyzing physical confrontations between police and 
citizens.  Police use of non-lethal force ranges from physical altercations to the use of 
pepper sprays, stun guns, and other control techniques.  While some studies claim there is 
no evidence that race plays a role in police use of physical force (Rogers and Johnson, 
2000; Brandl et al., 2001), other studies suggests that race is very relevant (Erez, 1984; 
Levin and Thomas, 1997; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Schuck, 2004).  As physical force 
comes from a wide range of activities that may or may not officially be documented in 
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police reports, research data may be limited when seeking to determine whether police 
use more physical force on Blacks and Hispanics than Whites.  However, when arrests 
are made, there is considerable research that covers various circumstances surrounding 
the disparate arrest rates between minority and White individuals.     
 
Arrests for Serious Felonies 
     While the literature is scant on arrest statistics for Hispanics, studies have shown that 
Blacks and Hispanics are generally arrested more often than Whites, and these 
differences vary between arrests for serious crimes as opposed to minor offenses.
5
  
Moreover, the ratio of Black-to-White Americans arrested for serious crimes is much 
greater than the ratio between the same groups for arrests for less serious crimes 
(Hindelang et al., 1979; Smith et al., 1984; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 
2004).  However, “controlling for the amount of race-specific crime reported to the 
police, Black citizens actually have a lower probability of arrest than Whites in cities 
with relatively large Black populations” (Stolzenberg et al., 2004: 673).  Furthermore, 
Blacks were found to be less likely to be arrested in cities where segregation is more 
pronounced, except for crimes involving a White victim and Black offender (Avakame 
and Fyfe, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004).  Thus, it appears that the racial makeup of the 
population and perhaps the local police department may have some influence on arrest 
rates.   
     The results are varied in studies that report the influences of the racial makeup of 
police departments as it relates to arrest rates.  While Whites are more likely to be 
                                                 
5
 (Hindelang et al., 1979; Moyer, 1982; Smith et al., 1984; Powell, 1990; Sealock and Sampson, 1998; 
Avakame et al., 1999; Avakame and Fyfe, 2001; Walker, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 2004) 
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arrested for assaults than Blacks and Hispanics regardless of the racial composition of the 
police department, the probability that Whites are arrested is even greater in cities with 
relatively more minority officers.  In fact, increases in the number of minority police are 
positively associated with White arrests while increases of White officers result in more 
minority arrests, particularly for minor offenses (Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Eitle et al., 
2005).  Having evidence that Blacks are arrested for serious crimes more often than 
Whites, self report and victimization surveys confirm data from official statistics that 
indicate that Blacks commit more serious offenses than Whites (Hindelang et al., 1979; 
Tonry, 1995; Walker et al., 2004).  Therefore, it appears that there is justification for the 
higher Black arrest rates for serious crimes.  Based on such data, one must question 
whether the justifications for higher Black and Hispanic arrests are as salient when 
analyzing arrests for minor offenses.  
 
Arrests for Minor Offenses 
     As stated earlier, while Blacks are arrested more often than Whites for serious crime, 
they are also arrested more for non-serious crime (Hindelang et al., 1979; Smith et al., 
1984; Powell, 1990; Crawford, 2000; Stolzenberg et al., 2004).  Conversely, unlike the 
patterns of criminal behavior reported for serious offenses, the ratio of offending between 
Blacks and Whites is not as pronounced when studying minor offenses.  In fact, many 
self report and victimization surveys show that crime rates between Blacks and Whites 
are similar for minor offenses; thus, discrimination may appear to play a larger role in 
these arrest statistics (Hindelang et al., 1979; Powell, 1990; Tonry, 1995; Donohue and 
Levitt, 2001; Eitle et al., 2005).  Alfred Blumstein (1982) conducted a study of racial 
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differences in arrest vulnerability.  He found that as the seriousness of the offense 
decreased, Blacks became disproportionately represented in arrests.  He acknowledges 
that police patrol neighborhoods that are more crime prone which accounts for some of 
the disparities, but the differences in arrest rates are more pronounced for minor 
violations of the law, which allows for more police discretion and the potential for bias 
activity.   
     However, there are studies that claim that race either has no significant correlation  to 
or little impact on police decisions to arrest (Moyer, 1982; Klinger, 1996, 1997; Chamlin 
and Brandl, 1998; Mastrofski et al., 2000).  Chamlin and Brandl (1998) report results 
from a Milwaukee study by analyzing populations from 1930 to 1972.  They found that 
as the percentage of the Black population rose, the arrest rates for vagrancy decreased, 
which contradicts the notion that Blacks are substantially more often arrested for minor 
offenses.  Klinger (1997) even espoused that in areas where crime rates are high, which is 
usually in Black neighborhoods, arrests for minor offenses are less frequent than in areas 
with lower crime rates.  He concluded that the conduct did not violate the threshold that 
would warrant an arrest in these types of neighborhoods.  On the other hand, other studies 
report that in neighborhoods where there is less informal control, there is a need for more 
official social control or police intervention (Bursik, 1986; Schuerman and Kobrin, 
1986).  More interestingly, Smith et al. (1984) show that in lower status neighborhoods, 
police are more punitive in their arrest practices when there are no complainants and less 
punitive if there is a Black victim.  These actions perpetuate what Smith et al. (1984) call 
a “systematic denial of legal protection for blacks” (p. 249).   
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Traffic Stops 
     Police treatment of minorities during traffic stops has become a controversial issue in 
recent years.  While criminological research on traffic stops is limited, much of it focuses 
on how minorities are racially profiled (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Cox, 2002).  The 
definition of racial profiling has varied around the notion of police stopping an individual 
based solely on the driver‟s skin color.6  Given the problem with determining whether an 
officer‟s motivation to stop an individual was truly based on skin color, the definition is 
difficult to use as an accurate measurement for analyzing race-based traffic stops.  
Nevertheless, research consistently reports that minorities are stopped by police at 
disproportionately higher rates than Whites, which at least provokes the need to examine 
whether some form of racial profiling exists.  The problem might be, as Batton and 
Kadleck (2004: 31) assert, that “the defining characteristics of racial profiling incidents 
have yet to be identified.”  That is, the circumstances surrounding a traffic stop must be 
examined more closely to determine whether racial profiling is taking place.     
     The concept of racial profiling became controversial in the 1980s as Operation 
Pipeline, a tool used by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration to profile 
drug couriers, was initiated.  Blacks and Hispanics were explicitly identified as drivers 
that fit the profile of drug traffickers.
7
  The facts surrounding these implications have 
been questioned as Engel et al. (2002) point out that Black drivers stopped for traffic 
violations do not produce more arrests or drug seizures than White drivers.  Racial 
profiling gained national attention in a 1993 incident when a Black attorney (Robert 
                                                 
6
 (Walker, 2001; Barlow and Barlow, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Farrell et al., 
2002; Meeham and Ponder, 2002; Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Novak, 2004) 
7
 (Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000;  Hemmens and Levin, 2000; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002; 
Engel et al., 2002; Farrell et al., 2002;  Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Walker 
et al., 2004) 
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Wilkins) accused Maryland State Police of stopping him simply because of his color 
(Lamberth, 1996; Novak, 2004).  Since then, the attention on racial profiling has caused 
many to question its magnitude.  Racial profiling studies are mixed when analyzing 
differential treatment of Whites as compared to minorities.  Most criminological studies 
reveal that minorities are either significantly or moderately more likely than Whites to be 
stopped by the police.
8
  Other studies, while fewer, reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are 
no more likely than Whites to be stopped by the police (Meeham and Ponder, 2002; 
Scmitt et al., 2002; Durose et al., 2005).   It is no surprise that minorities are more likely 
than Whites to believe that racial profiling exists in traffic stops (Novak, 2004; Walker et 
al., 2004).  Minorities have consistently reported, more often than Whites, having a 
negative perception toward police.
9
  However, a larger problem is determining whether 
these minority beliefs accurately depict unfair treatment by police or legitimate police 
actions are justified by the circumstances surrounding the stop and the perpetrators just 
happen to be minorities. 
 
POST TRAFFIC STOPS  
 
Post Stop Review  
     Several methods have been used to analyze traffic stop data; however, assessing racial 
profiling remains enormously challenging (Ridgeway, 2006).   Which method is best 
                                                 
8
 (Lamberth, 1996; Harris, 1997; Fagan and Davies, 2000; Hemmens and Levin, 2000; Langan et al., 2001; 
Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Walker, 2001; Buerger, 2002; Batton and Kadleck, 2004; Meeham and Ponder, 
2002; Novak, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004) 
9
 (Jacob, 1971; Peek et al., 1981; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Polivka, 1984; Welch, 1989; Murty et al., 
1990; Oramas, 1994; Frank et al., 1996; Priest and Carter, 1999; Henderson et al., 1997; Sampson and 
Bartusch, 1998; Chandek, 1999; Weitzer, 1999, 2000; Son et al., 2000; Hurst et al., 2000) 
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remains a controversial issue in criminological studies (Walker, 2001; Novak, 2004; 
Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005).  Studies have used a specified racial/ethnic 
group‟s number of stops within a given location divided by that racial/ethnic group‟s total 
residential population in the location to determine the likelihood of being stopped 
(Petrocelli et al., 2003; Withrow, 2004).  Other studies have used the number of stops 
divided by the total residential driving age population within a municipality to measure 
the likelihood of being stopped.
10
  Police chiefs argue that minority stops are not simply a 
function of their populations within a location but have more to do with the number of 
minority drivers that travel through a given area (Rojek et al., 2004).  The implication is 
that non-resident minorities travel from surrounding municipalities, which increases their 
likelihood of being stopped.  This may distort results in studies that use residential 
populations as the denominator to calculate stop rates.  Thus, studies have used direct 
observations to determine the racial make-up of driving populations along with spatial 
weighting to assure that drivers in surrounding areas are accounted for in the denominator 
(Rojek et al., 2004).  While the Rojek et al. (2004) study appears to be a better measure in 
providing a benchmark for comparing racial differences in stop rates, it still does not 
confirm that racial disparities in stop rates are the result of officer bias.   
     It could be that police disproportionately stop minority motorists because they violate 
the more serious traffic laws, such as speeding, at higher rates than Whites.  If police are 
justified in their actions and since speeding motivates most stops (Langan et al., 2001; 
Durose et al., 2005), it is expected that minority stop rates for serious traffic violations 
should be significantly higher than White rates.  Similarly, minority motorists might be 
                                                 
10
 (Harris, 1999; Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Zingraff et al., 2000; Nixon, 2003; Durose 
et al., 2005) 
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more likely to violate minor traffic ordinances as well, which may prompt police stops.  
These minor traffic stops, which are generally at the heart of racial profiling complaints, 
are the result of the “pretextual” stop (Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004).  The pretextual 
stop is a strategy originally used by officers as part of the war on drugs to stop a vehicle 
for minor infractions even though the officer‟s intentions might be to discover other 
illegal activity (Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004).  Additionally, pretextual 
stops have been used widely in the police profession and have been recently ruled 
constitutional by the United States Supreme Court (Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004).  
Pretextual stops could further cloud the ability to determine racial motives.  While this 
issue remains complex, an attempt to isolate patterns that show disparities might be a 
useful strategy to continue to understand the existence of conditions that might permit 
racist motives to remain inconspicuous.   
     This study examines the relationship between pretextual stops and the likelihood of 
disproportionate stops of Black drivers over White drivers.  While the argument can be 
made that minorities; operate more vehicles with equipment violations or improper 
registration, these stops are still considered minor traffic violations.  With this being the 
case, minority drivers may become suspicious of police intent, which might set off the 
racial profiling accusations.   
     Would it be wrong for officers to stop vehicles for minor violations?  What drives 
minorities toward allegations of racial profiling?  Since there are no statistical methods 
available to efficiently measure individual officer discrimination, analyzing what occurs 
after the stop might be a better way to examine racial profiling than simply looking at 
disparities in stop rates alone (Engel and Johnson, 2006).     
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     Researchers have recently started taking a closer look at what occurs after the stop to 
assess the existence of racial profiling (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming).  Some utilize 
outcome tests (Ridgeway, 2006; Engel et al., 2006; Engel, 2008, Perisco and Todd, 
2008), which employ statistical comparisons of search success rates, for instance, the 
number of searches that result in the discovery of contraband divided by the number of 
total searches.  These rates are then compared across racial/ethnic groups.  These 
comparisons, according to some economists who first generated the outcome tests, can be 
used to discern between officer bias and statistical discrimination (Engel, 2008).  
Statistical discrimination is described as a large dissimilarity in results between groups 
which leads to a disparate impact on one group, albeit these outcomes were not 
intentional (Engel, 2008).  An example would be the likelihood that minorities are 
stopped at much higher rates than Whites which might be due to race based deployment 
in crime prone neighborhoods, generally minority, to be saturated with police.  Such 
extention in law enforcement results in more police/citizen encounters (Engel, 2008).  
Minority motorists are more likely than White motorists to violate minor traffic laws 
(Langan et al., 2001; Crawford, 2000; Novak, 2004; Durose et al., 2005).   Thus, officers 
are given greater opportunity to make stops and further investigate minority motorists 
through vehicle searches.  If officers are finding that the search rate is generally 
successful, then officers may be more inclined to use the pretextual stop on minority 
drivers.  However, there could be other variables that drive an officer‟s desire to stop a 
vehicle for further investigation.   
     The number of arrests is central to the measurement of police efficiency, which might 
be a key motivating factor behind law enforcement practices (Walsh, 1986).  
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Interestingly, there is research that studied officer use of mobile data terminals that 
reveals that minorities are queried by police at higher rates than Whites (Meehan and 
Ponder, 2002).  These data imply that while police are in the privacy of patrol vehicles 
equipped with car computers, without any provocation they randomly run record checks 
on the license plates of vehicles driven by Blacks and Hispanics.  The queries could 
reveal results that include expired license plates, improper registrations, and wanted 
persons.  The results of the inquiries seemingly give police probable cause to make a 
pretextual traffic stop.   
     Since most research clearly indicates that Blacks are stopped at higher rates than 
Whites, it follows that Blacks will receive traffic citations at higher rates as well.  As a 
result, Blacks are more likely to have outstanding warrants because they are less likely to 
afford paying fines (Walker et al., 2004).  While officers are aware that the number of 
arrests is a key measurement of individual and department efficiency (Fisk, 1974; Walsh, 
1986; Gaines and Miller, 2006) and assuming that police are mindful that Blacks are 
more likely than Whites to be wanted (Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005), the 
chance of making an arrest after stopping Black drivers becomes greater.  For these 
reasons, outstanding traffic warrants might partly explain why police use the pretextual 
stop to detain Black motorists disproportionately to White motorists.  While some argue 
that these stops exhibit good police work (Walsh, 1986), others may argue that this 
practice is still racially driven. 
     Studies have shown that Blacks spend time in local jails at higher rates than Whites, 
which may be attributed to more warrant arrests (Walker et al., 2004).  Additionally, 
spending more time in jail can affect job opportunities, which results in higher 
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unemployment rates (Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2004).  Furthermore, these effects are 
associated with higher crime rates (Walker et al., 2004; Siegel, 2005).  Increased 
incarcerations produce a cycle that puts minorities at a considerable disadvantage within 
the criminal justice system.  These circumstances may be the result of statistical 
discrimination because Blacks are simply at a higher risk for police contact.  On the other 
hand, if there are no other explanations why Blacks are at risk for police contacts more 
than Whites, but are still searched, arrested, and given citations at much higher rates, such 
disparities could be the result of officer bias, particularly if search success rates are lower 
for Blacks (Ridgeway, 2006; Engel et al., 2006; Engel, 2008, Perisco and Todd, 2008).  
These factors seriously complicate any research looking to explain racial profiling.  This 
study will examine factors after the stop, including searches, arrests for contraband, 
arrests for outstanding warrants, arrests for traffic violations, and citations issued to 
provide a better understanding of the pretextual stop and the likelihood that racial 
profiling is in operation.  
 
Stop and Search 
     While studies reveal that Blacks and Hispanics are stopped by the police at higher 
rates than Whites,  Blacks and Hispanics are even more likely than Whites to be searched 
during a traffic stop.
11
  On the other hand, again to a lesser extent, some studies 
demonstrate that Whites are searched more often than minorities, particularly when it 
comes to consent searches (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Novak, 2004).   
                                                 
11
 (Lamberth, 1996; Knowles et al., 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002; 
Scmitt et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Steward and 
Totman, 2005) 
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     Knowles et al. (2001) claim that searches of Black drivers are justified because Blacks 
are arrested more often for various charges, and the searches are part of the search 
incident to the arrest, which this study will discuss later.  Steward and Totman (2005), to 
the contrary, state that Blacks and Latinos consent to searches at higher rates, which 
might suggest that searches are not necessarily due to arrest factors.  Rosenfeld et al., 
(forthcoming) examined searches that were purely discretionary and excluded searches 
incident to the arrest and outstanding warrants.  While Rosenfeld et al. (forthcoming) 
found that searches varied with age of driver, residence, and time of day, young Black 
males were subjected to discretionary and non-discretionary searches at higher rates than 
young White males.  On the other hand, when observing discretionary searches, which 
mostly included consent searches, older White males were more likely searched than 
older Black males.  The results held for searches conducted by both Black and White 
officers. 
 
Traffic Arrests 
     Mixed results emerge on the likelihood of being arrested after a traffic stop.  Although 
they exist, few studies show that Whites are more likely than minorities to be arrested 
after a traffic stop (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001) while other studies show that minorities 
are more likely than Whites to be arrested after being stopped (Crawford, 2000; Engel, 
2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2006).  Smith et al. (2006) furthermore claim that 
there is a link between suspicion and arrests.  That is, individuals who are perceived by 
the police as being suspicious have a higher probability of being stopped and perhaps 
arrested.  Since police perceive Blacks more often than Whites to be questionable, the 
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probability of Blacks arrested after a traffic stop becomes higher than the likelihood for 
Whites (Smith et al. 2006).  In other words, although the stop may or may not appear 
legitimate, the occurrences during the stop result in an arrest for Blacks at higher rates 
than for Whites.  It has even been reported that excessive noise complaints, such as 
driving with loud music, has been used as a pretextual stop, which results in Black arrests 
at higher rates than White arrests (Crawford, 2000).   
     After using race of the officer as an indicator, Smith and Petrocelli (2001) found that 
White officers were no more likely than Black officers to arrest minority drivers.  In fact, 
both White and Black police officers have been reported as treating people of color 
differently than White citizens during traffic stops (Buerger and Farrell, 2002).  This 
certainly makes the issue more complex but does not eliminate the possibility that the 
motivation for traffic stops is based on race.  While it remains difficult to determine why 
officers make the decision to arrest, most researchers report Blacks arrested at higher 
rates than Whites after traffic stops.  Why minorities are arrested at higher rates becomes 
the question.  It would be appropriate to examine the research on traffic stops that result 
in arrests after discovery of contraband, for outstanding warrants, and even for the traffic 
violation itself.   
 
     Contraband Justifies the Arrest and Search.  The research on contraband reveals that 
illicit drugs are found in cars driven by Blacks at rates lower than for Whites.
12
  Even 
some self reports reveal that White drivers report possessing illegal substances in their 
vehicles at higher rates than minorities (Geiger and Phillips, 2003).  However, larger 
                                                 
12
 (Zingraff et al., 2000; Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Gross and Barnes, 2002; Institute on Race and 
Poverty, 2003; Engel and Calnon, 2004;  Steward and Totman, 2005; Smith et al., 2006) 
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quantities of drugs may be found on Blacks and Hispanics more often than on Whites 
(Gross and Barnes, 2002).  Again, few studies find that Whites are less likely than Blacks 
to possess contraband although Knowles et al. (2001) report that Blacks do possess illicit 
drugs at higher rates than Whites.  If minorities are indeed less likely to be found with 
contraband during a traffic stop, then the justification for searches incident to an arrest of 
minorities should likely result from factors other than contraband findings.   
 
     Outstanding Warrants Justify the Arrest and Search.  Indications that minorities are 
arrested more often than Whites might explain why minorities are searched more often 
since officers are usually required to search after an arrest (Hernandez and Knowles, 
2004).  While the criminological research on warrants is scant, Stewart and Totman 
(2005) state that high minority search rates are particularly evident in the area of consent 
searches that cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or 
outstanding warrants.  On the other hand, if minorities are arrested on outstanding 
warrants more often than Whites, searching minorities at higher rates due to searches 
incident to arrest would be justified, assuming the arrest is legitimate.   
 
Traffic Citations  
     When examining traffic citations issued by police, the studies have mixed results.  
Some reveal that Black drivers are no more likely than non-Black drivers to be issued 
traffic citations (Ridgeway, 2006); Engel et al., 2006).  Others conclude that when other 
extra-legal and legal factors are controlled, Blacks are more likely to be issued traffic 
citations (Engel and Calnon, 2004; Mosher et al., 2008).  These circumstances that occur 
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after a stop are plagued with confounding issues that prevent researchers from 
determining the extent to which race is involved in an officer‟s decision to initially 
conduct a pretextual stop which leads to a search, citations, or arrests.  Nevertheless, 
patterns of police conduct must continue to be studied to get to the root of racial profiling 
allegations.  More importantly, a clear and explicit criminological theory should 
accompany these explanations of differential treatment. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MINORITY GROUP THREAT 
 
         To analyze police behavior, Engel et al. (2002) state that “theoretical models must 
guide future data collection efforts” (p. 249) and must be more explicitly stated as 
explanatory variables in determining racial profiling.  With evidence that minorities 
commit more serious crime at higher rates than Whites (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; 
Walker, 2001; Walker et al., 2004), it follows that law enforcement efforts, which include 
traffic stops, might increase, particularly for Blacks and Hispanics because of a perceived 
threat.  In other words, the greater the minority population, the higher the likelihood of 
formal law enforcement intervention (Bursik, 1986).  This is especially true when officers 
who patrol predominantly White neighborhoods view minorities as being suspicious 
(Walker, 2001).   
     From a criminological perspective, the minority group threat hypothesis proposes that 
as the minority population or population ratio to Whites increases, citizen fear of crime 
increases.  As a result, White citizens pressure political authorities, which motivate more 
police crime control tactics against minorities (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and 
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003; Kane, 2003; Smith and Holmes, 2003; Ruddell 
and Urbina, 2004; Stolzenberg et al., 2004, Kent and Jacobs, 2005).  Thus, minorities are 
stopped and searched by police at higher rates than Whites.  Do these stops constitute 
racial profiling and discrimination or is there a more complex question?  To explain 
differential treatment of minorities as it relates to their relative populations requires an 
examination of the sociological roots of the minority group threat hypothesis.   
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     In his attempt to develop a systematic theory that explains minority-group relations, 
Hubert Blalock grounded the minority group threat hypothesis in socio-psychological 
perspectives (Blalock, 1967).  He criticizes theories that focus on single factors that 
explain race relations, but points out that an attempt to combine variables, such as 
sociological, ideological, and status factors, does not require one to be forced to give 
equal explanatory power to each.  Furthermore, Blalock adds that it would be more 
appropriate to specify the conditions when one or the other causal factor or factors are 
more important.  He explains that there are various interrelated studies that emphasize 1) 
status factors; 2) competition; and 3) power relationships that attempt to explain minority 
relationships with Whites.  Few of these studies present explicitly stated theoretical 
propositions.  Nevertheless, these are important factors that Blalock (1967) uses to build 
the minority group threat theory.     
 
STATUS FACTORS 
     Some theorists believe that prejudice stems from a deliberate attempt by economic 
elites to preserve dominance over the less fortunate (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 2006).  
While some theories minimize the role that economic factors play in discrimination and 
favor personality traits derived from early childhood, Blalock (1967) insists that status 
factors cannot be ignored.  When the dominant group aspires to certain goals to maintain 
a preeminent status and minorities are in direct competition for these same goals, various 
forms of exploitation and discrimination may occur to block minority advancement.  For 
instance, Whites will avoid minorities because socialization with such an underprivileged 
group might jeopardize an elite status; therefore, minorities are excluded from various 
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activities.  Also political power may be obtained through manipulation of prejudice, as 
direct aggression against minorities may satisfy certain psychic needs produced by 
frustration of a social system that calls for equality (Blalock, 1967).  These premises 
imply that discrimination will increase as the minority population increases.  However, 
other variables will need to be introduced to determine to what extent minority presence 
produces economic competition and frustration that garner a particular level of racial 
prejudice (Blalock, 1967).  
 
COMPETITION 
     Measuring the degree of inter-group competition that might account for discrimination 
is a difficult task (Blalock, 1967).  Factors to consider are the intensity of goals and the 
value of rewards for which competition exists.  It would then make sense to measure the 
number of competitors relative to the number of rewards.  Additionally, it is appropriate 
to measure the manner by which rewards are distributed and the degree to which 
resources are to be allocated among competitors (Blalock, 1967).   
     For instance, in the 1940‟s, The Ford Motor Company in Detroit hired over half of all 
the Black males living in Detroit and approximately 14% of its White males.  Black 
males could not find employment elsewhere while White males had numerous 
employment opportunities.  There was no serious competition for the Ford jobs; 
therefore, discrimination appeared nonexistent in hiring practices at Ford.  However, 
Black employee wages were considerably lower than White Ford employee wages 
(Maloney and Whatley, 1995).  Since many Whites had no desire to work at Ford 
(Maloney and Whatley, 1995), why were Black wages lower?  Why were Blacks not 
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hired by other companies in Detroit?  Were they not qualified?  To what degree do these 
conditions represent inter-group conflict or competition?  One would assume that White 
employers formed subtle coalitions that maintained the status quo to block Black 
opportunities, which will be difficult to conceptualize (Blalock, 1967).  Nevertheless, 
Blalock says that inter-group competition must still be assessed at least as a general 
descriptive term. 
     Alternatives to measuring the degree of inter-group competition would be to analyze 
the legitimate means, such as how individuals develop their own resources and hard work 
that allow them to reach their goals without blocking others (Blalock, 1967).  On the 
other hand, one could analyze how alliances are formed with some competitors to place 
obstacles in front of other rivals.  Researchers can additionally examine how potential 
competitors, including minorities, might join together to assure an equitable division of 
rewards or increase total rewards by means of regulating contenders (Blalock, 1967).  To 
further illustrate the complexities of this theory, Blalock introduces class and educational 
factors that could further cloud the extent to which competition incites discrimination.  
For instance, he posits that competition between Whites and Blacks might be stronger in 
the lower classes, where resources are closer to equal.  Frustration and resentment may 
mount as lower class Whites do not possess the resources that will allow them to 
automatically benefit from their racial status (1967).  However, researchers note that it 
must still be determined at what point this resentment influences a person to act out 
frustrations with racist behavior (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 2006).   
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POWER AND DISCRIMINATION            
      To act out racist behavior, one must have the ability to do so.  Blalock (1967) 
describes power as the total resources one has and the degree to which these resources are 
mobilized.  By resources he refers to features such as money, property, prestige, 
authority, and natural and supernatural resources of an individual or group that provide 
the potential to exercise power.  The exertion of these resources depends on the 
motivations and goals of those whom power is exercised over.  In other words, if 
minorities aspire to achieve goals that challenge or threaten White status, power is put 
into action to control minority behavior, thus allowing Whites to maintain their position 
(Blalock, 1967).   
     Blalock (1967) conceptualizes mobilization as the potential or ability to apply power 
and the total resources that are actually used or expended to achieve a certain goal or 
objective.  The sources of power take on various forms, categorized as legitimate, 
referent, expert, reward, and punishment power.  Legitimate power is “a generalization of 
the notion of authority” in which definite role relationships need not be involved, such as 
a personal promise made from one person to another.  Referent power is “a generalization 
of the notion of charisma” by which one individual identifies with another and wishes to 
do as the other person requests even though that person has no special personality or 
charismatic traits that encourages the other to do as he/she says.  Expert power comes 
from a person‟s special skills or knowledge that makes him/her valuable to the 
subordinate; therefore, the subordinate yields power to that person (Blalock, 1967: 117).  
However, reward and punishment power comes from instances when resources, such as 
economic status, police, and the like are consciously mobilized to affect change in 
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another person (Blalock, 1967).  In modern times, legitimate, referent, and expert powers 
are not as significant as they were in the past, as minorities now question the dominance 
and expertise that Whites previously possessed (Blalock, 1967).  Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to explain race relations from perspectives that relate to reward and 
punishment power (Blalock, 1967).  This is where criminologists have expanded on the 
minority group threat hypothesis, particularly punishment power. 
     An example of reward power is evident when minority resources produce economic 
opportunities that allow them to afford relocating to better neighborhoods, which are 
usually predominantly White (Blalock, 1967).  Unfortunately, they are not always 
welcomed as Whites mobilize their resources to change minority behavior to push them 
out of, or prevent further migration to, mostly White neighborhoods.  The latter is an 
example of punishment power, which includes coercive functions by police (Blalock, 
1967; Quillian; 2006).  According to Blalock (1967), three factors of discrimination occur 
under punishment power: 1) political discrimination; 2) symbolic discrimination; and 3) a 
threat oriented ideological system.  While political and symbolic discrimination are 
important factors to consider, the threat oriented ideological system will be the central 
concept in this writing.     
     The threat oriented ideological system is a belief system that contributes to group 
functioning that calls for immediate mobilization of resources to attack the perceived 
threat of a numerically large minority population (Blalock, 1967).  According to Blalock, 
Whites fear that an influx of Blacks will threaten White existence as Blacks are 
stereotyped as oversexed, overaggressive, and criminally inclined (Blalock, 1967).  Since 
Blalock‟s writing, there have been changes to the Southern White stereotypes that 
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perceive Black males as oversexed rapists who need to be controlled.  This is evident in 
the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Furman v Georgia that made government 
sponsored executions for rape charges unconstitutional (Walker et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, these exaggerated fears of the violent Negro male are said to justify violent 
or extreme forms of social control over this potentially harmful group (Blalock, 1967).  
This fear is the cornerstone to criminological and sociological explanations of Blalock‟s 
minority group threat hypothesis as it relates to social control (Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and 
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003; Parker et al., 2004).  
 
MINORITY POPULATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
     Finding a connection between percentage of Blacks in cities and fear of crime, Kent et 
al. (2005) point out how these potentially hostile views that Whites have about large 
minority populations promote White anxiety and resentment.  Whites will then pressure 
political authorities to make greater efforts to control street crime.  Others have studied 
how minority population increases affect the various instances of social control, such as 
arrest rates, incarceration rates, and capital punishment (Jackson, 1989; Jacobs and 
Carmichael, 2001; Baumer et al., 2003).  Some researchers have found an opposite effect 
on minority population and arrest rates than Blalock proposed.  For instance, Jackson 
(1989) and Parker et al. (2004) claim that law enforcement becomes less sensitive to the 
needs of the minority community and do not investigate cases with the same vigor that 
would be evident in White communities.  Therefore, as the benign neglect hypothesis 
would argue some aspects of social control, particularly arrests rates, decrease as the 
minority population increases (Stolzenberg, 2004).      
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     While studies suggest that more social control is due to an increased minority 
population as a result of discrimination, other studies posit that the social context of 
certain neighborhood characteristics, such as crime rates, generate fear, which legitimizes 
more formal control (Jackson, 1989l; Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 
2000).  For instance, the turbulence felt after the 1960s urban disorders resulted in a steep 
rise in crime rates in areas heavily populated by Blacks (Siegel, 2005).  In turn, police 
strength increased, which resulted in more coercive use of force against minorities to 
calm the disorders (Jackson, 1989).  However, further research showed no real 
connection to or deterrent effect of police strength on crime rate decreases (Jackson, 
1989).  This finding led to further investigations of social control and its relationship to 
social class, race, and ethnicity (Jackson, 1989).   
     Other factors that play a role in the extent to which Whites feel threatened by an 
increasing or existing large minority population may depend on region, time period, or 
even the size of cities (Jackson, 1989).  Historically, Whites in the South were generally 
more sensitive to race issues and reacted in a more punitive manner against minorities 
than Whites in other regions (Blalock, 1967; Taylor, 1998; Walker et al., 2004).  There 
are also findings that show a connection between education and the motivation to 
discriminate (Blalock, 1967).  As this may be the case, the collective results of social 
control as it relates to minority populations will need to be studied across regions and 
perhaps communities.  There should be caution in relying upon cross sectional studies 
that do not weigh the attitudes and biases reflected in members of the social system, such 
as the police, who are responsible for crime control.  In the absence of assertive crime 
control tactics or collective methods to control minorities, a distinction between 
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individual and macro levels of discrimination will need to be examined, which makes 
studies of race relations even more complex (Jackson, 1989).    
 
Macro vs. Individual Level Explanations 
     Attempting to interpret back and forth between macro and micro level explanations 
has plagued research efforts for years (Blalock, 1967).  From a macro level perspective, 
one might make assumptions about individual motivations to develop meaningful 
theories that pertain to groups (Blalock, 1967).  For instance, to say that Whites become 
threatened and demand more police action against minorities, as the minority population 
increases one might assume that the motivation behind this demand is individual 
discrimination turned collectively.  One would also have to determine whether the 
collective results from police practices stem from each individual officer‟s reaction to the 
demands of citizens or his or her own biases.  One would be required to understand the 
underlying values, motivations, and other issues that are more appropriately studied in 
psychology (Blalock, 1967).  Therefore, it is imperative that sociologists and 
criminologists continue to attempt to integrate psychological and sociological factors into 
race related studies.   
     Lincoln Quillian (2006) explains how overt expressions of discrimination have 
sharply declined and now prejudice and discrimination have taken on new and more 
subtle forms.  He elaborates on how subtle, hidden, and sometimes unintentional biases 
could create methodological problems in understanding prejudice.  He uses the term 
“new racism” and distinguishes four types: 1) symbolic racism; 2) modern racism; 3) 
ideological refinement; and 4) laissez-faire racism.  Symbolic racism refers to the deep 
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seated hostility that Whites feel toward minorities learned from childhood with the idea 
that Black Americans are violating the values of American society.  Modern racism is the 
belief that racism is in the past, yet Blacks are pushing too hard for equality.  Ideological 
refinement refers to the discrepancy between White‟s support for the idea of having 
equality but low support for active governmental intervention to reduce racial inequality.  
Laissez-fare racism deals with beliefs in anti-black stereotypes that blame minorities for 
inequality and resist active policies to reduce inequality (Quillian, 2006).  To further the 
laissez-fare perspective, one could posit that social control is used more often against 
Blacks and Hispanics because they are more prone to criminal behavior.    
     Existing research has shown that Blacks are arrested more often because of their 
demeanor and negative attitude toward authority, which could legitimate formal law 
enforcement reactions (Klinger, 1996; Bridges and Steen, 1998, Mastrofski et al., 2002).  
Professional assessments also show some criminal justice agents perceive Black youth as 
violent and deserving of harsher treatment because of their negative internal attributes 
(Bridges and Steen, 1998).  Since police officers cannot read minds to determine who 
will commit crimes, their decisions to stop must be based on crude information that 
results in statistical discrimination (Kent and Jacobs, 2005).  If these claims are real, it 
does not alleviate the possibility that discrimination occurs due to individual officer 
stereotypes and racism.  Whichever type of racism exists, as Quillian (2006) proposes, 
Blalock (1967) suggests that personality variables which produce motives to discriminate 
against minorities might bring similarly motivated individuals of the dominant group 
together to bring about concerted efforts to discriminate against minorities as their 
populations increase.  Given the difficulties in making assumptions about individual 
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motivations, other problems, such as analytical strategies, unit of analysis, time period, 
statistical controls, and relative size of the Black population as the only measurement of 
racial threat confound the minority group threat hypothesis as well (Blalock, 1969; 
Jackson, 1989; Parker et al., 2004).  Because these methodological concerns are real, 
support for this theory is mixed (Parker et al., 2004).  However, criminologists and 
sociologists must continue to attempt to find theoretical connections between minority 
populations and social control.  While the data in this study do not allow for addressing 
all the methodological problems such as time period and regional effects, the research 
will attempt to focus on a strategy that will show patterns that connect minority 
population size to social conditions that engender more social control by the police.   
 
WHEN THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE MINORITY POPULATION BECOMES A 
THREAT 
     While some studies overwhelmingly claim that there is a strong association between 
percentage of minorities and fear of crime, which compels more social control (Myers, 
1990; Eitle et al., 2002; Earl et al., 2005; King, 2007), other studies contend that this 
reaction only occurs in desegregated locations (Kent and Jacobs, 2005).  As mentioned 
previously, some even maintain that as the minority population increases, elements of 
social control actually decrease (Jackson, 1989; Parker et al., 2004).  It begs the question 
of at what point does the percentage of the minority population pose a threat to Whites?  
According to Marlee Taylor, White opinions on racial policy become more negative as 
the Black population increases but only up to the point when Blacks represent about 40 
percent of the population (1998).  Sampson and Morenoff (2006) show that population 
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change increase once the Black population reaches 40 percent in a given neighborhood.  
Liska et al. (1985) and Taylor (1998) show that threat become evident when the Black 
population reaches 20 to 30 percent, which results in more social control.  The 
implications are that fear of crime becomes a concern which induces residents to move 
out of areas or request more social control as the minority threat becomes prevalent.  
Furthermore, once Blacks make up 75 percent of the population, neighborhoods become 
concentrated in poverty, which multiplies the crime rates and furthers minority threat 
(Sampson and Morenoff, 2006).     
     On the other hand, some contend that once the population reaches a particular 
threshold, social control actually decreases due to the benign neglect hypothesis, which 
explains, as indicated earlier, that when the minority population is considerably high, 
police are not as proactive or do not sufficiently react when it comes to minority victims.  
At that point there is less pressure on police to control crime (Jackson, 1989; Parker et al., 
2004).  While the preceding research attempts to pinpoint when fear or threat begins to 
exist, it remains unclear at what minority population threshold actually produces fear that 
subsequently fosters what some consider unfair treatment of minorities.  This disparity in 
treatment is not minor in nature and could be fatal in some circumstances as explained 
earlier in chapter 1.  With that being said, it is appropriate to now explain how this 
dissertation will contribute to the literature on traffic stops and allegations of minority 
mistreatment by the police. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PREDICTING PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND TRAFFIC STOP OUTCOMES 
 
  MINORITY POPULATIONS EXPLAIN DISPROPORTIONATE STOPS 
     The preceding chapter reflects disparities in how police treat minorities as compared 
to Whites.  The reasons for these disparities are complex.  Most studies that attempt to 
explain racial differences in outcomes find difficulty identifying race as the motivation 
for these distinctions.  While some studies lean toward race as an explanation, others 
challenge this notion and explain that racial differences are a result of offending patterns 
and contextual conditions that call for more police intervention (Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer 
and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000; Walker et al., 2004).  As much of the research shows that 
minorities (particularly Blacks and Hispanics) participate in violent crime at higher rates 
than Whites, it is plausible that minorities will be scrutinized by law enforcement 
officials at higher rates than Whites.  This situation might even explain why minorities 
fair worse than Whites on the back end of the criminal justice system.  Violent crime 
justifies longer and harsher prison sentences although economic status, lack of competent 
representation, and other legal and extralegal factors may contribute (Walker et al., 
2004).  However, on the front end, which includes initial contacts with the police, there 
has yet to be research that gives a clear justification for the reason or reasons police stop 
minorities at higher rates than Whites for traffic violations.  While studies show that 
traffic stops make up the largest portion of a citizen‟s first contact with the police 
(Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005), much of the research simply displays 
disparities in stop rates, and few studies give solid explanations for these differences.  
Racial discrimination merely appears to be inferred.   
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     There are opposing academic views of racial/ethnic differences in police stops.  Robin 
Engel (2008) reports that researchers guide their studies from four viewpoints: the 
legalistic, criminological, normative, or economic perspectives.  The legalistic 
perspective is concerned with analyzing how police processes and procedures vary 
among racial and ethnic groups.  This perspective argues that law enforcement should be 
equally distributed across racial and ethnic groups and assumes that there are no 
significant differences in criminal behavior across racial/ethnic groups.  Therefore, there 
should be very few differences in stop and search rates.  Otherwise, police discrimination 
is present.  The criminological perspective is more concerned with understanding why 
police behave differently toward some racial/ethnic groups.  It claims that law 
enforcement should be proportional across groups based on the criminal activity groups 
are involved in.  While the criminological perspective embraces the benchmark technique 
for analyzing police stops, it also uses multivariate statistical modeling to assess the 
effects of race on officers‟ decisions during stops.  The normative perspective is 
concerned with substantive along with procedural equality across groups.  It argues that 
although one ethnic or racial group may be more prone to criminal activity, it does not 
justify unequal treatment of members of that group who are law-abiding.  In other words, 
if innocent minorities are being stopped or scrutinized merely because other minorities 
are more likely to violate the law, statistical discrimination is in and of itself not a 
legitimate excuse for racial disparities in stop or search rates.  Lastly, the economic 
perspective embraces equality of outcomes.  It also argues that law enforcement should 
be proportional across racial/ethnic groups depending on their crime involvement.  While 
it welcomes the belief that racial/ethnic groups do behave differently, police behavior, 
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due to racial differences in offending patterns, may be legitimate and cannot be ignored.  
Therefore, the economic perspective supports the unfortunate circumstances of statistical 
discrimination as outcome tests are a major technique used in this perspective (Engel, 
2008).  While there are problems with each of the preceding perspectives, which will be 
addressed later, this dissertation incorporated the criminological and economic 
perspectives.  The findings could subsequently lead toward determining or understanding 
organizational or individual motives that drive discriminatory practices by the police.   
     Prior research has indicated that minority population is an important variable to 
consider when social policies are implemented, social controls are mobilized, and 
neighborhood compositional changes are made (Liska et al., 1998; Sampson and 
Morenoff, 2006).  If the first police contact is considered a gateway to more serious 
encounters with the criminal justice system and with evidence that the more contact 
citizens have with police (traffic or non-traffic) the higher the likelihood that criminal 
careers will develop (Shannon, 1978), then it must be determined why or what social 
conditions of minority populations become a relevant factor in the higher likelihood of 
being stopped.   
     Using the minority group threat hypothesis as the explicitly stated theory, this research 
more specifically analyzes the relationship between minority population and the 
likelihood that minorities (particularly Blacks) experience pretextual stops at higher rates 
than Whites.  Additionally, this research examines how Black population size affects five 
traffic stop outcome ratios.  The outcomes are the Black-to-White ratio for 1) search 
rates; 2) outstanding warrant arrests; 3) drug arrests; 4) traffic violation arrests; and 5) 
traffic citations issued.  The question is to what extent Black drivers experience these 
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outcomes at higher rates than White drivers when the Black population increases relative 
to the White population from 1990 to 2000 across selected Missouri municipalities.  
     Although Hispanics have become a larger portion of the minority population in the 
United States, most of the racial profiling research compares White and Black drivers.  
Hispanics represented too small a proportion of the data being used in this study to permit 
any meaningful conclusions.  Likewise, those that fit in the category of other race were 
also too small to extricate valid results.  Therefore, this study also uses Black and White 
drivers as its central focus.  If minority population is correlated with the likelihood of 
experiencing a pretextual stop and the five outcomes, it does not necessarily reveal 
discrimination as a result of a perceived threat.  Paradoxically, the lack of a correlation 
does not prove the non-existence of discrimination.  In fact, given the many 
circumstances that may be operating, other factors are examined.  While this writing is 
not sufficient to address every issue, it does attempt to unfold some of the key problems 
that complicate racial profiling studies.   
   
 MISSOURI BACKGROUND 
     In the State of Missouri racial profiling continues to be a concern.  The various studies 
that have reported on this phenomenon conclude that Black motorists are considerably 
more likely than White motorists to be stopped by police (Hernandez and Knowles, 2004; 
Rojek et al., 2004).  Additionally, Blacks have an even greater chance than Whites of 
being subjected to searches after the stop.  More importantly, there have been consistent 
findings that show Blacks are less likely than Whites to possess contraband during the 
stop (Hernandez and Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004).   
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     Some criminal justice administrators have challenged the various techniques used to 
analyze racial profiling data in Missouri.  Nevertheless, there were some municipalities in 
the State that had significantly large traffic stop disparities between races (Hernandez and 
Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004).  Since police have been required to record each stop 
in Missouri, data indicate that Black motorists have been consistently at risk of being 
stopped and searched at higher rates than Whites (Koster, 2008).  Little is known about 
Black population increases and how they affect the outcomes of traffic stops.  Using the 
minority group threat hypothesis in the State of Missouri, the following hypotheses are 
explored.          
   
THE IMPORTANTCE OF EXAMINING PRETEXUAL STOPS 
      Recall the disputes concerning the denominator problem that continues to plague 
racial profiling studies.  Opponents argue that using the number of Black residents as the 
denominator is not appropriate when calculating stop rates.  Studies should focus on the 
actual driving population (Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Engel et al., 2006).  
Also recall that some have learned that a better examination of racial profiling is through 
inspection of stop dispositions (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Ridgeway, 2006; Persico and 
Todd, 2008; Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming).  In other words, a closer look at the 
circumstances behind officers issuing warnings and citations, arresting motorists, 
conducting vehicle searches, and perhaps using force might allow for a better explanation 
regarding the existence of racial profiling.  Because extralegal and legal factors that 
contribute to an officer‟s decisions after the stop can be statistically controlled, 
researchers can be more confident in interpreting the results as an explanation of racial 
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profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006).   To that extent, much of what occurs after a stop 
might depend on why the initial stop was made.  Therefore, the pretextual stop could play 
an important role in the citizen/officer post-stop encounter.  However, this study must 
avoid the denominator issue that becomes problematic in many racial profiling studies.  
While studies argue whether the proper benchmark to analyze over-representation of 
minority drivers should be the total residential population, driving age population within 
a location, or driving population based on spatial weighting procedures (Rojek et al., 
2004), this study attempts to eliminate that problem by using the actual number of stops 
recorded for a given racial group as the denominator.  This population represents a 
concrete number that can only be adjusted by reporting agencies wishing to amend 
previously reported data.  The numerator in this study will be pretextual stops, which 
include an aggregation of minor traffic violations, including faulty equipment, license 
violations, following too closely, failing to signal, and lane violations. At this point, the 
proportion of pretextual stops accounted for by a given group divided by that group‟s 
proportion of total stops in a given municipality will represent that group‟s over-
representation in pretextual stops.  A more comprehensive explanation of this method is 
presented in chapter 5. 
     In their comprehensive study of vehicle stops in San Diego, California, Cordiner et al. 
(2002) found that approximately 25% of all traffic stops in 2001 were pretextual stops 
made to investigate non-traffic violations such as drugs, gangs or crime suspicion.  
Officers report that they would observe a car suspected of non-traffic related activity and 
wait until the driver commits a traffic violation to develop probable cause to stop.  This 
technique is legal as long as officers are truthful that the stop did not take place until an 
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official traffic violation occurred (Harris, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Cordner et al., 2002).  
Some have argued that police routinely use the pretextual stop to detain minority drivers.  
In fact, the Supreme Court‟s decision in Whren v. United States sanctioned the practice of 
racial profiling according to Birzer and Birzer (2006).  This practice has created problems 
with researchers attempting to uncover racial bias in traffic stops because an officer‟s 
racial motives may be easily hidden behind the Whren decision.       
     There are formalized drug interdiction training seminars that teach officers the clues to 
look for when investigating drug carriers.  For starters, the type of vehicle driven is a key 
sign that draws an officer‟s attention.  For example, large SUV‟s, which can carry large 
quantities, and rental vehicles, which may hide identities, are hints that prompt officers to 
further investigate at minimum.  Luxury vehicles driven in poor neighborhoods may also 
tip police (Engel and Johnson, 2006).  While on the surface these clues appear race 
neutral, some suggest that one should be cautious not to underestimate the role race may 
play in these so-called leads.  Social psychologists have studied consumer behavior and 
have found that Blacks are more likely to purchase large SUV‟s and luxury cars no 
matter where they may reside.  Blacks are also more likely, because of economic reasons, 
to rent vehicles while traveling (Engel and Johnson, 2008).  Thus, race does have serious 
implications when officers are using these clues to decide which vehicles appear 
suspicious to stop.  With that in mind, it is more probable that a police officer will act on 
the aforementioned clues in locations where there is a perceived need to make such stops.  
The minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that White residents will feel it is 
necessary for police to scrutinize Black citizens more often when Black populations 
increase relative to White populations.  Larger Black populations are perceived 
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threatening to the quality of life for the community and create fear (Blalock, 1967).  As a 
result, this study examined the impact of this perceived threat, indexed by the relative 
size of the local Black population, on police actions toward Black motorists.   
 
Research Question 1: Pretexual Stop 
     Research question 1 examines the minority group threat hypothesis by inspecting the 
relationship between Black population increases relative to White population increases 
over time and the likelihood that Black motorists will experience pretextual stops at 
disproportionately higher rates than White motorists.  In other words, as the gap between 
the population percentages of Black-to-White residents narrows, Whites will feel fearful 
and threatened by the relative Black population increases to the extent that White 
residents will pressure police to control this perceived threat.  Thus, the likelihood that 
Black motorists will experience pretextual stops at rates higher than White motorists will 
significantly increase in municipalities where Black-to-White populations increased from 
year 1990 to 2000. 
     Recall in chapter 2 that punishment power is the source of power this dissertation 
focuses on.  For punishment power to work as Blalock (1967) explained, White residents 
must have the ability and resources to mobilize the police to address the perceived threat.  
Therefore, it was important to consider the relative size of the Black population before 
and after the populations increased over time.  For instance, in cities where Blacks 
already made up a large portion of the population in 1990, the perceived threat of a rising 
Black population may not have elevated to a level of concern for White residents to 
pressure the police to monitor Blacks.  Studies show that as Black populations reach 
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certain levels, White flight becomes more prevalent (Walker et al., 2004).  When White 
residents begin to leave neighborhoods, as the community accountability hypothesis 
would suggest, larger Black populations create the ability for more elected Black 
representation in city government, including law enforcement (Smith and Holmes, 2003).  
In fact, it is only in the absence of influential minorities in the community and police 
organizations that White residents have the ability to dictate police action toward 
minorities.  Moreover, White officers will not be sensitive to minority issues and are, 
therefore, not held accountable for their actions against minority citizens in the absence 
of minority representation (Smith and Holmes, 2003; see Appendix A for a more detailed 
discussion of the community accountability hypothesis).  That said, relative increases in 
the Black population from 1990 to 2000 (referred in the hypotheses as growth) in selected 
Missouri municipalities should increase Black-to-White pretextual stops (pretextual stop 
ratio), and the effect of relative Black population growth on pretextual stops of Black 
motorists should weaken once the relative Black population, as recorded for year 2000 
(current population), reaches a critical threshold.  Additionally, total municipal 
population sizes for year 2000 (referred to as total population) were controlled because 
police activity and the extent that Whites feel threatened by an increasing or large 
minority population vary with size of the location (Jackson, 1989; Rojek et al., 2004).  
All subsequent hypotheses were conducted across selected Missouri municipalities.  
Hypothesis 1 explores the following:   
 
H1:  When the total population is controlled across the targeted Missouri municipalities, the following was  
         expected.  As the Black-to-White population percentage change from 1990 to 2000 (growth)  
         increases, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly increases in 2002, but this effect  
         diminishes as the Black-to-White population ratio for year 2000 (current population) increases. 
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     As earlier stated, finding such an association is important to understanding what 
occurs after a traffic stop, particularly during pretextual stops.  The following section 
examined the role searches played in arguably controversial traffic stops.   
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING SEARCH RATES 
     Generally, most of the criminological research shows that Blacks are subjected to 
vehicle searches at much higher rates than Whites. 
13
  The reasons behind these searches 
may vary from mandatory, when departmental policy dictates the search, to discretionary, 
when the officer‟s judgment prompts further investigation (Hernandez, 2004; Ridgeway, 
2006; Engel et al., 2008; Perisco and Todd, 2008).  As previously stated, what occurs 
after a stop is important to racial profiling studies.  In fact, search rate disparities are so 
high that it would be negligent to disregard further investigation of such dissimilarities.        
 
Research Question 2: Overall Searches 
     Similar to pretextual stops, the minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that 
growing Black populations might play an important role in search rate differences.  It 
may not be enough to simply stop more Black motorists when Black populations increase 
to a perceived threatening level.  Additionally, it is expected that pretextual stops might 
condition search rates.  Therefore the following hypothesis is explored.  Relative 
increases in the Black population should increase 2002 Black-to-White overall search 
ratios (overall searches), and the effect of Black population growth on overall searches 
should weaken once the Black population reaches a critical threshold.  However, if 
                                                 
13
 (Lamberth, 1996; Knowles et al., 2001; Langan et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Buerger and Farrell, 2002; 
Scmitt et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005; Steward and 
Totman, 2005) 
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relative Black population growth interacts with Black-to-White pretextual stops, the 
effect of growth on overall search rates may become stronger. 
 
H2:  When total population size is controlled, the following is expected.  As growth increases, the overall  
         search ratio significantly increases.  The effects of the growth on the overall search ratio diminishes  
         with increases in the relative size of the Black population in 2000, but the effects become stronger at  
         higher levels of the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for 2002.  
 
      While types of searches vary, it is the discretionary search that comes into question.  
Engel (2008) argues that not all discretionary searches have equal levels of an officer‟s 
discretion.  For instance, activities such as discovery of evidence in plain-view, canine 
alerts, the smell of drug odors, and other physical evidence that trigger low-discretion 
searches require less discretion than consent searches (Engel, 2008).  In fact, Rosenfeld et 
al. (forthcoming) acknowledge that racial bias is minimal under mandatory or low-
discretion searches, which makes it necessary to separate types of searches.    
 
Research Question 3: Discretionary Searches 
     If indeed there is little bias in low-discretion searches, as Rosenfeld et al. 
(forthcoming) suggest, then Black population increases should have little effect on the 
likelihood that Black motorists will undergo low-discretion searches at higher rates than 
White motorists.  In fact, given that many studies indicate that White motorists are found 
with contraband at higher rates than Blacks (Zingraff et al., 2000; Knowles et al., 2001; 
Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Rojek et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004), White motorist 
should be subjected to low-discretion searches at higher rates than Blacks.  However, 
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because discretion is involved, which potentially opens opportunities for discrimination 
(Johnson, 2003), Black population increases might even affect low-discretion searches 
and the effect may become greater at higher levels of pretextual stops of Blacks 
compared to Whites.  In other words, keeping with the minority group threat hypothesis, 
the following is expected: 
   
H3:   When total municipal size is controlled, the following is expected.  As relative Black population 
         growth increases, the Black-to-White low-discretionary search ratio for year 2002 (LD search)  
         significantly increases.  The effects of growth on LD search ratio diminishes at higher levels of the  
         2000 Black-to-White population ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the 2002  
         Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio. 
 
     Researchers explain that the discretionary search is a more accurate assessment of 
racial profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Persico and Todd, 2008).  Some discretionary 
searches require less discretion than consent searches (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming), 
which may explain Steward and Totman‟s (2005) contention that consent searches are 
based on non-legal factors and appear to contribute considerably to the search disparities.        
 
Research Question 4: Consent Searches 
     The data in this study does not readily make available the outcomes of consent 
searches.  Absent any reasonable suspicion or probable cause after an officer makes a 
pretextual stop, a driver must give permission for police to legally conduct a vehicle 
search.  While some studies show that Blacks are only slightly less likely than Whites to 
give consent to search (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Novak, 2004; Durose et al., 2005), 
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under some circumstances White motorists are significantly more likely to consent to 
searches (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Engel, 2006).  Obviously, something motivates an 
officer to request authorization to search.  If officers claim that generally minorities are 
stopped for minor traffic violations more often because they engage in infractions at 
higher rates than Whites, then the motives behind an officer‟s request to search should be 
similar to search requests of motorists stopped for major traffic violations such as 
speeding.  In the event that pretextual stops are highly correlated to Black population 
increases, an argument can be made that extra-legal factors, particularly race, indirectly 
drive officer discretion toward consent search requests.  In fact, Steward and Totman 
(2005) argue that when search rates for minorities are high, the consent search, which 
cannot be explained by outside factors such as probable cause or outstanding warrants, is 
evident.   
     Although the data in this study cannot determine if consent was solicited by the officer 
or volunteered by the driver, it does show if a permitted search was executed.  While it 
may be accurate in some studies that Black motorists refuse to consent to a search at 
higher rates than Whites (Smith and Petrocelli, 2001; Engel, 2006), this study supposes 
that most drivers, regardless of race, will grant the search upon request.  Drivers believe 
that cooperation with police could be a major factor that determines the traffic stop 
outcome, or they simply are not aware that they have the right to refuse a search request 
(Steward and Totman, 2005).  To that extent, if there are disparities in officers requesting 
a search, the actual consent search index should expose such differences.   
     As stated earlier, officers are trained to observe clues that indicate when a person 
warrants further scrutiny.  Inconsistencies between the driver‟s clothing and the type of 
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vehicle driven, socioeconomic status and jewelry worn, and any occupant‟s past drug 
record could be clues that the vehicle stop might yield a successful drug hit and 
subsequent arrest (Engel and Johnson, 2006).  Other non-verbal clues might be the 
driver‟s nervousness, excessive smiling, vibrant hand gestures, eye contact avoidance, 
profuse sweating, and speech disruptions (Engel and Johnson, 2006).  It is argued that 
these interpersonal cues are sometimes inaccurately interpreted by officers as deception.  
There is further argument that these cues are not necessarily race-neutral, which Engel 
(2008) describes as the subgroup validity problem.  Engel explains that the utilization of 
the outcome test, when studying search rates across racial/ethnic groups, assumes that all 
drivers behave similarly, which would flaw many studies because some activities are 
more prevalent in some groups than in others.  For instance, social psychology and cross-
cultural communication research suggests that Black motorists are more likely to exhibit 
the previously described normal non-verbal behaviors more often than White motorists 
during a traffic stop.  Furthermore, racial/ethnic differences in the style of dress, patterns 
of residency, vehicle ownership, and types of vehicles purchased are social realities that 
researchers need to be aware of (Engel and Johnson, 2006).  While Engel (2008) argues 
that the subgroup validity problem makes research on group differences in searches 
useless without controlling for these behaviors, some of this conduct, such as hand 
gestures and profuse sweating, might be difficult to control for.  Perisico and Todd (2008) 
counter Engel by saying that drivers adjust their behaviors, having knowledge that these 
are the types of clues officers look for.  Either way, something triggers an officer‟s 
intuition to request a search.  If indeed officers are misinterpreting this behavior as 
deception, then this study suspects that threat becomes heightened with growth in the 
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Black population, which will increase an officer‟s desire to request a consensual search.  
Again, there could be stronger effects if growth interacts with pretextual stops.   The 
following hypothesis is explored.   
 
 H4:  When total population is controlled, the following is expected.  As Black population growth  
          increases, the Black-to-White consent search ratio for year 2002 (consent search) significantly  
          increases.  The effects of growth on consent search ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000  
          Black-to-White population ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the Black-to-  
          White pretextual stop ratio for 2002. 
 
      Even though the discretionary search might be a more useful tool to detect racial 
profiling (Engel and Johnson, 2006; Persico and Todd, 2008), to discard a comprehensive 
analysis on mandatory searches potentially eliminates the possibility that mandatory 
searches could be based on race.  It is plausible that when police perceive a threat, arrest 
chances increase which incite mandatory searches.   
      
Research Question 5: Mandatory Searches 
     Without additional information regarding the stop, this study assumes that a 
mandatory search accompanies an arrest although some searches might have triggered the 
arrest.  Thus, it is difficult to determine when officers truly use discretion to search 
(Ridgeway, 2006).  However, mandatory searches, which include inventory searches and 
searches incident to an arrest should eliminate much of the discretion that officers use in 
other searches.  This study expects to find that Black population increases still have an 
effect on mandatory searches although not as large as what would be found with consent 
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and low-discretion searches.  The effects on mandatory searches may increase with 
interactions between relative Black population growth and Black-to-White pretextual 
stops.  Hypothesis 5 explores the following:  
 
H5:   When total population is controlled, the following is expected.  As growth increases, the Black-to- 
         White mandatory search ratio for year 2002 (mandatory search) significantly increases.  The effects  
         of growth on mandatory search diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population  
         ratio, but the effects become stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop  
         ratio. 
 
     With evidence that Black motorists are arrested at higher rates than White motorists 
after traffic stops (Crawford, 2000; Engel, 2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Smith et 
al., 2006) it will not be surprising that Black population increases will significantly affect 
mandatory search ratios.  The question now becomes whether or not there are justifiable 
reasons to arrest Black motorist at such higher rates.      
 
IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING OUTSTANDING WARRANT ARRESTS 
     As mentioned previously, most criminological studies show that Blacks are more 
likely than Whites to be arrested as a result of a traffic stop (Crawford, 2000; Engel, 
2003; Rojek et al., 2004; Engel, 2006; Smith et al., 2006).  Recall that officers are aware 
that police efficiency is measured by number of arrests (Fisk, 1974; Walsh, 1986; Gaines 
and Miller, 2006).  Officers are also aware that Black motorists are more likely than 
White motorists to be wanted on warrants (Langan et al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005).  
When recording traffic stop data, officers are provided the opportunity to indicate 
whether or not a given driver had outstanding warrants.  Given the scrutiny an officer 
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might encounter with superiors, it is doubtful that when officers submit racial profiling 
forms they will check the outstanding warrant box without making an arrest.   
 
Research Question 6: Outstanding Warrant Arrests 
     In the event that Black-to-White population increases create fear, as the minority 
group threat hypothesis suggests, officers might be more likely to arrest Black motorists 
at higher rates than White motorists when outstanding warrants are discovered.  Although 
officers are likely to make an arrest when outstanding warrants are determined 
(Hernandez and Knowles, 2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005), it was difficult 
for this study to measure when officers decided not to arrest for outstanding warrants 
because the data did not separate each stop.  Thus, this dissertation assumes, perhaps 
wrongly, that an arrest accompanies any reported outstanding warrant.   
     While a strong and positive correlation between the Black-to-White population 
increase and the Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrest ratio would support minority 
group threat, this study acknowledges that the relationship might have more to do with 
legal factors.  Because Blacks are more likely than Whites to be wanted (Langan et al., 
2001; Durose et al., 2005), it makes sense that Blacks will be more likely than Whites 
arrested on warrants.  While Black motorists are responsible for making sure they are not 
wanted, which weakens debates on officer discrimination, an argument can be made that 
officers consciously target Black motorists for the purpose to make an easy arrest.  This 
study suspects that the pretextual stop also plays an important role with regard to Black 
population increases and warrant arrests.   
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     There are ways in which officers might target individuals who appear less financially 
stable to pay traffic fines.  The condition of the vehicle and other license registration 
violations might be the major indicators that trigger an officer‟s suspicion that a 
potentially wanted person is occupying a given vehicle.  While the current United States 
economic structure would suggest that Blacks will be more likely than Whites to be 
unable to pay traffic fines, Black motorists will be also more often wanted on warrants 
when officers make random stops.  A case can be made that White motorists in lower 
class areas may be just as likely to drive vehicles with defects and are, therefore, just as 
unable to pay traffic fines that result in outstanding warrants.  The potential for police to 
target lower class citizens in lower class neighborhoods might be similar for Whites and 
Blacks.  On the other hand, economic inequality is so pronounced (Walker et al., 2004) 
even low income White motorists may still have the ability to pay traffic fines at higher 
rates than Black motorists.  In fact, White motorists might be more willing to pay fines.  
Because the tendency is higher for Blacks to distrust the criminal justice system (Walker 
et al., 2004), Blacks are less likely to show deference to authority (Klinger, 1996; Walker 
et al., 2004) which may include rebellion to the extent that Blacks refuse to pay traffic 
fines.   
     While some argue that the pretextual stop exhibits good police work, as wanted 
individuals are being taken off the street (Walsh, 1986), others may argue that this 
practice is still racially driven.  Interestingly, there is research on officer use of mobile 
data terminals that reveals that minorities are queried by police at higher rates than 
Whites (Meehan and Ponder, 2002).  These data imply that while police are in the 
privacy of patrol vehicles equipped with computers, without any provocation, they 
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randomly run record checks on license plates of vehicles driven by Blacks and Hispanics.  
As a result, the computers display expired license plates, improper registrations, and 
wanted persons, which seemingly give police probable cause to make a pretextual traffic 
stop.   
     This study contends that the pretexual stop interacts with Black population increases 
to the extent that Black drivers will have a higher likelihood than White drivers of being 
arrested on outstanding warrants.  Consistent with minority group threat, when Black 
populations present a perceived threat, officers might consciously make questionable 
stops confident that the potential results will justify and mitigate allegations of racial 
discrimination.  Therefore, the following hypothesis represents how Black population 
increases relative to White population increases might intersect with pretextual stops to 
the extent that Black motorists are more likely than White motorists arrested on 
outstanding warrants.  
 
H6:   When total population is controlled, the following is expected.  As Black population growth  
          increases, the Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 (warrant ratio)  
          significantly increases.  The effects of growth on warrant ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000  
          population ratio, but become stronger at higher levels of the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio. 
      
     While officers will likely arrest an individual for outstanding warrants, officers will 
also likely arrest individuals found in possession of contraband (Hernandez and Knowles, 
2004; Rojek et al., 2004; Durose et al., 2005).  If officers perceive Black motorists as the 
common drug carrier, officers may feel justified making questionable stops to further 
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investigate for drug violations when Black populations perceptually reach threatening 
levels. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING DRUG ARRESTS  
     According to Perisico and Todd (2008) officers are aware of who might more likely 
possess contraband.  However, the research is mixed on who is actually more likely 
found with drugs as a result of traffic stop vehicle searches.  Most studies, as previously 
explained, acknowledge that officers are less likely to find unlawful substances on 
Blacks.
14
  A report that analyzed the Maryland State Police found that close to two-thirds 
of all drivers searched were not carrying any illegal drugs.  In fact, Black drivers who had 
no drugs were far more likely to be stopped and searched than drug-free White drivers.  
Also, as stated earlier, while few in number, substantial quantities of illegal drugs were 
found on Black drivers (Gross and Barnes, 2002).  So if an officer‟s objective in 
discretionary searches is to detect the transport of drugs (potentially large amounts), 
according to Hernandez (2004), at least in Missouri, a large share of the excess burden 
that Blacks face seems to be unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives.  In other 
words, innocent Black motorists are being penalized for actions of a few law violators.   
     Engel and Johnson (2006) say that there is very little known about the reasons why 
there are such disparate patterns in police behavior when it comes to treatment of Blacks 
and Whites in search and seizure rates.  Much of the research speculates that the 
                                                 
14
 (Zingraff et al., 2000; Knowles et al., 2001; Buerger, 2002; Engel et al., 2002; Gross and Barnes, 2002; 
Geiger and Phillips, 2003; Institute on Race and Poverty, 2003; Engel and Calnon, 2004;  Steward and 
Totman, 2005; Engel and Johnson, 2006;  Smith et al., 2006) 
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disparities are due to racism and biases potentially ingrained in the police subculture 
(Engel and Johnson, 2006).  However, this supposition has been deluged with challenges.   
 
Research Question 7: Drug Arrests 
     If it is more probable that officers believe Black motorists are more likely to carry or 
possess larger quantities of drugs, and if these assessments are accurate, there should be a 
strong association between Black population increases and arrests for possessing large 
quantities of drugs.  Since racial profiling forms do not indicate the amount of drugs 
found, possession can only be measured by the dichotomous yes or no indicator on the 
forms.  Again, this study assumes that when contraband is recorded in the data used for 
this research, an arrest is presumed to have occurred.  Similar to outstanding warrants but 
to a greater degree, drivers make their own conscious decision to possess drugs.  Unless 
officers plant evidence, complaints against officers for unreasonable drug arrests should 
be limited.  Research question 7 addresses the relationship between Black populations 
and arrests for contraband, particularly drugs.  A weak association between relative Black 
population percentage increases and arrests for possession of drugs might indeed cause 
some to be suspicious of stops and searches of Black drivers, particularly if Blacks are 
less likely to possess contraband.  Although self report surveys indicate differently, there 
remains a public perception that Blacks are more likely to use drugs (Walker et al., 2004).  
Therefore, this dissertation asserts that Black population growth will increase the 
likelihood that Black motorists will be arrested for drugs at higher rates than White 
motorists.  To the degree that pretextual stops are conducted to detect other violations, 
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officers might be more likely to search Black drivers and find contraband, which leads to 
more drug arrests.  The following hypothesis is presented: 
 
H7:  When total population is controlled, as relative Black population growth increases, the Black-to-White  
         drug arrest ratio for year 2002 (drug ratio) significantly increases.  The effects of growth on drug ratio  
         diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population ratio, but become stronger at  
         higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio. 
 
     So far arguments can be made that police motives to utilize the pretextual stop could 
be based on factors that involve legitimate law enforcement concerns, potentially Black 
population growth, or a combination of both.  There is still difficultly drawing concrete 
conclusions about unequal treatment of minority drivers.  Yet, there are other options that 
might develop a clearer picture of what occurs after the stop which could facilitate 
conclusions that race is indeed a large factor behind police profiling. 
 
IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING TRAFFIC VIOLATION ARRESTS 
     An arrest for the actual traffic violation can be a questionable practice.  After an 
officer makes a traffic stop, it is rare that the driver will be arrested for that offense.  In 
1981, the United States Supreme Court ruled that police officers are allowed to search the 
passenger compartment of vehicles when the occupant has been lawfully arrested (Justia, 
1981).  This gave officers the incentive to arrest for the traffic violation and make further 
searches in cases when consent was refused or other probable cause was absent.  
Additionally, because officers and Black motorists are suspicious of each other before an 
encounter (Rosenfeld et al., forthcoming; Weitzer, 1999), altercations between police and 
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Black motorists may lead to traffic violation arrests.  While Black citizens perceive police 
to be more disrespectful than what White citizens perceive (Walker et al., 2004; Durose 
et al., 2005), this implies that police potentially antagonize Black drivers in ways that 
leads to a reluctance to cooperate during the stop.  On the other hand, as Mastrofski et al. 
notes, police are actually more likely to be disrespectful toward White subjects, but only 
when disrespect is initiated by that person (2002).  Furthermore, officers have found 
ways to broaden the scope of their searches beyond the passenger compartment.  Once an 
arrest is made, it was common practice for police to search a vehicle incident to the arrest 
(Ginsburg, 1968; Justia, 1981).  By departmental policy in many cases, officers are 
generally required to conduct a more thorough inventory search of all contents within the 
vehicle to protect the owner‟s property (Reamey, 1983).  Anything illegal found during 
this lawful search can be used as evidence against the driver.  Particularly during 
pretextual stops, when officers are likely looking for other criminal activity, the custom 
of arresting a driver for a minor traffic violation could be great tool for drug interdiction.   
 
Research Question 8: Traffic Violation Arrests 
     The question becomes what patterns are found when officer suspicion becomes more 
intense when the threat of an increasing Black population is more widespread.  Therefore, 
research question 8 pertains to the likelihood that Blacks more than Whites will be 
arrested for traffic violations when the relative Black population increases over time.  
Again, this study expects to find that relative Black population increases become less 
threatening based on the size of the Black population which will affect traffic violation 
arrest ratios; as follows: 
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H8:  When total population is controlled, the following is expected.  As relative Black population growth  
         increases, the Black-to-White traffic violation arrest ratio for year 2002 (TVA ratio) significantly   
         increases.  The effects of growth on TVA ratio diminishes at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White  
         population ratio, but become stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop 
         ratio. 
 
     The arguments in this research concern how Black population growth influences 
pretextual stops which, in turn, influence traffic stop outcomes.  The implications are that 
pretextual stops are seemingly unjustified or questionable.  To avoid blatant allegations 
of discrimination, there are unwritten practices that warrant further exploration.    
 
IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING CITATIONS ISSUED DURING TRAFFIC STOPS 
     Recall that the research is mixed about Black drivers being more likely than White 
drivers to receive traffic citations (Engel, 2006; Engel and Calnon, 2004; Mosher et al., 
2008; Ridgeway, 2006).  In fact, an officer‟s decision to issue a traffic citation might 
depend on neighborhood characteristics, situational factors, and individual characteristics 
(Ingram, 2007; Mosher et al., 2008).  Anecdotally speaking, this study argues that some 
officers have been taught that after making a lawful arrest after a questionable 
(pretextual) traffic stop, it is prudent that the officer issue a citation for the original stop 
violation.  While this practice is not mandatory, it may prevent defendants from 
attempting to argue that failure to issue a citation questions the validity of the stop 
(Minnesota Court of Appeals, 2004).  A written policy that requires officers to issue 
tickets for the original stop undermines an officer‟s use of discretion that is a corner stone 
to police operations.  That said, officers might be less likely to fuel the fire and issue 
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traffic citations when questionable stops do not result in arrests.  Unfortunately, there is 
very little, if any, scholarly literature that addresses the phenomenon of officers being 
required or trained to issue citations for the original stop when arresting a subject on a 
separate charge.   
 
Research Question 9: Citations  
     While the minority group threat hypothesis would suggest that Black drivers will be 
more likely to receive traffic citations when the relative Black population increases, this 
study contends that an opposite effect will occur when pretextual stops and arrests are 
considered.  It also expects to find that as the Black-to-White population increases over 
time, Black drivers will be more likely than White drivers to receive traffic citations, but 
only to a point when 2000 Black-to-White populations reach a certain level.  
Additionally, as Black-to-White pretextual stops increase and the likelihood that Blacks 
will be arrested at higher rates than Whites decreases, the effects of Black population 
growth will diminish.        
 
H9:  When total population is controlled, the following is expected.  As relative Black population growth  
         increases, the Black-to-White traffic citation ratio for year 2002 (citation ratio) significantly increases.   
        The effects of growth on the citation ratio diminishes at higher levels of 2000 Black-to-White  
         population ratio and when higher levels of Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio interacts with lower  
         levels of Black-to-White arrest ratio. 
 
     This dissertation has proposed various relationships that might present patterns that 
deserve further examination.  Pretextual stops have been an important variable to this 
  
61 
 
point and might be alarmingly associated with traffic stop outcomes when relative Black 
populations are taken into consideration.  One must be cautious not to overstate the 
effects of minority populations on the likelihood to be stopped pretextually and traffic 
stop outcomes.  As stated earlier, the presence or absence of a significant correlation does 
not necessarily indicate discrimination or non-discrimination.  While there could be a 
correlation between populations and traffic stop outcomes, there might be other 
legitimate legal factors, such as an association between violent crime rates and minority 
presence, which condition effects on traffic stops and outcomes.  In some cases, a 
relationship between these legal factors and the likelihood of being stopped or searched 
may allow police racial motives to become hidden.  Nevertheless, this study addresses 
this potential connection.  In other words, it could be discovered that Black population 
growth is only relevant in certain circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COUNFOUNDING ISSUES IN RACIAL PROFILING STUDIES 
 
OFFENDING PATTERNS MOTIVATE POLICE BEHAVIOR   
     To test the preceding hypotheses, alternative explanations that may account for Blacks 
being disproportionately stopped, searched, arrested, and/or cited are examined.  There 
are studies that explain violent behavior from cultural and social structural perspectives.  
The cultural perspectives generally explain that minorities who experience historical 
atrocities adopt alternative values that are conducive to violent behavior.  Structural 
explanations emphasize inequality in socioeconomic conditions that causes violent 
behavior and pushes various institutions to reproduce inequality toward minorities 
(Peterson and Krivo, 2005).  Regardless of the perspective, there are overwhelming 
reports that minorities, particularly Blacks and Hispanics, commit violent crime at much 
higher rates than Whites.  In fact, much of the criminological research finds that there is 
some correlation between minority population increases and violent crime rate increases 
(Neapolitan, 1992; Sloan, 1994; Hannon and Defronzo, 1998; Liska et al., 1998; Logan 
and Stults, 1999; Petrocelli et al., 2003; Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2005).  With violence 
being a major source of citizen fear, it appears logical that citizens might push for 
punitive police actions against minorities. 
     Law enforcement policies develop from the perception that proactive and aggressive 
police activity, which includes more traffic stops, could indirectly decrease overall crime 
rates (Sampson and Cohen, 1988; Smith and Holmes, 2003).  In this respect, there are 
studies that examine the correlation between crime rates and traffic stops (Weitzer, 1999; 
Petrocelli et al., 2003).   
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Research Question 10: Violent Crime 
     This dissertation attempts to put crime rates in a context that might explain the 
association between violence and pretextual stops along with traffic stop outcomes.  The 
study further attempts to disentangle violent crime rates with the percentage of the Black 
population‟s influence on traffic stop outcomes and the likelihood that Blacks experience 
pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites.  It is plausible that police officers will more 
likely attempt to jail individuals considered a threat to society.  Having knowledge that 
Blacks are more likely to commit violent crime, officers might feel it necessary to 
become more intrusive on traffic stops, conduct more searches, and arrest Black motorists 
at higher rates.  It is also likely that higher Black populations might drive police toward 
creating these outcomes.  Therefore it was necessary to control for violent crime rates in 
the models previously presented to address to what extent Black populations influence 
traffic stop outcomes.   
     While violent crime might have some direct or indirect role in an officer‟s motive to 
carry out a pretextual stop or further an investigation that will lead to other traffic stop 
outcomes, there are other non-legal factors that potentially drive pretextual stops and 
traffic stop results.          
 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE MOTIVATES POLICE BEHAVIOR 
      Having difficulty assessing individual officer motivations, some research began to 
focus on how citizens perceive being treated by the police.
15
  While most of these studies 
contend that Blacks have a more negative perception than Whites toward the police, a 
                                                 
15
 (Jacob, 1971; Peek et al., 1981; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Polivka, 1983; Welch, 1989; Murty et al., 
1990; Oramas, 1994; Frank et al., 1996; Priest and Carter, 1999; Henderson et al., 1997; Chandek, 1999; 
Son et al., 1998; Hurst et al., 2000; Brunson and Miller, 2006) 
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small group of studies claim that Blacks perceive police more positively than Whites 
(Frank et al., 1996; Hurst et al., 2000; Murty et al., 1990).  The later studies acknowledge 
that the positive perceptions Blacks have of police are partly due to the predominant 
Black representation in local police forces and governments.  In fact, the race of the 
police departments has a significant effect on citizen attitudes (Frank et al., 1996; Murty 
et al., 1990).  The question becomes, as stated earlier, whether citizen perceptions are true 
assessments of how minorities are treated differently than Whites.   
     Other studies claim that race is not the determining factor that shapes citizen 
perceptions of police.  While race remains important, age is found to be just as vital in 
some cases (Decker, 1981) and even stronger in others (Peek et al., 1981).  While there 
are many criminological studies that explain perceptions of the police from an individual 
perspective, macro-level studies have begun to make headway (Reisig and Parks, 2003; 
Sampson and Bartusch, 1998).  Macro-level studies explore police treatment as it relates 
to neighborhood characteristics, disadvantages, crime rates, suspect demeanor, and even 
social class.
16
  As a result, conclusions on police perceptions are confounded between 
individual factors (particularly race) and neighborhood contextual factors (Weitzer, 1999; 
2000).   
     Ronald Weitzer (1999, 2000) made an explicit attempt to unravel these perplexing 
issues by comparing race and neighborhood context from a qualitative perspective.  After 
finding that race was a significant predictor of how individuals felt they were treated by 
the police in Washington, D.C., Weitzer also found that social class position of 
neighborhoods also conditioned resident‟s attitudes toward police.  In other words, 
                                                 
16
 (Jacob, 1971; Decker, 1981; Dunham and Alpert ,1988; Davis, 1990; Alba et al., 1994; Cao et al., 1996; 
Klinger, 1996, 1997; Sampson and Bartuch, 1998; Logan and Stults, 1999; Wilson and Dunham, 2001, 
Mastrofski et al., 2002) 
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Blacks that lived in lower-class predominantly Black neighborhoods felt they were 
treated worse than how Whites in middle-class predominantly White neighborhoods felt 
they were treated.  On the other hand, Blacks who lived in middle-class predominantly 
Black neighborhoods felt they were treated about the same as how Whites felt they were 
treated in predominantly White middle-class neighborhoods.  In spite of those 
perceptions, Weitzer did discover that middle-class Blacks who encountered police 
outside their neighborhoods felt they were treated differently than how middle-class 
Whites felt they were treated when they traveled outside their own neighborhoods.  
Unfortunately, Weitzer was not able to locate a lower-class predominantly White 
neighborhood in Washington, D.C., to compare to the lower-class Black neighborhood.  
Therefore, his study was limited in completely extricating the perplexing issues between 
race and neighborhood context.  Weitzer expresses being able to corroborate his findings 
with other urban neighborhood studies which lends support to Wilson‟s (1978) argument 
that class inequality and not racial discrimination is a more decisive factor that structures 
the Black experiences with social institutions (Weitzer, 2000).  Acknowledging Wilson‟s 
contention, this study further examines how class inequality is imbedded in 
institutionalized racism and not the dichotomy as Wilson suggested.  In other words 
finding that minorities are stopped at higher rates than Whites might be functioning 
simultaneously with social class conditions and individual officer motives.          
     Part of Blalock‟s minority threat hypothesis explains that discrimination might stem 
from the need for economic elites to preserve their status over the less fortunate (1967).  
With that being said, socioeconomic status could affect police actions depending on the 
minority population size.  Assuming that police are subconsciously aware of assisting in 
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the preservation of the elite status that those with higher financial standing possess, the 
effects of relative Black population growth on traffic stop outcomes might be working 
through social structure such as median household income, unemployment and poverty 
rates, as well as municipal property values.  The models presented in this study and 
summarized earlier will control for each of the social variables to obtain a stronger 
assessment of the confounding issues that attempt to explain racial profiling. 
 
Median Household Income (MHI)   
     Median household income is important to control for because Blalock would argue 
that relative Black population increases might be functioning through relative MHI to the 
extent that rising Black incomes might reach levels that Blacks may afford to compete for 
what Blalock calls scarce resources that translate into power (1967).  Police might find 
reason to target Black motorists who appear financially threatening to the White 
establishment.  From this economic standpoint, Black population growth would affect 
police behavior only when Black incomes close the gap with White incomes.  However, 
income status may also be working in another direction. Some studies argue that social 
unrest may be prevalent in places where income inequality is high (Smith and Holmes, 
2003), which may lead to police targeting more Black drivers.  Regardless of the 
motivations that lead police toward focusing more on Black drivers, relative MHI needs 
to be controlled in each of the models presented in chapter 3.       
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Unemployment and Poverty 
     Rising poverty and unemployment rates generally have similar effects on other 
phenomena.  Crime rates increase, police are called and patrol more often, property 
values decrease and so on (Siegel, 2005; Walker et al., 2004).  It is plausible therefore, 
that police will look at citizens in these areas with more caution than in other areas.  It is 
also logical that vehicles in these areas will have more equipment violations as well due 
to the inability of drivers to afford appropriate repairs.  Indeed these conditions could 
lead to more pretextual stops and produce more arrests for outstanding warrants and 
drugs.  Additionally, the validity of equipment violation stops might increase the 
opportunity for negative police/citizen encounters, which might lead to more traffic 
violation arrests.     
     Sampson and Morenoff (2006) found that in Chicago poverty is generally 
concentrated and isolated within locations that are surrounded by predominantly White 
neighborhoods.  These neighborhoods are generally occupied by minorities and are 
riddled with high crime rates.  As Weitzer (1999, 2000) contends and this dissertation 
stated earlier, middle class Blacks who live in middle class neighborhoods feel they are 
treated differently once they leave their neighborhoods.  This perception could be a 
function of the population of minorities that live in neighborhoods that are concentrated 
with poverty and high violent crime rates.  Blacks who travel out of their middle class 
neighborhoods and enter surrounding neighborhoods within the municipality cannot be 
distinguished from residents in the lower class law violating neighborhoods and may be 
targeted by police (Terrill and Reisig, 2003).  Concentrated poverty might explain why 
minority drivers in municipalities with very small minority populations still experience 
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disproportionate stop and search rates.  Moreover, the condensed poverty could also 
explain why municipalities with low crime rates as a whole experience disproportionate 
minority stops and searches.  High violent crime rates in small minority neighborhoods 
may not be salient at the municipal level, but they might still present a perceived threat to 
the larger municipal population (Weitzer, 1999; Weitzer and Tuch, 1999; Weitzer, 2000).  
That said, unemployment and poverty are also controlled in the models to ascertain the 
effects of relative Black population growth on pretextual stops and other traffic stop 
outcomes.   
           
Property Values 
    A logical conclusion one could make is that property values are related to median 
household income and can also be factored into an officer‟s motivation to stop Black 
drivers.  Rojek et al. (2004) found municipalities in Missouri where Blacks were stopped 
at considerably higher rates than Whites.  Upon further examination, it happens that, 
according to the 2000 Missouri Census, these municipalities had very high property 
values and very small Black populations (United States Census, 2000).  It could be 
discovered that in areas where property values are relatively high, the elitist attitude is 
further exacerbated to the extent that citizens become fearful and are motivated to 
pressure police to protect property from perceived threats.  Furthermore, research reveals 
that as the Black population increases, property values decrease (Rent and Lord, 1978; 
Flippen, 2004).  Therefore, the mere presence of minorities might trigger old biases that 
represent such threats that may put minorities at risk of being stopped at much higher 
rates than Whites.  This condition assumes that police consciously or subconsciously stop 
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Blacks at higher rates to discourage them from traveling through or moving into an area.  
Similar to previous problems with racial profiling studies, it would be nearly impossible 
to prove officer motivations.  Nevertheless, finding a pattern that connects property 
values with the likelihood of Blacks stopped at higher rates than Whites should not be 
ignored.  
     When analyzing the 2000 census, there is no racial breakdown comparing property 
values.  Particularly, for the more affluent cities, the municipal rankings essentially 
mirror the overall median household income rankings.  In other words, the cities that 
have the highest property values also had the highest MHI‟s.  Although one may assume 
that Black drivers in these municipalities are more likely than Black drivers in less 
affluent cities to be able to pay fines and operate vehicles with proper equipment, it 
remains difficult to pinpoint the extent that Black residents contribute to high property 
values.  The proximity of small minority populations within cities with high property 
values may be threatening.  It is therefore also important to control for property values to 
make confident conclusions about the extent that relative Black population growth affects 
pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes. 
 
MAJOR HYPOTHESES 
     This study has pointed out some of the difficulties in precisely concluding that racial 
profiling is in full operation when there are significant disparities in traffic stop outcomes 
of Black and White motorists.  The confounding issues of violent crime and 
socioeconomic factors that might condition traffic stop results are addressed.  However, if 
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the minority group threat hypothesis is a major explanatory factor with respect to racial 
profiling, socioeconomic status and violent crime rates should be less relevant.   
 
Research Question 11: Confounding Factors 
     Research question 11 expects to find that when violent crime and the socioeconomic 
variables (which are MHI, Black-to-White poverty and unemployment, and municipal 
property values) are controlled along with the total municipal population size, Black-to-
White population ratio increases over time will significantly affect pretextual stops and 
traffic stop outcomes.   
 
H10:   When total population, and the social economic variables for census year 2000 (sociological  
            variables) along with violent crime are controlled, the following is expected.  As growth increases,  
            the pretextual stop ratio and traffic stop outcomes significantly increase.  The effects of growth on 
            pretext stop ratios and the traffic stop outcomes diminish at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to- 
            White population ratio.  Growth becomes stronger at higher levels of the 2002 Black-to-White  
            pretextual stop ratio in the other outcome models. 
. 
Research Question 12: Outcome Influences on Pretextual Stops 
     While this study used pretextual stops as a control variable in the traffic stop outcome 
models, other potentially relevant control variables were not included in the models that 
used pretextual stops as the dependent variable.  The argument is that the more likely 
Blacks experience pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites, the more likely Blacks 
will be at risk of being arrested for outstanding warrants, drugs, and traffic violations.  
This study has also made the argument that an officer‟s belief that Black motorists are 
more likely to be wanted or carry drugs might be the motivation behind the pretextual 
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stop.  Officers may also be prepared and potentially willing to arrest for a traffic 
violation, if the officer‟s authority is questioned by the driver.  Because causal time 
ordering affects the validity of this reasoning (Maxfield and Babbie, 1997), this study 
was reluctant to use the traffic stop outcomes as controls for pretextual stops.  The logic 
is that the outcomes cannot explain the stop before hand.  However, the difficulty in 
assessing officer motivations is already abstract to the extent that researchers may never 
provide accurate results without an officer‟s admission.  Therefore, this study defied logic 
by using the outcomes as controls to bring forth discussion about potential motivations 
that create the cycle that keeps racial profiling near the forefront of criminological 
literature.  Research question 12 addresses the following hypothesis.      
       
H11:   When total population and the social economic variables along with violent crime rate, warrant ratio, 
            drug ratio, and TVA ratio are controlled, the following is expected.  As growth increases, the  
            2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly increases.  The effect of growth diminishes  
            at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White population ratio.   
 
MINORITY THREAT, RACIAL PROFILING, AND GOVERNMENT TYPE 
     There are speculations that police practices may vary in small, medium, and large 
municipalities (Rojek et al., 2004).  With this being the case, this study previously added 
a control variable to account for population size.  It seemed necessary to address 
population size when examining minority threat.  Although Missouri does not classify 
municipalities by size but by the type of government rule (MML, 2004), the type of 
government rule has population implications.  Generally, larger populated municipalities 
are flexible in choosing the form of government leadership while smaller municipalities 
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are limited.  For instance, a municipality classified as a village can only use an elected 
board of trustees as the form of government rule.  Only five trustees are elected in cities 
with populations below 2,500.  If the population is larger, nine trustees may be elected.  
Municipalities with populations between 500 and 2,999 may choose a mayor/ board of 
aldermen or mayor/city administrator/aldermen form of government and are considered 
4
th
 class cities.  Cities where there are between 3,000 and 29,999 residents, are considered 
3
rd
 class cities, and the mayor/council or the mayor/city administrator/council/manager 
commission form of government may be used (Dohm, 1995; MML, 2004).  The 
legislative or special charter form of government has no population requirement and the 
form of government is set forth by individual legislative charter (Dohm, 1995; MML, 
2004).  The constitutional/home rule charter classification is based on populations of 
more than 5,000 and may use the form of government chosen by the people as approved 
in the charter (Dohm, 1995; MML, 2004).  Although there is overlap when looking at the 
required population sizes for each category, the type of government rule or municipal 
classification is based in part on the population size (Dohm, 1995, MML, 2004).   
     There are roughly 760 municipalities in the State of Missouri that use the 
mayor/council form of government, which includes villages with a chairman and a board 
of trustees (MML, 2004).  There are two types of the mayor/council form.  The weak 
mayor/council form of government has a mayor with very little appointive power because 
voters elect most administrative officials.  This leaves the mayor with very little authority 
over administrators who are responsible to their electorate (MML, 2004).  On the other 
hand, the strong mayor/council form of government enables the mayor to appoint 
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administrators who are usually later approved by the council.  The mayor and council 
may hold the officials accountable since they are not elected by the voters (MML, 2004).  
     There are 132 municipalities that use the mayor/city administrator/council form of 
government.  This form of government allows the mayor and council to delegate specific 
duties to a city administrator who is accountable to the mayor and council.  The city 
administrator is essentially responsible for appointing and discharging all other city 
officials, other than those elected (MML, 2004). 
     The council/manager form of government is used in thirty-six municipalities while 
two municipalities use the commission form of government (MML, 2004).  Under the 
council/manager form of government, the council is responsible for setting municipal 
policy.  The council will appoint a city manager to handle administrative matters for the 
city government.  The council may fire the city manager at will.  The mayor under this 
rule is simply a political figure who presides over council meetings but has no 
administrative authority or veto power (MML, 2004).  The council is, of course, made up 
of elected officials.  In some respects, municipal government should have similar checks 
and balances as our federal government to prevent hasty, unwise, and unjust actions by 
one government body and curb arbitrary and ill-advised acts of public officials (Durand, 
1900; Ryan, 1911).  That is, legislative and executive responsibilities should be clearly 
separated to prevent centralized power that may lead to corruption (Durand, 1900; Ryan, 
1911).                
     With evidence that local government corruption tends to operate in larger 
municipalities more often than smaller cities (Rahn and Thomas, 2005), this study 
examines the various forms of government operated in each targeted municipality in this 
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study.  Larger cities require more government officials including the police, and it 
becomes more difficult to monitor activities (Rahn and Thomas, 2005).  It could be that 
the type of government rule is associated with the inability to hold department heads 
accountable for improprieties committed by their subordinates as a whole.  As a result, 
police practices may include instances of racial profiling or, at minimum some form of 
improper police tactics.  A note should be made that some municipalities with relatively 
smaller populations may still have governmental classifications similar to larger 
municipalities.  In addition, there are economic characteristics that distinguish the types 
of government rule which could influence the outcomes in this study.  For instance, in 
large cities that operate under the constitutional charter/home rule government, property 
values are lower than property values in the legislative or special charter government 
structure.  White household incomes are relatively higher than Black incomes in class 3 
cities compared to what is found in cities that operate under the mayor/board of aldermen 
or mayor/city administrator/aldermen form of government. 
 
Research Question 13: Government Rule 
     To assess the effect on pretextual stops and traffic stop outcomes, the type of 
government rule was added as a control variable in the major hypotheses.  It is expected 
that traveling through cities that operate under the constitutional charter rule, which have 
larger populations, will significantly increase the disparities in the traffic outcomes. 
 
H12:  When the conditions in hypothesis 11 are met, the disparities between Black and White pretextual  
           stop ratios will increase when drivers travel through cities that operate under the constitutional/home   
           charter rule.   
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H13:  When the conditions in hypothesis 10 are met, the disparities between Black and White drivers will  
           increase on the outcomes when drivers travel through cities that operate under the  
           constitutional/home charter rule.   
 
     Without an officer‟s admission that the motivation to stop was indeed based in part on 
some combination of Black population increases and the desire to make an easy arrest, 
this study compared speed stops to pretextual stops.  There is considerably less 
controversy over the speed stops than the pretextual stops.  In fact, many Black drivers 
indicate that when they are stopped for speeding, they feel the stop is justified (Langan et 
al., 2001; Durose et al., 2005).  The implications are that the motivating factor for the 
stop is the actual traffic violation and officers are not necessarily looking for other 
criminal activity.  On the other hand, the pretextual stop allows for more officer 
discretion and potentially results in extra-legal factors driving an officer‟s decision to 
stop.  Because of the questionable nature of the pretextual stop, this study tested and 
compared speed and pretextual stops by substituting speed stop ratio with pretextual stop 
ratio.  The following hypothesis is expected.   
 
H14:  When the Black-to-White speed stop ratio replaces Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio in the  
           models presented in hypotheses 12 and 13, relative Black population growth will have no effect on  
           the relative speed stop ratio or the traffic stop outcome ratios.  Additionally, the relative speed stop  
           ratio will have no effect on the traffic stop outcome ratios. 
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THRESHHOLD POINT OF THREAT AND FEAR 
 
Research Question 14: When Does Black Population Matter?  
     As stated earlier, in many circumstances poverty is concentrated within areas 
surrounded by predominantly White neighborhoods.  These impoverished areas are 
generally occupied by minorities and are riddled with high crime rates especially but 
mostly, according to Sampson and Morenoff, once the minority population reaches more 
than seventy-five percent (2006).  Other studies claim that once the minority population 
reaches twenty to thirty percent, threat becomes a factor and more law enforcement 
intervention becomes mobilized (Liska et al., 1985; Taylor, 1998) regardless of the 
degree of racial segregation.  If Blalock‟s proposal is accurate, it is likely that Whites 
may equate large Black populations with high poverty and crime rates.  Relative Black 
population increases will exacerbate the fear and perceived threat Whites have.  Research 
question 14 asks at what percentage point does relative Black population growth creates 
fear that translates to pressure on authorities to control the perceived threat to the extent 
that it pushes police to initiate more contact with Black residents. 
     Concentrating on the relative Black population growth from 1990 to 2000 within a 
municipality, this study tested Liska et al‟s. (1998) twenty percentage point threshold.  
For instance, it is expected that once relative Black population growth in the targeted 
Missouri municipalities reach twenty percent or above, fear sets in.  Black motorists are 
then significantly more likely than White motorists to experience pretextual stops, and 
the traffic outcomes in 2002 than what Black motorists experience in cities where they 
make up less than twenty percent of the population (see hypothesis 12). 
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H15:   Black-to-White Pretextual Stop, Search, Outstanding Warrant Arrest, Drug Arrest, Traffic Violation Arrest  
           rates, and Citations Issued in municipalities in 2002 with 20% or more Black residents in 2000 will be  
           significantly higher than the Black-to-White outcomes in municipalities where Blacks make up less than 20% of  
           the population in 2000. 
 
     Additionally, this study conducted analyses with respect to other Black population 
percentage points to assess how the effects on the outcomes diminish or ascend at 
significant levels.  It also looked for a percentage point that triggered the likelihood that 
White motorists became over-represented in the outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 5  
DATA AND METHODS 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOP DATA 
     The traffic stop data in this study is the result of §590.650 of the Missouri Revised 
Statues, which mandates collection of traffic stop information.  The purpose is to monitor 
and assess the extent of racial profiling.  Over 86 percent of the 720 law enforcement 
agencies in Missouri reported traffic stop data to the Missouri Attorney General‟s office 
in 2002.  Of these agencies, 495 were municipal police departments.  To obtain a 
meaningful analysis, this dissertation presented data from municipalities with ninety or 
more Black residents in Missouri.  Similar to the study conducted by Rojek et al. (2004), 
this population threshold was used to insure reliability for the number of traffic 
encounters and the circumstances surrounding the stops that were recorded in 2002.  
Because other races constituted a very small percentage of the population and because 
prior research has focused mostly on Blacks and Whites (Rojek et al., 2004), only Blacks 
and Whites were examined in this study.  Using this criterion, one hundred and thirteen 
municipalities were included in this study.   
      
LIKELIHOOD OF EXPERIENCING PRETEXTUAL STOPS 
     To determine a valid stop rate or the degree to which members of a particular group 
were over or under-represented in stops by the police, Rojek et al. (2004) developed a 
disproportionality index (DI).  The DI was computed by dividing the proportion of stops 
accounted for by a given group by that group‟s proportion of the driving age population.  
Similar to the Rojek study, this research used a disproportionality index to examine 
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pretextual stops.  The proportion of pretextual stops accounted for by a given group 
divided by that group‟s proportion of total stops in a given municipality represented that 
group‟s pretextual stop DI index.  A disproportionality index value of 1 indicates no over 
or under-representation of a given group.  A DI value less than 1 indicates under-
representation, and a DI value greater than 1 indicates over-representation.  To the extent 
that one group has a higher DI rate than the other, the following method was used.  If the 
DI for Blacks was 1.21 and .95 for Whites in a given municipality, then Blacks were 27% 
(1.21/0.95 = 1.27) more likely than Whites to be stopped.  This method was used to 
calculate the pretextual stop DI for Blacks and Whites in each municipality.    
     Pretextual stops were derived from data on minor traffic violations recorded in the 
2002 racial profiling files.  These included stops for faulty equipment, license violations, 
following too closely, failing to signal, and lane violations.  The violations were 
aggregated for a total number of pretextual stops and separated by race.   
 
LIKELIHOOD OF BEING SEARCHED AND OTHER SEARCH FACTORS   
     To obtain a disproportionality index for searches, the proportion of a given racial 
group represented in searches was divided by that racial group‟s proportion of stops in 
each municipality.  The likelihood of Blacks being searched more than Whites was then 
assessed, as measured in the pretextual stop data, by dividing each Black search DI by the 
White search DI.  
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Discretionary Search Methods and Data 
     The data did not explicitly distinguish discretionary from mandatory searches.  If an 
officer indicated a search was conducted, he/she checked all boxes that applied.  The 
options included 1) consent; 2) inventory; 3) drug/alcohol odor; 4) incident to arrest; 5) 
plain view contraband; 6) drug dog alert; 7) reasonable suspicion-weapon [Terry Search]; 
and 8) probable cause/other searches.  While there is certainly overlap in the type of 
search an officer selects, for instance, officers may check the inventory box which is 
more likely a mandatory search and the drug/alcohol odor box which is more likely a 
discretionary search, attempts are still needed to separate types of searches.  This study 
uses drug/alcohol odor, plain view contraband, drug dog alert, reasonable suspicion, and 
probable cause/other variables to account for discretionary searches.  As officers are 
likely to decide to search individuals under these circumstances, it remains the officer‟s 
discretion.  These variables were aggregated to create one total discretionary search item.  
A DI was then created to determine the extent that Black motorists were searched under 
discretionary conditions at higher rates than White motorists.  This was accomplished by 
dividing the proportion of Black motorists that experienced a discretionary search by the 
proportion of Black motorists searched.  The Black discretionary search DI was then 
divided by the White discretionary search DI to obtain the Black-to-White discretionary 
search ratio.   
     It should be noted that, although the consent search could have been included as a 
discretionary search, the consent search provides implications in respect to driver 
cooperation.  Additionally, because the level of discretion used for consent searches is 
higher than other so called low-discretion searches, and because some research argue that 
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the consent search contributes considerably to racial disparities in searches, it seems 
imperative to separate it from other discretionary searches. 
   
Mandatory Search Methods and Data 
     Inventory and incident to arrest variables were aggregated to achieve one mandatory 
search category.  The methods used with discretionary searches to obtain the DI and 
Black-to-White mandatory search ratio were used for this search measure.      
 
Consent Search Methods and Data 
     The consent search is clearly distinguished as a category in the 2002 racial profiling 
data.  Once again a DI was created for Black and White motorists who reportedly 
consented to a search by taking the proportion of a given group‟s consent searches 
divided by that group‟s proportion of total stops.  The likelihood that Blacks will consent 
to a search at higher rates than Whites was then assessed by dividing the Black DI by the 
White DI.    
     This study acknowledges that perhaps the total proportion searched should have been 
used rather than the total proportion stopped as the denominator to determine the DI rates 
for the various types of searches.  However, this research uses the latter because, the 
pretextual stop is key to this study.  Using the proportion searched does not capture all 
drivers stopped and could potentially eliminate those stopped pretextually.  Unfortunately 
the data does not distinguish whether drivers stopped pretexutally are searched; therefore, 
it is best to use stops to capture all drivers at risk of encountering one of the types of 
searches, which possibly provides a better picture of differential treatment.  Nevertheless, 
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analyses that incorporated the proportion searched as the denominator is still examined 
and reported in chapter 7.         
 
Outcome Test for Contraband 
     To supplement the search data, this study used outcome tests to examine the success 
rate that police officers had in discovering contraband during the stop.  The 2002 racial 
profiling data provides a total number of times a traffic stop resulted in the discovery of 
contraband.  Contraband is described as drugs/alcohol paraphernalia, currency, weapon, 
stolen property, and other.  The number of searches that resulted in the discovery of 
contraband found in vehicles driven by Blacks was divided by the total number of Blacks 
searched and compared to contraband found in vehicles driven by Whites.  The quotient 
was then multiplied by 1,000 to simplify the interpretation of the results.    
 
LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ARRESTED 
     The racial profiling data presented a single variable that clearly referenced the total 
number of drivers arrested in each municipality.  The types of arrests included 
outstanding warrant, resisting arrest, property crime, offenses against a person, drug 
violation, traffic violation, DWI/BAC, and other.  To obtain the DI, the proportion of a 
given racial group‟s representation in the total number of arrests divided by that group‟s 
proportion of drivers stopped was computed.  The arrest DI for Black drivers was divided 
by the arrest DI for White drivers to obtain the likelihood that Blacks were 
disproportionately arrested after the traffic stop compared to Whites. 
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Data and Methods for Various Types of Arrests 
     This study proposed to focus on certain types of arrests.  To create a DI for Black 
motorists arrested for outstanding warrants, the proportion of Black drivers arrested on 
warrants was divided by the proportion of Black drivers represented in the total number 
stopped in each municipality.  After doing the same for White drivers, the Black arrest 
for outstanding warrant DI was divided by the White arrest for outstanding warrant DI.  It 
was then determined to what extent Black drivers are more or less likely than White 
drivers arrested for outstanding warrants.  The same analyses were conducted for drug 
and traffic violation arrests.  Again, it may have been prudent to use the total number 
arrested as the denominator rather than the total number stopped.  As stated earlier, this 
method could potentially eliminate those stopped pretextually.      
 
Outcome Test for Traffic Citations Issued 
     Similar to the outcome test method used for the previous variables, outcome tests were 
used for citations issued.  The proportion of Black drivers issued traffic citations was 
divided by the proportion of Black drivers stopped and compared to the proportion of 
White drivers that received citations divided by the proportion of White drivers stopped.  
The Black-to-White citation ratio was derived by dividing the Black citation DI by the 
White citation DI.    
 
CRIME RATE DATA  
     To assess violent crime rates, this research examines index crimes compiled in the 
Missouri Highway Patrol‟s (MSHP) 2002 Uniform Crime Report.  The Missouri 
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Highway Patrol develops crime rates by examining total crime per 1,000 residents.  Total 
crimes in the MSHP‟s 2002 index crime report include homicide, manslaughter, forcible 
rape, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, 
and arson.  Violent crime is separated from property crime to further examine any 
confounding relationships.  Homicide, manslaughter, forcible rape, attempted rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault are the violent crimes listed by the MSHP.  Burglary, 
larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson are listed as property crime.  Each total number of 
violent crimes reported in year 2002 for a particular municipality was divided by that 
city‟s total population.  That value was then multiplied by 1,000 to obtain the crime rate.  
This study uses only violent crime because it is more likely to raise citizen fear. 
 
POPULATION AND OTHER SOCIOLOGICAL DATA 
 
Population Data   
     This study uses Missouri Census data for years 1990 and 2000 to calculate the Black 
and the White residential populations in each of the targeted municipalities and uses year 
2000 Black-to-White population ratios to compare population sizes across municipalities.  
To obtain population ratios among Blacks and Whites in each municipality, the total 
percentage of the Black population in each city was be divided by the total percentage of 
the White population within each municipality.  For instance, in a municipality where 
there are 100 Black residents and 200 White residents, the Black-to-White population 
percentage ratio is 33 to 66 or .5.  See the example in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Example Calculating Black-to-White Population Percentage Ratio 
 
Black population percentage equals (100/300 = .33 X 100 = 33) 
White population percentage equals (200/300 = .66 X 100 = 66) 
Black-to-White population percentage equals (33/66 = .5) 
      
     The example indicates that for every White citizen, there are .5 Black citizens in a 
given municipality.  An increase in this value indicates that the Black population is 
closing the gap on the White population.   
     To obtain population ratio increases over time, the differences in the 1990 to 2000 
Black-to-White population ratios were divided by the 1990 Black-to-White population 
ratio to create the percentage change over time.  The change decreased if the 2000 Black-
to-White population ratio was smaller than the 1990 Black-to-White population ratio.  
Minority threat was measured by observing the Black-to-White population ratio 
percentage increase from 1990 to 2000 in each city and the 2000 Black-to-White 
population ratio across municipalities.  Black population increases alone were not used in 
this study because in locations where Blacks made up a very large portion of the 
population, Black population increases were useless in assessing White fear and 
perceived threat.  White population increases alone were not used because minority group 
threat specifies the increase in the minority population and not the majority.   
 
Sociological Data 
     Missouri Census data for year 2000 is used to analyze Black-to-White median 
household income, poverty level, and unemployment.  It was also used to examine 
municipal property values.  The total Black median household income was divided by the 
White median household income in each municipality to obtain a ratio.  Smaller ratios 
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represent wider gaps between Black and White incomes.  For poverty, the total number of 
Black residents that lived below the poverty level was divided by the total number of 
Black residents within a city to obtain a poverty rate.  This measurement was also 
conducted for White residents.  The Black poverty rate was then divided by the White 
poverty rate to obtain the Black-to-White poverty ratio.  The method used for poverty 
was duplicated for analyzing unemployment.  Increases in the poverty and unemployment 
ratios indicate that the proportion of Black residents living below the poverty level or 
unemployed is larger than the proportion of White residents living below the poverty 
level or unemployed.  To analyze differences in property values across municipalities, 
this study examined the average property value reported by the census for each 
municipality.   
 
Population Percentage Threat Threshold/Tipping Point 
     This study created a dummy variable for municipalities where Blacks made up twenty 
percent or more of the municipal population.  Regressing Black-to-White pretextual stop 
rates on one dummy variable is the same as performing a two sample t test (Hamilton, 
1998) for whether the mean Black-to-White pretextual stop rate is the same across 
municipalities where Blacks made up twenty percent or more of the population compared 
to municipalities in which they made up less than twenty percent of the population.  If the 
pretextual stop rate was significantly higher in places where Blacks made up twenty 
percent or more of the population, then an argument can be made that threat of the Black 
population becomes prevalent at this percentage point.  This process was conducted for 
various Black population percentage points to compare when significant differences in 
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pretextual stop, search, outstanding warrant arrest, drug arrest, traffic violation arrest 
rates, and traffic citation rates occurred.  
 
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
     To account for differences depending on the type of government structure in the 
targeted 113 municipalities, this study compared municipal classification type.  This 
research uses data from the Missouri Municipal League (MML), which records 
information about Missouri cities to promote welfare, interest, and closer relations among 
municipalities to improve municipal government and administration in the state (Dohm, 
1995).  In doing so, the MML keeps records on the exact type of government each 
municipality uses in its daily operations.  For purposes of this writing, each type of 
government rule was assigned a classification number.  Municipalities classified by the 
MML as constitutional charter/home rule governments were assigned as class 1 
municipalities.  Legislative or special charter government classified cities were assigned 
as class 2 cities.  Third and fourth class cities, as described by MML, were assigned class 
3 and class 4 categories respectively, and villages were assigned class 5 municipalities.    
     With the class 1 category considered the highest classification and the class 5 category 
being the lowest in terms of professional government structure and resources, the MML‟s 
classification system generally appears to show higher classified cities with larger 
populations than the other municipalities, although as previously mentioned, there is 
some overlap.  While the MML does not classify by size of population, this dissertation 
made the following distinctions between large, medium, and small municipalities.  
Municipalities with 40,000 or more residents were categorized as large cities, 10,000 to 
  
88 
 
39,999 were medium, and fewer than 10,000 were considered small.  There was variation 
in the city size and classification type which is illustrated in Table 5.2.     
 
Table 5.2. Missouri Municipal Classifications and Size    
                     
                       Class 1          Class 2       Class 3        Class 4        Class 5 
Small                   5                     1                 17                28                4 
Medium              16                    1                 15                12                0 
Large                   11                   0                  1                   2                0 
Total                    32                   2                 33                 42                4    N = 113 Municipalities 
 
     Having reason to believe that government classification influences Black-to-White 
pretextual stop rates and the other traffic stop outcomes, this study created five dummy 
variables from the municipal classification categories.  The dummies were named class 1, 
class 2, class 3, class 4 and class 5.  These categorical variables were added one at a time 
to the major regression equations to control for the type of government structure. 
   
Regression Analysis 
     Bivariate and multivariate regression was used to examine associations between the 
various legal, extra-legal, and sociological variables presented in each hypothesis.  The 
items were tested for multicollinearity.  Additionally, outliers were examined and 
equations were transformed with proper log methods to obtain better fits when needed.  
Few equations were skewed to the extent that they needed transformation; therefore, the 
original equations were used in the results.    
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CHAPTER 6  
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN TRAFFIC STOPS AND OUTCOMES   
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL PROFILING DATA FOR YEAR 2002  
     Before examining the stated hypotheses, this study provides a description of the major 
variables and compares overall rates in disparities in treatment between Black and White 
motorists in the 2002 Missouri racial profiling data.  Although this research was not 
overly concerned with total stops, the total stop data did provide a reference to other 
outcomes.  Table 6.1 indicates that the rate at which Black motorists were stopped was 
higher than the rate for White motorists in the targeted municipalities.  For every 1,000 
Blacks in the driving age population of the targeted municipalities, 385.8 Black motorists 
were stopped by the police in 2002.  The rate for Whites was 291.5.  On average Blacks 
made up only 17 percent while Whites comprised close to 77 percent of the driving age 
population amongst the 113 cities analyzed.  However, Blacks accounted for 22 percent 
of all stops while Whites accounted for 74 percent.  This indicates that Blacks are 
disproportionately overrepresented in traffic stops (.22/.17=1.29) and Whites are 
underrepresented (.74/.77=.96).  More importantly, Blacks are approximately 34 percent 
(1.29/.96=1.34) more likely than Whites to be stopped by the police in the targeted 
Missouri municipalities.   
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Table 6.1.  Municipal Stop Disproportionality Index (DI) for Blacks and Whites for Year 2002 and Stop  
                   Rates per 1,000 Driving Age Population (Proportions in Parentheses)      
                                    Driving Age  (prop)                Stopped  (prop)                   Stop Rate                 DI    
                                     Population 
                                        
Blacks                             361,265    (.17)                      139,374 (.22)                         385.8                 1.29 
Whites                           1,618,945  (.77)                      471,949  (.74)                         291.5                  .96 
Other                                125,538   (.06)                       25,711  (.04)                         204.8                   .66   
Total                              2,105,748 (1.00)                      637034 (1.00) 
N= 113 Municipalities                       Black-to-White Stop Disproportionality Index = 1.34 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data  
 
     Not surprisingly, the stop rates in this study are consistent with other racial profiling 
research.  The descriptive results on rates for pretextual stops, speed stops, and searches 
(see Table 6.2) are also consistent with much of the previous research.  After breaking 
down the other traffic stop outcome variables, which is also presented in Table 6.2, this 
study finds that the highest disparity between Black and White motorists is for 
outstanding warrant arrest rates.  For every 100 Black motorists stopped in the targeted 
cities, 5.51 were arrested for having an outstanding warrant.  Only 1.67 White motorists 
were arrested on this charge for every 100 White motorists stopped.  The Black rate was 
over 200 percent of the White rate.  The smallest disparity was found in the consent 
search rate although Black motorists were more likely than White motorists to consent to 
a search.  In fact, all the rates for Blacks were higher except for speeding.  See Table 6.2 
for these results.  It should be noted that each of the rates were derived by dividing by a 
given race‟s total number stopped.     
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Table 6.2.  Comparison of Black and White Pretextual Stop, Speed Stop, Search, Arrest and Citation Rates  
                   Per 100 Black and White Motorists Stopped in the Targeted Municipalities  
 Traffic Stop                                                            
   Outcome                                            Black Rate                          White Rate 
 
Pretextual Stop                                           45.38                                  31.66                
Speed Stop                                                 36.41                                  49.36                 
Search                                                        12.74                                   7.16                  
Discretionary Search                                    2.08                                   1.35                  
Mandatory Search                                        9.58                                   4.90                  
Consent Search                                             3.28                                   2.61                  
Arrests                                                        10.11                                   4.98               
Outstanding Warrant Arrests                       5.51                                    1.67               
Drug Arrests                                                  .86                                      .62                
Traffic Violation Arrests                             4.08                                    1.50                
Citations                                                      74.97                                  63.89 
N= 113 Municipalities            
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data 
 
     What this study finds to be interesting are the rate of arrests and the rate that drug 
contraband is found.  It is certainly plausible to believe that Black arrest rates are higher 
than White arrest rates mostly because Blacks have higher outstanding warrant arrest 
rates.  However, the question becomes the discrepancy between lower Black contraband 
hit rates (shown in Table 6.3) and higher Black drug arrest rates (previously shown in 
Table 6.2).  Figure 6.1 shows both Black and White types of arrests by percentage.   
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Figure 6.1.  Pie Chart Representing Percentages of Black and White Arrest Categories                         
                    White Drivers                                                                          Black Drivers 
 
N = 113 Municipalities 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data 
 
     While the Black drug arrest rate is certainly higher for Black drivers, a smaller 
percentage of Black arrests involve drugs compared to the percentage of White drug 
arrests.  After conducting outcome tests for contraband discovered, this research finds 
that the hit rate for White drivers is higher than the hit rate for Black drivers (see Table 
6.3).  Before assuming that White drivers are found with contraband but not necessarily 
arrested, recall that contraband discovered emanates from drugs/alcohol paraphernalia, 
currency, weapon, stolen property, and other.  Having knowledge that White motorists 
are more likely to be arrested on alcohol related charges (Novak, 2004; Rojek et al., 
2004; Walker et al., 2004), the force behind White contraband hit rates might stem from 
the drugs/alcohol paraphernalia variable.  This study divided drugs/alcohol paraphernalia 
by total searches to obtain a separate hit rate for each racial group.  Similar to the total 
overall contraband found, White drivers had higher hit rates than Blacks in the 
drugs/alcohol paraphernalia category.  In fact, Figure 1 indicates that the percentage of 
Whites arrested for DWI is much higher than the percentage of Blacks arrested for DWI.  
  27% warrant
  10% drugs
   1% resists
   1% person
  27% DWI
   1% property
  24% traffic
   9% other arrest
  42% warrant
   7% drugs
   1% resists
   1% person
   7% DWI
   1% property
  31% traffic
   9% other arrest
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Unfortunately, the data does not separate drug contraband from alcohol.  Therefore, this 
study attempts to disengage the two by further examining the types of searches.  By 
virtue of the various types of provisions that justify a search, drug dog alert is the only 
variable that exclusively isolates drugs from alcohol.  Also recall that the contraband hit 
rate was derived from contraband found divided by searches conducted for each racial 
category.  An outcome test was conducted to determine a hit rate for drug dog alert that 
potentially resulted in an arrest.  This rate was established by dividing drug dog alert 
accounted for by each race into the number of that race‟s drug arrests.  This research 
acknowledges that drug dog alert does not necessarily signify a drug arrest, given that 
officers have the discretion to arrest and there may be errors in detection.  However, such 
errors are normally due to the dog handler‟s misinterpretation of the dog‟s responses 
(Gordon, 2004).  In fact, many dogs are nearly perfect in detecting narcotics; moreover, 
the United States Supreme Court declares them highly reliable (Bird, 1996).  Coupled 
with the idea that officers are likely to arrest when drugs are found (Hernandez and 
Knowles, 2004; Durose et al., 2005), this study concludes that most dog alert searches 
result in an arrest.  That said, Table 6.3 also displays various outcome tests that pertain to 
contraband found and drug dog alert searches.  It shows that the drug dog alert hit rate is 
higher for White drivers.  In other words, of the population of White drivers arrested for 
drugs, they had a higher rate of undergoing a dog alert search than Black drivers arrested 
for drugs in conjunction with dog alert searches.  On the other hand, of the Black drivers 
stopped by the police, they experienced a higher rate of drug dog alert searches than 
White drivers stopped by the police.  Yet, Black drivers still had a higher rate of total 
drug arrests.  It appears that Black drivers are more often arrested for drugs under 
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circumstances other than canine dogs alerting the police.  One option could be that Black 
drivers arrested for outstanding warrants likely constitute mandatory searches which 
potentially reveal illegal substances and prompt officers to additionally check the drug 
arrest box on the racial profiling form.  The same could be true for Black drivers arrested 
for traffic violations.  The data does not provide individual information that shows 
specific circumstances surrounding each stop.     
 
Table 6.3.  Contraband Hit Rates, Drug/Alcohol Hit Rates, Drug Dog Alert Arrest Rate, and Drug Dog  
                   Alert Search Rate per 1,000 Black Drivers and 1,000 White Drivers 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                    Black                                 White 
Contraband Found                                                     149.2                                  175.7 
Drug/Alcohol Contraband Found                              107.6                                  154.1 
Drug Dog Alert Search Divided by Arrests              103.2                                  126.7 
Drug Dog Alert Search Divided by Stops                    .88                                       .79 
N = 113 Municipalities 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data 
 
     This study also constructed a descriptive table for the median disproportionality 
indices to determine to what extent Black motorists were more likely than Whites to be 
treated differently.  Once again, as Table 6.4 indicates, only in the speeding category 
were Blacks less likely than Whites to be stopped.  Not surprisingly, Black motorists 
were 204 percent more likely than White motorists arrested for an outstanding warrant.  
The only variable that indicates near parity between the races is the citation indices.  
Black motorists were actually overrepresented in all categories except consent searches, 
citations issued, and stops for speeding.  As the overall Black-to-White disproportionality 
index on searches showed that Blacks were more likely to be searched by police, there 
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was more disparity when it came to mandatory searches.  This incongruity could be a 
direct result of outstanding warrant and traffic violation arrests.    
 
Table 6.4.  Disproportionality Index for Black-to-White Pretextual Stop, Speed Stop, Search, Low-Discretionary  
                  Search, Mandatory Search, Consent Search, Arrests, Outstanding Warrant Arrest, Drug Arrest, Traffic  
                  Violation Arrest Rates, and Rate of Citations Issued  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                           Black  DI               White DI              B/W DI 
Pretextual Stop                                   1.34                             .91                   1.47       
Speed                                                     .37                           .49                      .76   
Search                                                 1.68                           .89                     1.89 
Discretionary Search                           1.77                          .85                     2.08   
Mandatory Search                               1.78                          .80                     2.23  
Consent Search                                      .32                          .21                     1.52  
Arrests                                                 1.71                           .82                    2.09 
Outstanding Warrant Arrests              2.13                             .7                    3.04 
Drug Arrests                                        1.51                           .88                    1.72 
Traffic Violation Arrests                     1.52                           .72                    2.11  
Citations                                                .99                           .97                    1.01    
N = 113 Municipalities 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data 
 
     The preceding descriptions provide an examination of stop disparities and 
circumstances that occurred after the stop.  One could conclude that the differences might 
be justified and not necessarily driven by an officer‟s biases.  However, some activity is 
still left un-explained.  We now turn to results related to the minority group threat 
hypothesis.     
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EXPLAINING STOPS THROUGH THEORY 
     The descriptive analyses informed that as a whole, Blacks were stopped, searched, and 
arrested at higher rates than Whites in the 113 targeted municipalities.  This is consistent 
with most research.  As previously indicated, an explicit theory should accompany 
explanations on traffic stops.  Thus, a simple regression equation (y=a+bx+e) using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to assess the minority group threat hypothesis as a 
possible explanation for Black overrepresentation in stops, searches, and other traffic stop 
outcomes in Missouri.  Using the 2002 Black-to-White stop rate as the dependent 
variable in a bivariate regression analysis, it is discovered that the minority group threat 
hypothesis cannot explain the likelihood that Blacks would be stopped at higher rates 
than Whites across municipalities in year 2002.  The study found that after examining the 
Black-to-White population percentage increase from 1990 to 2000, there is no significant 
relationship as Table 6.5 indicates.  The analysis also reveals that the Black-to-White 
population percentage ratio across municipalities is not significantly related to stop rates 
across municipalities.   
      
Table 6.5.  Bivariate Regression:  The Effect of Black-to-White Population Percentage Change from 1990 to 2000 (B/W Growth) and   
                  Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Increase Across Municipalities (B/W 2000) on the 2002 Black-to-White (B/W) Stop  
                  Index (N = 113)a 
                                                            
                                                                                          B/W Stop Index                                                    
                                                                               b                    Beta              R2           
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
B/W Growth                                      .002                  .157             .02 
                                                          (.001)                                                                           
 
 B/W 2000                                          -.081               -.171              .03                              
                                                           (.044)                                                                         
 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  1990 and 2000 Missouri Census Bureau 
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     The preceding regression models were used to set the foundation for this research‟s 
major hypotheses.  While there is no intent to ignore overall stop rates, this study is more 
concerned with pretextual stops which have become central when analyzing racial 
profiling data.   
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CHAPTER 7  
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MAJOR STOP VARIABLES AND OUTCOMES  
      
PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND MINORITY GROUP THREAT  
     There could be simple and justifiable reasons why Blacks are stopped more often than 
Whites.  This study compared Black and White motorists stopped for serious and non-
serious traffic violations.  Figure 7.1 shows the mean stop rate for Blacks and Whites 
stopped for serious traffic offenses (speed stops) and Blacks and Whites stopped for non-
serious traffic offenses (pretextual stops).  As indicated in the previous chapter, roughly 
49 percent of the White drivers stopped in the targeted Missouri cities were stopped for 
speeding while approximately 37 percent of Black drivers were stopped for this reason.  
However, 45 percent of Black and 32 percent of White drivers were stopped for faulty 
equipment, license violations, following too closely, failing to signal, or lane violations.  
This is consistent with most research that indicates that Black motorists are more likely 
than Whites to be detained as a result of a pretextual stop.  With evidence that the legality 
of the pretextual stop has been challenged in court but ruled constitutional, the question 
becomes whether or not an association can be drawn between these types of stops and the 
minority group threat hypothesis.  Police might use the pretextual stop as a legal disguise 
to hide race-based motives to stop minorities.  In fact, the pretextual stop might be an 
important variable that predicts differential treatment of minorities after the stop.        
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Figure 7.1. Mean White and Black Stop Rates for Speeding and Pretextual Stops  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
                     White Speed             Black Speed           White Pretext         Black Pretext 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data 
  
Simple Bivariate Regression Analyses: Black Populations and Traffic Stop Outcomes 
     Using bivariate regression (none shown), this study finds that there were generally no 
significant relationships between relative Black population growth and any of the 
dependent variables used as outcomes.  Relative Black population growth also has no 
significant effect on the confounding violent crime or socio-economic variables.  On the 
other hand, Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio is significantly and positively associated 
with Black-to-White outstanding warrant arrests, drug arrests, traffic violation arrests, 
municipal violent crime, and municipal property values.  While Black-to-White median 
household income is also significantly related to pretextual stops, a negative relationship 
is found.  However, it is premature to make reliable conclusions with the bivariate 
analyses.    
0
55
 white speed stop rate rate  black speed stop rate
 white pretext stop rate  black pretext stop rate
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Regressing Population Growth and Pretextual Stops  
     To answer research question 1, the following was discovered using multivariate 
regression.  Table 7.1 shows that when the total municipal population and the Black-to-
White population for year 2000 was controlled, the relative Black population growth 
from 1990 to 2000 across the targeted Missouri municipalities had no significant effect 
on the 2002 Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios in these cities.  However, the analysis 
did find a significant main effect between relative size of the Black population for year 
2000 and Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios.  Hypothesis 1 also stated that the effect 
of Black population growth on the ratio of Black-to-White pretextual stops should 
weaken in areas with relatively large Black populations.  The results were consistent with 
that expectation.  The analysis observed a significant negative effect of the interaction 
variable (B/W Growth X B/W2000) on pretextual stops of Blacks relative to Whites 
(bB/W Growth X B/W2000  =  -.000151, p < .001).   
 
Table 7.1. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000  
                  on 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios When Total Municipal Population is Controlled.  
                  Also B/W Growth is Interacting with Black-to-White Population Ratio (N = 113)
a
 
                                                             B/W Pretext                           
                                                           b                Beta                                            
Independent Variable                                                                                                                                                                                   _ 
 
B/W Growth                                 .0001              .050                                                                                 
                                                     (.0002)                                                                                                            
 
B/W 2000                                    .035 *              .366 
                                                     (.014) 
 
TotPop                                        2.74e-06         .306 
                                                    (7.80e-07) 
 
B/W Growth X B/W2000          -.000151 **    -.537 
                                                    (.00004) 
 
R2                                               .19                                                 
Notes:  B/W Pretext  = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002                   TotPop    = Total municipal population for year 2000 
             B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 -2000        B/W 2000 = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio 
             B/W Growth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05   
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census 
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     So the minority group threat hypothesis is certainly relevant with the interaction term 
in the model.  Community accountability theory also may be important.  In other words, 
the results imply that Black population increases produce fear that pushes police toward 
more contact with Black motorists.  However, where Blacks make up a larger fraction of 
the population, and presumably exert more political power, the police are less likely to 
stop Black motorists on minor traffic violations. 
 
Regressing Population Growth on Overall, Low-Discretionary, Consent, and Mandatory 
Searches 
     Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 are all rejected as Table 7.2 shows that relative Black 
population growth has no effect on overall search ratios or search ratios separated by 
type.  Likewise, the interaction terms have no effect.  However, the analysis does show 
that the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio has a significant main effect on overall 
Black-to-White search ratio (bB/W pretext  =  .465, p < .05).   
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Table 7.2. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000   
                  on 2002 Black-to-White Overall, Low-Discretionary, Consent, and Mandatory Search Ratios  
                  When Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 is Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White  
                  Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting and with 
                  B/W Growth (N = 113) 
 
                                                                                                     Dependent Variables 
                                                                              
                                        B/W Searches                    B/WLow-Descr                         B/W Consent                                B/W Mandatory              
                                       b                Beta                   b              Beta                         b               Beta                             b                  Beta   
Independent Variables                                                                                                                                                                                 _ 
 
B/W Growth               -.001             - .220               -.002         -.156                     -.0003           -.071                        -.001              -.140                                                      
                                     (.0009)                                 (.003)                                      (.0009)                                          (.001)                      
               
B/W 2000                    -.063 *          -.333              -.011          -.019                     -.015              -.091                       -.084                -.276 
                                     (.030)                                   (.096)                                      (.028)                                            (.045) 
 
TotPop                        3.58e-06 *      .203              4.760e-06     .091                    1.62e-06          .105                       -9.68e-07        -.034 
                                   (1.65e-06)                            (5.39e-06)                               (1.58e-06)                                      (2.50e-06)   
 
B/W Pretext                 .465 *            .236               -.277            -.047                  -.108               -.062                      1.637 **           .517 
                                    (.200)                                    (.649)                                     (.191)                                             (.303) 
 
B/W Growth X  
B/W2000                     .0001             .250               -.00004        -.022                  9.51e-06           .020                       .0002               .225 
                                     (.00009)                               (.0003)                                  (.00009)                                          (.0001) 
 
B/W Pretext  X 
B/W Growth                .0004             .118                .0005           .047                  -.00006            -.020                      -.00002            -.003   
                                     (.0006)                                  (.002)                                   (.0006)                                             (.001) 
 
R2                                 . 19                                        .03                                        .03                                                  .28 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002             B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                        TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002                         B/WLow-Descr = Low discretionary search ratio for year 2002   
             B/W Consent = Consent search ratio for year 2002                                      B/W Mandatory = Mandatory search ratio for year 2002   
             B/W Pretext X B/W Growth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth  
             B/WGrowth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census 
 
     The pretextual stop ratio is also significantly and positively associated with mandatory 
searches (bB/W pretext  =  1.637, p < .001).  Although the minority group threat hypothesis 
cannot explain the likelihood that Black motorists are searched at higher rates than White 
motorists, future research should examine the pretextual stop as it relates to searches.   
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Regressing Population Growth on Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Violation 
Arrests Along with Traffic Citations Issued 
     Similar to the search results, relative Black population growth has no significant effect 
on arrest outcomes or traffic citations.  Considering the lack of a significant association 
with population growth and the interaction variables, hypotheses 6, 7, 8 and 9 are 
rejected.  Again, there are significant associations between certain arrests and pretextual 
stops.  Table 7.3 indicates that as the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio increases, the 
Black-to-White outstanding warrant and traffic violation arrest ratios significantly 
increase (bB/W pretext  =  5.905, p < .001) and (bB/W pretext  =  1.411, p < .001) respectively.     
 
Table 7.3. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000  
                  on 2002 Black-to-White Outstanding Warrant, Drug, Traffic Arrests Ratios when Total  
                  Municipal Population for Year 2000 is Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population  
                  Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W Growth  
                 (N = 113) 
 
                                                                                                                   Dependent Variables 
                                                                              
                                                          _B/W Warrant Arrest_                     _B/W Drug Arrest    _                          B/W Traffic Arrest                                                   
                                                           
Independent Variables_                         b                   Beta______             _b__           Beta____                     __b______    Beta______________      _____ 
 
B/W Growth                                        -.002             -.098                          -.001             -.142                          -.0007             -.079                                                                                                  
                                                            (.004)                                              (.002)                                              (.002)                                             
                
B/W 2000                                            -.168             -.173                           -.057            -.173                          -.070                -.201                       
                                                            (.140)                                               (.055)                                              (.056)                                             
 
TotPop                                                 -.00001        -.153                            1.90e06        .062                           -7.03e.07         -.022                      
                                                            (7.84e-06)                                        (3.05e-06)                                      (3.11e-06)                                       
 
B/W Pretext                                       5.905**         .589                             .692                .202                           1.411**           .391                                          
                                                           (.950)                                                (.369)                                              (.377)                                              
 
B/WGrowth X 
B/W2000                                            .0007            .235                            .0001              .102                            .0002               .240                                  
                                                            (.0004)                                             (.001)                                              (.0002)                                           
 
B/W Pretext  X  
B/W Growth                                       .0005            .030                           -.00001        .002                             .0002               .029                                   
                                                            (.003)                                              (.001)                                                (.001)                                             
R2                                                          .29                                                  .09                                                    .14                                                  
Notes:  B/W pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002                  B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                             TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/WGrowth X B/W2000  =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000             B/W Warrant arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/W Drug arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002                                             B/W Traffic arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002   
             Pretext X B/W Growth   = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth   
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census 
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     Interestingly, while interactions between pretextual stop and arrest ratios were 
insignificant, Table 7.4 shows the following.  As Blacks are more likely than Whites to 
be arrested after a traffic stop, Blacks are significantly more likely to receive a traffic 
citation (bB/W arrest  =  .195, p < .001).  This appears consistent with this study‟s 
anticipation that police might unofficially be trained to issue citations for the original stop 
violation once a lawful arrest is made during a questionable stop.       
 
Table 7.4. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000  
                  on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000  
                  is Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W  
                  Growth While Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-to- 
                  White Arrest Ratio (N = 113) 
 
                                              Dependent Variables 
                                                                            
                                                     B/W Citation                            
Independent Variables              b                   Beta                                                                                                                                       _ 
B/W Growth                         .00004             .029                                                                            
                                               (.0001) 
 
B/W 2000                              .004                  .079 
                                             (.009)  
 
TotPop                                 -2.39e-09         -.0005 
                                            (4.83e-7) 
 
B/W Pretext                          .120                  .218  
                                             (.126) 
 
B/W Arrest                            .195 **            .807 
                                             (072) 
 
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                             -.00001            -.081 
                                             (.00003) 
 
B/W Pretext X 
B/W Arrest                          -.066                -.672 
                                             (.042) 
 
R2                                          .13 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002                 B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                            TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W2000  =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000           B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/WPretext X B/WArrest  = B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest            B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002   
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census 
 
     At this point, Table 7.1 seems to indicate that relative Black population growth at 
certain levels of Black-to-White population size does possibly explain why Black 
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motorists are more likely than White motorists to experience pretextual stops.  In turn, 
Table 7.2 implies that the pretextual stop positions police to negotiate further general 
searches or, more specifically, find other illegal activity that require a mandatory search.  
Moreover, Table 7.3 provides speculative reasons to believe that law enforcement 
officials are aware that by making this type of stop there is a significant chance that an 
outstanding warrant arrest is possible, and that, if Black drivers become un-cooperative in 
the absence of other legal justifications to make an arrest, police might be inclined to 
arrest Black drivers for the original traffic violation.  And finally, Table 7.4 implies that 
when the likelihood to make an arrest decreases, perhaps due to the driver‟s cooperation 
or the lack of other illegal activity, the likelihood that Black drivers are issued traffic 
citations decreases.  Unfortunately, there remains too much speculation to make concrete 
conclusions without analyzing other potential effects.      
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CHAPTER 8  
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CONFOUNDING VARIABLES   
 
VIOLENT CRIME REGRESSION 
     Violent crime, which is associated with Black population increases and potentially 
produces citizen fear, might give officers an added incentive to make questionable, albeit 
lawful pretextual stops of Black motorists at higher rates than White motorists.  Model 1 
in Table 8.1 is taken from the results in Table 7.1 to show sequential changes after violent 
crime is introduced (shown in Model 2 of Table 8.1).  It shows that when violent crime 
for year 2002, Black-to-White population ratio, and total population for year 2000 are 
controlled, the effect of the relative Black population growth on the Black-to-White 
pretextual stop ratio continues to significantly depend on the relative size of the Black 
population for year 2000 (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000  =  -.0001, p < .001).  Again, the results 
consistently show that growth weakens on pretextual stops when Black populations are 
relatively high.    
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8.1. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002 
        Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 and Violent  
        Crime are Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W  
        Growth (N = 113) 
 
                                                                            B/W Pretext                                                            
                                                           
                                                         Model 1                                      Model 2                                                                         
 
Independent Variables                 b                 Beta                         b              Beta                                                                                      _ 
  
B/W Growth                            .0001              .050                     .00008           .033                                                                                                                                              
                                                (.0002)                                        (.0002)                                                                                       
 
B/W 2000                                .035 *             .366                     .028               .291                                            
                                                 (.014)                                         (.016)                                          
         
TotPop                                     2.74e-06        .306                     2.56e-06 **   .286                                                 
                                                 (7.80e-07)                                 (8.03e-06)                                                                            
 
Violcrime                                                                                   .007               .094                                               
                                                                                                   (.008)            
                                                     
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                                -.000151 **    -.537                   -.0001 **         -.483                                      
                                                 (.00004)                                    (.0004)                                                                                                                                
R2                                             . 19                                              .20 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002                         B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                             TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000             Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002   
 a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR 
 
     When the municipal violent crime rate was controlled to determine the extent that 
relative Black population growth affected relative overall searches, warrant, drug, and 
traffic violation arrests, there were no significant effects on Black-to-White pretextual 
stops.  However, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio significantly and positively had 
a main effect on overall Black-to-White searches (bB/W pretext  =  .481, p < .05), Black-to-
White warrant arrests (bB/W pretext  =  5.908, p < .001), and Black-to-White traffic violation 
arrests (bB/W pretext  =  1.406, p < .001) see Table 8.2.   
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Table 8.2. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000  
                  on 2002 Black-to-White Overall Search Ratio, Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Arrests 
                  Ratios when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000 and Municipal Violent Crime Rate are  
                  Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White 
                  Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W Growth (N = 113)  
 
                                                                                          Dependent Variables 
                                                                              
                                         B/W Searches                   B/W Warrant Arrest                     B/W Drug Arrest                     B/W Traffic Arrest                                                  
                                                           
Independent Variables      b               Beta                   b                Beta                          b                 Beta                          b                Beta 
  
B/W Growth                  -.001          -.224                 -.002            -.098                      -.001              -.141                     -.0007            -.078                                                                              
                                       (.0009)                                 (.004)                                        (.002)                                           (.002) 
 
B/W 2000                      -.039          -.205                  -.164           -.169                       -.067              -.201                     -.077             -.222 
                                       (.033)                                   (.158)                                         (.062)                                          (.063) 
 
TotPop                          4.15e-06 *    .235                  -.00001       -.152                      1.68e.06          .055                      -8.74e-07     -.027 
                                       (1.68e-06)                            (8.06e-06)                                 (3.13e-06)                                    (3.20e-06) 
 
B/W Pretext                  .481*            .244                   5.908 **      .589                       .686                .200                      1.406 **        .389                  
                                      (.199)                                     (.956)                                         (.371)                                           (.379)  
 
Violcrime                     -.025             -.168                -.004             -.004                      .010                .037                       .008              .027          
                                     (.016)                                    (.075)                                          (.029)                                           (.030) 
  
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                     .00009            .166                .0007              .233                      .0001              .121                      .0003             .254         
                                     (.0001)                                  (.0005)                                         (.0002)                                         (.0002) 
 
B/WPretext X 
B/WGrowth                  .0005             .056               .0005               .031                      -.00006           -.010                    .0001             .022           
                                     (0006)                                   (.003)                                          (.001)                                            (.001) 
 
R2                                       .21                                        .29                                               .10                                                 .14 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002            B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                       TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/WGrowth X B/W2000  =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000       B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002                                     B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002   
             B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002                        B/WPretext X B/WGrowth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth                   
             Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002             
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR 
 
     Table 8.3 shows that controlling for violent crime rates also makes no difference with 
respect to the effect of relative Black population on Black-to-White citations issued.  It 
does indicate that the arrest ratio continues to have a significant main effect on the 
citation ratio (bB/W arrest  =  .196, p < .001).  While violent crime makes no discernable 
differences in the models, it cannot be ignored until other variables that might explain 
traffic stop outcomes are examined.     
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Table 8.3. Table 8.3. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 
                  to 2000 on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for  
                  Year 2000 and Municipal Violent Crime Rate are Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White 
                  Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth while Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual  
                  Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-to-White Arrest Ratio (N = 113) 
 
 
                                              Dependent Variable 
                                                                              
                                                     B/W Citation                             
                                                           
Independent Variables                b                     Beta                                                                                                                                  _ 
 
B/W Growth                            .00002                .011                                                                            
                                                 (.0001) 
 
B/W 2000                                .00008                .002 
                                                 (.010)  
 
TotPop                                   -1.00e-07            -.020 
                                                (4.93e-07) 
 
B/W Pretext                            .107                     .196  
                                                (.127) 
 
B/W Arrest                              .196 **                .812 
                                                (.072) 
 
Violcrime                                .005                   .109 
                                                (.005) 
 
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                               -4.60e-06            -.030 
                                               (.00003) 
 
B/W Pretext X 
B/WArrest                             -.064                  -.660 
                                               (.042) 
 
R2                                           .14 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002                B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                           TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W2000  =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000            B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/WPretext X B/WArrest  = B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest                                B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002   
             Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002  
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR 
 
SOCIAL FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN PRETEXTUAL STOPS AND TRAFFIC STOP 
OUTCOMES     
      With economic inequality embedded in institutionalized discrimination, Table 8.4 
describes the economic breakdown using the sociological variables to be analyzed.  
Consistent with most sociological research, the median household income for Blacks was 
lower than that of Whites.  On average, Blacks had higher unemployment rates and were 
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two times more likely than Whites to live below the poverty level.  Before the regression 
analyses were conducted, this researcher checked and found the following.  It was 
discovered that Black-to-White unemployment and poverty ratio variables were highly 
correlated.  Therefore this study used Black-to-White poverty and not unemployment 
because previous research cited in this dissertation used poverty to reference the 
percentage point that Black population causes fear.  Multicollinearity was not a problem 
with the other chosen variables (see correlation matrix in Appendix D).   
 
Table 8.4.  Municipal Level Black and White Median Household Income, Black and White Unemployment  
                   Rate Percentage and Black and White Poverty Rate Percentage Per 1,000 Residents   
                                                
                           Median Household Income            Unemployment                   Poverty                
 
Blacks                            $32,063                                        4                                      21                                   
 
Whites                           $42,111                                        3                                       10                                    
N= 113 Municipalities        Black/White Med Income = .76           Black/White Unemployment rate = 1.67  
                                            Black/White Poverty Rate = 2.09         
Source: 2000 Missouri Census 
 
     Hypothesis 10 was partially accepted.  After adding Black-to-White median household 
income, poverty, and municipal property values (socio-economic variables) to the models 
as controls, model 3 in Table 8.5 indicates that the interaction between relative Black 
population growth and the Black-to-White population ratio continues to affect the Black-
to-White pretextual stop ratio as previously observed (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000  =  -.0001, p < 
.001).     
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Table 8.5. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on  
                  2002 Black-to-White Pretextual stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000,    
                  Violent Crime, Black-to-White Income and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are  
                  Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth  
                  (N = 113)  
 
 Dependent                                                                              
  Variable                                                                       B/W Pretext______________________________________________________                                                          
                                                           
                                                    Model 1                                      Model 2                                      Model 3                                   
 
Independent Variables                b                 Beta                    b                   Beta                      b                   Beta                   ________ 
  
B/W Growth                            .0001              .050                .00008                .033                  .0002                 .067                                                                                                                                           
                                                 (.0002)                                  (.0002)                                         (.0002)                                                                                   
                
B/W 2000                                 .035 *            .366                .028                    .291    .031                   .319                                                      
                                                 (.014)                                    (.016)                                         (.016)                                               
 
TotPop                                      2.74e-06       .306                2.56e-06 **        .286                   2.43e-06 **      .271                                              
                                                 (7.80e-07)                            (8.03e-06)                                     (7.71e-07)                                                                       
 
Violcrime                                                                               .007                   .094                    .012                 .158                                            
                                                                                               (.008)                                           (.007)                                                    
 
B/W Income                                                                                                                              -.170                 -.165              
                                                                                                                                                    (.088)                                      
 
B/W Poverty                                                                                                                               .012                  .068                 
                                                                                                                                                    (.015)                                      
 
Propval                                                                                                                                        1.37e-06           .211                               
                                                                                                                                                    (5.73e-07)    
                                                                              
B/WGrowth X B/W2000     -.000151 **     -.537              -.0001 **              -.483        -.0001 **          -.479                                           
                                               (.00004)                                 (.0004)                                           (.00004)                                                                            
 
R2                                            .20                                           .20                                                 .29                        
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002                    B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                        TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/WGrowth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000         Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002 
             B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000                              B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000 
             Propval         = Municipal property value 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census 
 
     Black population growth had no effect on Black-to-White warrant, drug, or traffic 
violation arrests when the sociological variables were controlled even after the interaction 
measures were added.  However, as presented in Table 8.6, Black-to-White pretextual 
stop ratios continued to significantly affect the likelihood that Black motorists were 
arrested on warrants (bB/W pretext  =  5.600, p < .001) or for traffic violations (bB/W pretext  =  
1.244, p < .001) at higher rates than White motorists.  Only the total municipal population 
size had a significant and positive association to Black-to-White searches when the 
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sociological variables were added and controlled in the model (bTotPop  =  4.21e-06, p < 
.05).   
      
8.6.  Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002  
        Black-to-White Overall Search Ratio, Outstanding Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Arrests Ratios when  
        Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Municipal Violent Crime Rate, Black-to-White Income  
        and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White 
        Population Ratio and Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratios are Interacting with B/W  
        Growth (N = 113)  
 
                                                                                                             Dependent Variables 
                                                                              
                                         B/W Searches                   B/W Warrant Arrest                     B/W Drug Arrest                     B/W Traffic Arrest                                                  
                                                           
Independent Variables      b               Beta                   b                Beta                          b                 Beta                          b                Beta 
 
B/W Growth                  -.001            -.234              -.002             -.090                      -.001             -.146                       -.0006           -.074                                                                             
                                       (.0009)                               (.004)                                           (.002)                                           (.002) 
 
B/W 2000                      -.032            -.169              -.164             -.169                      -.050              -.150                       -.072            -.206 
                                       (.033)                                 (.159)                                           (.061)                                           (.064) 
 
TotPop                          4.21e-06 *     .238              -.00001          -.147                      2.03e.06        .066                        -6.47e-07     -.020 
                                      (1.68e-06)                          (8.03e-06)                                    (3.11e-06)                                     (3.22e-06) 
 
B/W Pretext                    .388            .197                5.600 **        .558                       .412               .120                        1.244 **        .345                  
                                       (.211)                                 (1.008)                                         (.390)                                             (.404)  
 
Violcrime                       -.024           -.159              .031                .041                       .019              .074                          .019              .069          
                                       (.016)                                (.077)                                           (.030)                                             (.031) 
 
B/W Income                   -.333          -.164               .158                .015                      -.560            -.158                          -.145           -.139 
                                       (.186)                                (.890)                                           (.345)                                             (.356) 
 
B/W Poverty                  -.0007        - .002               -.142             -.079                      .048               .077                          -.022           -.034    
                                      (.032)                                   (.152)                                         (.059)                                             (.061)   
 
Propval                         1.03e-07        .008               .0001             .165                      2.10e-06         .094                        3.29e-06        .140 
                                     (1.22e-06)                           (5.82e-06)                                  (2.25e-06)                                      (2.33e-06) 
 
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                      .00007          .134                .0006             .230                      .00008            .084                        .0002             .241         
                                      (.00009)                              (.0004)                                        (.0002)                                          (.0002) 
 
B/W Pretext X 
B/W Growth                .0006             .187               .0005              .029                      .0002              .027                       .0002              .032           
                                     (.0006)                                  (.003)                                          (.001)                                            (.001) 
 
R2                                   .23                                       .32                                              .13                                                 .16 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002          B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 19990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                     TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W 2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000    B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002                                   B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002   
             B/W Searches = Black-to-White search ratio for year 2002                      B/W Pretext X B/W Growth = B/W pretext interacting with B/W Growth                   
             Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002              B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000    
             B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000                     Propval         = Municipal property value 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census 
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     While population growth has no effect on Black-to-White citation ratios, the 
sociological variables did make a difference.  Table 8.7 shows that in areas where the 
Black-to-White median household income ratio increases, the likelihood that Black 
motorists receive traffic citations significantly more than White motorists decreases (bB/W 
income  =  -.157, p < .001).  When Black poverty decreases relative to White poverty, 
Blacks are more likely than Whites to receive traffic citations (bB/W poverty  =  -.026, p < 
.001).  The interaction variables in this model were insignificant.   
 
8.7.  Table 8.3. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000  
         on 2002 Black-to-White Traffic Citation Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000,  
         Municipal Violent Crime Rate, Black-to-White Income and Poverty, and Municipal Property Values are  
         Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth while   
         Year 2002 Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio is Interacting with Black-to-White Arrest Ratio  
         (N = 113) 
                                              Dependent Variable 
                                                                              
                                                     B/W Citation                             
                                                           
Independent Variables                b                     Beta                                                                                                                                  _ 
 
B/W Growth                           .00003                .021                                                                            
                                                (.0001) 
 
B/W 2000                               .003                     .059 
                                               (.009)  
 
TotPop                                   -2.85e-07           -.058 
                                               (4.62e-07) 
  
B/W Pretext                           -.00002               - .117  
                                              (.00003) 
 
B/W Arrest                             .140                     .581 
                                              (.075) 
 
Violcrime                              .003                     .069 
                                              (.004) 
 
B/W Income                          -.157**               -.278               
                                              (.057)                                    
 
B/W Poverty                        -.026**                -.263              
                                             (.009)                                   
 
Propval                                  -6.47e-07           -.182                
                                              (3.33e-07) 
 
B/WGrowth X 
B/W2000                               -4.60e-06           -.030 
                                              (.00003) 
 
B/W Pretext X 
B/W Arrest                            -.020                  -.205 
                                              (.044) 
R2                                            .27    
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio for year 2002                   B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
              B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                             TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
              B/WGrowth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000              B/W Arrest = Overall arrest ratio for year 2002 
              B/W Pretext X B/W Arrest= B/W pretext interacting with B/W arrest             B/W Citation = Ratio of citations issued for year 2002   
              Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002                       B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000    
              B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000                              Propval         = Municipal property value 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census 
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Controlling for Warrant, Drug, and Traffic Violation Arrests 
     Again acknowledging the fallacy that accompanies attempts to use traffic stop 
outcomes (warrant, drug, and traffic violation arrests) to explain pretextual stops, model 4 
in Table 8.8 shows that when these outcome variables are controlled, along with the 
sociological variables, municipal violent crime rate, and total population, hypothesis 11 is 
partially accepted.  Black population growth does have a significant effect on the 
likelihood that Black motorists experience pretextual stops at higher rates than White 
motorists.  As expected, the effect of relative Black population growth on the Black-to-
White pretextual stop ratio weakens at higher levels of the 2000 Black-to-White 
population ratio when all other variables are constant (bB/WGrowth X B/W2000  =  -.0001, p < 
.001).  However, this effect does not predict pretextual stops alone.  Total municipal 
population size, Black-to-White warrant and traffic violation arrests also affect the 
likelihood that Black motorists are more likely than White motorists stopped pretextually.  
A note should be made that the search and citation outcome variables were not used as 
controls because logic does not present these as major motivating factors.  While the 
motivation behind pretextual stops might be to search for other illegal activity, this study 
argues that officers are looking for the end result to be an arrest.  In fact, if officers are 
looking to make an easy arrest for an outstanding traffic warrant, there is no motivation to 
search until the arrest is made.  The same holds true with citations.  The purpose for the 
pretextual stop is arguably to subsequently make an arrest.  This study previously argued 
and found that there was no significant association between the likelihood of 
experiencing a pretextual stop and receiving a traffic citation.  Citations were only 
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significantly related to the likelihood of being arrested on any charge as Table 8.3 
indicates.   
 
8.8. Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002  
        Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Violent Crime,  
        Black-to-White Income and Poverty, Municipal Property Values, and Traffic Stop Outcomes are  
        Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting with B/W Growth  
        (N = 113) 
 
 Dependent                                                                              
  Variable                                                                       B/W Pretext______________________________________________________                                                          
                                                        
                                                    Model 1                                  Model 2                                      Model 3                                      Model 4 
 
Independent Variables             b                 Beta                b                   Beta                          b                   Beta              b                Beta_ 
  
B/W Growth                         .0001              .050          .00008                .033                     .0002                .067             .0001              .079                                                                                                                            
                                             (.0002)                             (.0002)                                           (.0002)                                 (.0002)                                               
 
B/W 2000                             .035 *             .366           .028                   .291                .031                  .319             .032 *             .329                                       
                                             (.014)                                (.016)                                  (.016)                                   (.014) 
         
TotPop                                  2.74e-06        .306           2.56e-06 **       .286                     2.43e-06 **       .271            2.32e-06 **    .259                              
                                             (7.80e-07)                        (8.03e-06)                                     (7.71e-07)                            (6.69e-07)                                         
 
Violcrime                                                                      .007                  .094                     .012                   .158            .007                 .086                             
                                                                                      (.008)                                           (.007)                                    (.007)              
B/W Income                                                                                                                       -.170                 -.165            -.126              -.123 
                                                                                                                                            (.088)                                   (.077) 
 
B/W Poverty                                                                                                                        .012                  .068             .016                .087    
                                                                                                                                             (.015)                                   (.013) 
 
Propval                                                                                                                               1.37e-06             .211             4.20e-06        .065                   
                                                                                                                                            (5.73e-07)                             (5.17e-07) 
B/W Warrant Arrest                                                                                                                                                         .040 **           .403 
                                                                                                                                                                                          (.008)  
 
B/W Drug Arrest                                                                                                                                                              -.005             -.020 
                                                                                                                                                                                          (.023) 
 
B/W Traffic Arrest                                                                                                                                                             .045 *           .163 
                                                         (.021) 
B/WGrowth X  
B/W2000                     -.000151 **     -.537                -.0001 **           -.483                 -.0001 **          -.479             -.0001 **       -.473                             
                                       (.00004)                                  (.0004)                                        (.00004)                                  (.00004)                                              
 
R2                                               .20                                          .20                                                 .29                                           .49                        
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002                           B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000  = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                                   TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W2000 =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000               Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002 
             B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000                                     B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000 
             Propval         = Municipal property value                                                             B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002                                             B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002   
 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; 2000 Missouri Census 
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     An important finding is that neither Black population growth nor Black-to-White 
pretextual stops is significantly related to the likelihood that Blacks are arrested at higher 
rates than Whites for drug violations.  Recall in chapter 6 that the descriptive analyses 
show that Black motorists are arrested at higher rates than White motorists for drugs, but 
Whites are found with contraband at higher rates than Blacks.  These results certainly 
raise questions concerning the inconsistencies with respect to drug arrests.  Nevertheless, 
this study has provided a better understanding of what drives police to make pretextual 
stops of Black drivers at higher rates than White drivers which potentially leads to other 
traffic stop outcomes.  Finding that relative Black population differences are an important 
variable to examine in racial profiling data, it is paramount to examine the extent to 
which racial profiling operates beyond individual officer behavior or police organization 
tolerance.   
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CHAPTER 9 
THE IMPORTANCE OF RACE AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
 
MUNICIPAL CLASSIFICATION AND RACIAL PROFILING 
     This study previously discussed the effects that size of the municipal population may 
have on how police and other government officials behave.  Research question 13 is 
informed by the notion that police will only behave in ways they are allowed to act.  In 
other words, if certain types of behaviors are covertly or even openly condoned, unequal 
justice might play a major role in law enforcement daily operations.  Moreover, if cities 
are structured in ways that make negative police activity difficult to detect due to 
complex organizational styles, the potential for corruption might also consume daily 
operations.  At minimum, this study argues that Black motorists are likely to experience 
differential treatment by police when larger citizen populations necessitate larger police 
organizations.  These organizations become less manageable depending on how the city‟s 
organizational structure holds police managers accountable for their officer‟s actions. 
     Recall that the municipal classifications, such as class 1, 2, and 3 cities generally 
either required higher populations than class 4 and 5 municipalities, or they had no 
population requirements.  With that being the case, higher populations in this study‟s 
targeted cities were indeed located in class 1, 2, and 3 cities.  In the thirty-two class 1 
cities, the mean population size was 58,120 and 28,763 when excluding the four cities 
with more than 100,000 citizens which skewed the mean.  In the two class 2 cities, the 
mean population size was 17,474.  In the thirty-three class 3 cities, the mean population 
size was 11,339.  In the forty-two class 4 cities the mean population size was 11,653.  
And the mean population size in the four class 5 cities was 2,300.     
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     After controlling for government classification type by introducing each to the 
regression models, this study tested hypotheses 12 and 13.  The hypotheses stated that the 
pretextual and traffic stop outcome ratios respectively will increase when motorists travel 
through class 1 (constitutional charter rule) municipalities.  However, the results in Table 
9.1 show that hypothesis 12 must be rejected.  The ratio of the pretextual stop only 
significantly decreased in class 3 cities.  After observing effects on the other traffic stop 
outcomes, hypothesis 13 was also rejected.  Class 2 municipalities showed a significant 
increase in the outstanding warrant arrests ratio, while class 5 cities showed a significant 
increase in the Black-to-White citation ratio.  It should be noted that these two models are 
not shown because the number of observations were too small to make valid conclusions.  
There were only two class 2 and four class 5 municipalities in the data.    
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9.1.  Multivariate Regression:  The Effect of Relative Black Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 on 2002  
         Black-to-White Pretextual Stop Ratio when Total Municipal Population for Year 2000, Violent Crime,  
         Black-to-White Income and Poverty, Municipal Property Values, Traffic Stop Outcomes and Municipal   
         Government Structure are Controlled.  Also Year 2000 Black-to-White Population Ratio is Interacting  
         with B/W Growth (N = 113) 
 Dependent                                                                              
  Variable                                                                                B/W Pretext______                                                                                                                     _                                                                               
                                                        
                                                Model 1                               Model 2                              Model 3                             Model 4                             Model 5 
      
Independent Variables         b                  Beta                b                 Beta                 b                  Beta               b                  Beta                b                  Beta_ 
  
B/W Growth                      .0002             .082              .0001             .081               .0001              .048             .0001             .060               .0002              .106                                                                                                                
                                           (.0001)                               (.0002)                                (.0002)                                (.0002)                                (.002)                  
 
B/W 2000                          .032 *            .329               .032*            .329               .030 *             .310              .030 *           .315                .032*             .335                            
                                           (.014)                                  (.014)                            (.013)                                  (.013)                                   (.014) 
         
TotPop                              2.17e-06 **    .242              2.32e-06 **   .259                1.97e-06 **   .220            2.48e-06 **    .277             2.30e-06**      .257                     
                                          (7.24e-07)                           (6.72e-07)                           (6.74e-07)                           (6.67e-07)                           (6.69e-07)                  
 
Violcrime                           .007               .089              .007               .087               .009                .113              .007               .091              .006               .076                   
                                           (.007)                                  (.007)                                   (.007)                                 (.007)                                  (.007) 
   
B/W Income                      -.127             -.123              -.127            -.123              -.172 *           -.167             -.160 *          -.155             -.130              -.126 
                                            (.078)                                (.078)                                   (.078)                                  (.079)                                  (.077) 
   
B/W Poverty                       .014             .079               .016               .087                .011              .058                .016             .090                .017              .094 
                                            (.013)                                 (.013)                                   (.013)                                  (.013)                                  (.013) 
   
B/W Propval                        4.09e-07      .063                4.22e-07       .065              1.80e-07         .028               1.89e-07        .029              3.00e-07       .046 
                                            (5.19e-07)                          (5.19e-07)                          (5.18e-07)                            (5.27e-07)                           (5.32e-07) 
      
B/W Warrant Arrest            .041 **      .407                   .040 **       .404                .039 **         .388               .041**           .414                .045 **        .457     
                                             (.008)                                 (.008)                                 (.008)                                   (.008)                                  (.010) 
 
B/W Drug Arrest                -.007           -.023                 -.005            -.018              -.003             -.012               -.004             -.015               -.009         -.029 
                                             (.023)                                  (.023)                                 (.022)                                   (.023)                                  (.023) 
 
B/W Traffic Arrest              .043              .155                 .045*           .162                .043 *            .157              .049 *             .176               .042            .153 
                        (.022)            (.021)                               (.021)                                  (.021)                                   (.022)   
                                                                               
B/W Growth X 
B/W2000                          -.000132 **   -.471              -.0001 **        -.473             -.0001 **       -.477              -.0001 **       -.486            -.0001**     -.486                    
                                           (.00004)                               (.0004)                                (.00004)                                (.00004)                           (.00004)                   
  
Class1                                  .051             .047          
                                            (.090) 
         
Class2                                                                               .065              .017 
                                                                                        (.271) 
         
Class3                                                                                                                        -.190 *           -.176 
                       (085) 
 
         
Class4                                                                                                                                                                       .145              .143         
                      (.081)         
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
         
Class5                                                                                                                                                                                                                   -.233        -.087 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (.245) 
 
R2                                              .49                                         .49                                            .51                                         .50                                   .49 
Notes:  B/W Pretext   = Black-to-White pretextual stops for year 2002                     B/W Growth = Black-to-White population ratio from 1990 to 2000  
             B/W 2000      = Year 2000 Black-to-White population ratio                         TotPop          = Total municipal population for year 2000  
             B/W Growth X B/W2000  =  B/W Growth interacting with B/W 2000        Violcrime      = Municipal violent crime recorded for year 2002 
             B/W Income = Black-to-White MHI ratio for year 2000                               B/W Poverty = Black-to-White Poverty ratio for year 2000 
             Propval         = Municipal property value                                                       B/W Warrant Arrest = warrant arrest ratio for year 2002 
             B/W Drug Arrest = Drug arrest ratio for year 2002                                        B/W Traffic Arrest = traffic arrest ratio for year 2002  
             Class 1 = Constitutional Charter Rule                                                            Class 2 = Legislative or Special Charter Government 
             Class 3 = Mayor/council; Mayor/City Administrator/council/manager         Class 4 = Mayor/Board of Alderman or Mayor/City Administrator 
             Class 5 = Villages (elected board of trustees) 
a Standard error in parentheses.   
**p < .01  *p < .05 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data;  2002 Missouri Highway Patrol‟s UCR; Missouri Municipal League; 2000 
Missouri Census  
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     At this point it is necessary to note that this study changed the disproportionality 
indices to reflect search outcomes derived from search populations and arrest outcomes 
derived from arrest populations.  Recall the methods used for this dissertation were the 
population of drivers stopped in each racial category.  After conducting the analyses, 
there were no significant changes to the results in respect to relative Black population 
increases.  However, the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio became significantly 
correlated to the Black-to-White mandatory search ratio.  Additionally, when the overall 
search ratio is used as the denominator to obtain the rates for the various types of 
searches, Black motorists are less likely to be searched in all the categories.  Recall that 
Table 6.2 indicates that Whites are less likely searched in each search category.  The 
same is true when the total arrest ratio is used as the denominator to obtain the rates for 
the different types of arrests except for outstanding warrants.  Black motorists remain 
more likely arrested for outstanding warrants regardless of the denominator used.  
Readers must be reminded that this method potentially misses some drivers stopped 
pretextually.  Thus, the total number stopped remained the denominator for this writing.                 
     The final hypothesis (14) substituted Black-to-White speed stop ratio (not shown) for 
Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio.  As expected, hypothesis 14 was accepted because 
there were no significant associations in either model.  In other words, when all other 
variables remained the same, motorists stopped for speeding might have been more a 
function of driving habits rather than police motivation.  Officers have little incentive to 
produce further traffic stop outcomes during stops for speeding because the initial reason 
to stop is usually for the traffic violation and not for other underlying purposes.  
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POINT OF FEAR 
     Recall in chapters 2 and 4 the research indicated a tipping point that triggered 
reactions in response to Black population percentages.  Testing Liska et al‟s. (1985) 20% 
threshold, the final hypothesis stated the following.  The statistical means for the Black-
to-White pretextual stop and the other traffic stop outcome ratios will be significantly 
higher in cities where Black residents accounted for 20% or more of the population than 
in cities where Blacks made up less than 20% of the population.  Hypothesis 16 was 
partially accepted because a significant difference at this percentage point was only found 
in the pretextual stop data and not the other traffic stop outcome data.  In municipalities 
where Blacks made up 20% or more of the population, the likelihood that Black motorists 
experienced pretextual stops at higher rates than White motorists was significantly higher 
than the Black-to-White pretextual stop ratios in cities where Blacks accounted for less 
than 20% of the population.  Although the 20% mark is significant, it was important to 
find exactly when the difference occurred.   
     Further data analyses found that the actual population ratio tipping point was at .08 
when Blacks made up approximately 7% and Whites made up approximately 91% of the 
population.  Of the 113 municipalities in the sample, Blacks made up 7% or more of the 
population in 59 cities.  After using two sample t tests, the results (not shown) reveal that 
the mean Black-to-White pretextual stop ratio is significantly .187 points higher in these 
municipalities than in the remaining 54 cities where Blacks make up less than 7% of the 
residents.  In fact, the mean pretextual stop ratio was 1.60 as indicated in Table 9.2 and 
1.41 in municipalities with less than 7% of Black residents.  These results suggest that 
once the Black population reached 7% in a given municipality, Black citizen visibility 
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raised citizen fear and police caution.  However, once the relative Black population size 
reached the .51 ratio point or higher, which had Blacks accounting for 31% or higher and 
Whites accounting for 61%  or lower of the population, the differences compared to the 
relative Black population size in cities where Blacks accounted for less than 31% of the 
population became insignificant.  The study further discovered that in locations where 
Blacks made up 80% or more of the population, Black motorists were less likely than 
White motorists to experience a pretexual stop although the difference was not 
significant.  
     Even though the 20% Black population mark shows no significant differences in 
Black-to-White search rates, a significant difference is found at the 76% threshold.  For 
most municipalities in which Blacks do not make up 76% or more of the total population, 
the Black-to-White search ratio does not vary significantly across those municipalities, 
even though Blacks are searched at higher rates than Whites.  The mean ratio for Black-
to-White searches in cities where Black residents accounted for 76% or more of the 
population was .761 points lower than in cities where Blacks made up less than 76% of 
the population.  In fact, as Table 9.2 indicates, the mean Black-to-White search rate was 
.957 in the cities where Blacks represented 76% or more of the population.  This meant 
that Black motorists were less likely to be searched than White motorists.  This difference 
was also statistically significant.  In some of these cities, Blacks represented more than 
90% of the municipal population while Whites made up 20% or lower of these 
populations.  A note should be made that Black residents made up 76% or more of the 
municipal population in 10 of the 113 cities analyzed, so these results must be taken with 
caution.   
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Table 9.2  Two Sample t test Showing Mean Traffic Stop Outcome Ratio Differences by Black Population  
                   Percentage   
                                                      
Black Population                 Blk Pop = or >                           Blk Pop <                              Black Pop = or >                           Black Pop < 
Percentage                                  7%                                           7%                                            76%                                             76%                        
   
Mean Ratio 
Category                           mean         s.d.                           mean          s.d.                             mean         s.d.                      Mean           s.d. 
  
B/W Pretext                     1.60*        .54                             1.41           .40                             1.58            .77                        1.49            .46                
 
B/W Searches                  1.78         1.07                            1.80           .87                              .96 *          .75                        1.87            .96    
 
B/W Warrant Arrests      4.36         6.38                            3.16           2.57                            6.48        14.26                        3.54         2.88 
 
B/W Drug Arrests           1.72         1.72                            1.88           1.69                              .97            .57                        1.88         1.75 
 
B/W Traffic Arrests        1.95         1.93                            2.35           1.61                            2.04          1.15                        2.15         1.84 
 
B/W Citations                 1.02           .28                              .99             .27                              .99           .02                         1.01            .28 
 
Number of Cities                    59                                                54                                                 10                                          103 
 
N= 113 Municipalities         
NOTE: * Group mean in targeted municipality with the listed percentage point  is significantly different from the mean for other cities 
at  p < .01  **p < .01  *p < .05 difference 
Source: State of Missouri Attorney General‟s 2002 Traffic Stop Data; 2000 Missouri Census 
 
     While the remainder of the outcome variables showed no significant differences when 
Black population percentages reached a certain point, there were, although few, times 
when Black motorists were less likely to experience a given traffic stop outcome.  For 
instance, in cities where Black residents accounted for 76% or more of the population, 
Black drivers were significantly less likely than White drivers to be searched by the 
police as indicated earlier.  This was also the case, although not significantly, with Black-
to-White drug arrests and citations issued.  The table also shows that Blacks were less 
likely than Whites to receive citations in cities where Black residents made up less than 
7% of the municipal population.  While minority group threat is limited in explaining 
when fear becomes essential to police practices, there is evidence that relative Black 
population increases are important factors to examine in racial profiling studies.       
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CHAPTER 10  
CONCLUSION 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
     This study sought to explain differential treatment of Black motorists by the police 
through the minority group threat hypothesis.  Efforts were made to better understand the 
dynamics behind the results to the extent that racial profiling played a major role in 
police behavior and was apparent in various cities in Missouri.  But before the theory was 
tested, this study described the disparities that existed under certain circumstances 
between Black and White drivers.   
  
Descriptive and Outcome Tests Conclusion 
     Initially, the descriptive results were not surprisingly different from much of the racial 
profiling research.  Black motorists were certainly subjected to various police encounters 
at higher rates than White motorists in most accounts.  Through methods using outcome 
tests, other than stops for speeding and contraband found, Blacks had higher rates for the 
various overall stops, searches, and arrests.   
     While the outcome tests for most of the variables were straightforward, the contraband 
variable was somewhat misleading.  The recorded racial profiling data did not provide a 
clear distinction on the type of contraband found.  For instance, by White drivers having 
a higher contraband hit rate, some would expect that White motorists should have been 
arrested for drugs at higher rates than Blacks.  With the opposite being the case, this 
study adjusted by isolating variables that pertained to drugs alone.  The contraband found 
variable grouped alcohol and drug related offenses together which might have driven the 
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White hit rate higher.  After making these adjustments, it was discovered that when 
examining the entire population of motorists stopped, Black motorists were searched by 
police after a canine drug alert at a higher rate than White motorists.  When taking the 
population of drivers arrested for drugs in consideration, White drivers were searched 
after a canine drug alert at higher rates than Black drivers.  Again, assuming that arrests 
followed the drug alert searches coupled with findings that Black drivers had higher drug 
arrests rates, this study concludes that Black drivers are seemingly arrested for drugs at 
higher rates than Whites under other conditions not related to the canine alert.  Given the 
high probability of Black drivers arrested for outstanding warrants and traffic violations, 
it is plausible to believe that drugs were being found during the search incident to the 
arrest.  More importantly, to prevent researchers from having the urge to prematurely 
conclude that Black motorists were unfairly targeted for drug violations when contraband 
is found on White motorists at higher rates, there needs to be more clarity in the type of 
contraband found.  Having described the outcomes, regression analyses were conducted 
to assess an explanation for such disparities.   
 
Conclusions on Regression Analyses for Pretextual Stops and Traffic Outcomes 
     Bivariate regression made it difficult to conclude that minority group threat affected 
any of the traffic stop outcomes or pretextual stops.  Additionally, relative Black 
population growth had no significant effect on violent crime rates or any of the 
sociological variables.  However, while violent crime and municipal property values 
affected the pretextual stop variable, the pretextual stop variable was important in 
explaining some of the traffic stop outcomes.     
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     Once interaction terms were introduced with all relevant control variables, Model 3 in 
Table 9.1 provided the best results.  Minority group threat did become relevant depending 
on the size of the Black population in year 2000.  It made sense that relative growth had 
no main effect on pretextual stops without taking relative Black population size into 
account.  By only taking into account relative Black growth from 1990 to 2000 it would 
have implied that citizens and officers, in year 2000, were aware of the population 
dynamics in year 1990 to the extent that they had a reference point to base their 
perception of threat that would affect traffic stop outcomes in year 2002.  Therefore, 
minority group threat was not able to provide the sole explanation for pretextual stop 
ratio increases.  Because the effects on growth diminished once the relative size of the 
Black population reached a particular point, community accountability theory also had 
some explanatory power.  Model 3 additionally showed that outstanding warrant and 
traffic violation arrests were significantly associated with Black-to-White pretextual stop 
ratios.  Again, this study acknowledged the problem with time ordering because, as Table 
8.6 illustrated, the pretextual stop ratio consistently affected the ratios for outstanding 
warrant and traffic violation arrests.  Statistically speaking, this fatal fallacy of circularity 
presents serious problems and can be challenged by many scholars who strictly adhere to 
the rules of statistical analyses.  On the other hand, it may take this type of drastic 
measure to provoke further discussion to pinpoint what motivates police action. 
     Finding that relative Black population growth and Black-to-White pretextual stop 
increases do not significantly affect the rate that Blacks are more likely than Whites 
arrested for drugs appears to indicate that other variables affect police decisions.  Having 
found that canine alert searches are used at higher rates on Black drivers than White 
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drivers stopped, there could be speculation that White drug arrest rates might be higher if 
police use dog alerts at similar rates used on Blacks.  Particularly, since the overall 
contraband hit rate indicates that Whites are found with contraband at higher rates than 
Blacks.  As the contraband hit rates are derived from using searches as the benchmark, it 
is difficult to determine if drug arrests occur as a result of searches conducted during 
pretextual stops.  Nevertheless, Blacks are still arrested for drugs at higher rates, which 
might indicate that police efforts to find drugs on Blacks result in drug arrests regardless 
of the type of stop.  In fact, since Blacks are more likely arrested on warrants and traffic 
violations, mandatory searches might be the driving force behind higher Black drug arrest 
rates.  However, it remains difficult to exclude the possibility that police indeed make 
pretextual stops because the potential to make outstanding warrant and traffic violation 
arrests are high, even if drugs are not found.  This study also noted, as predicted, that 
racial profiling was imbedded in economic inequality.  Model 3 in Table 9.1 furthermore 
showed that lower Black household incomes compared to higher White household 
incomes affected the pretextual stop ratio.   
     Bringing the study to the last point of regression, it was discovered that after 
controlling for government structure, class 3 cities showed a negative effect on pretextual 
stop ratios.  When Black motorists traveled through class 3 cities, the likelihood that 
Black drivers were subjected to pretextual stops at higher rates than White drivers 
decreased.  The form of government in class 3 cities ranged from the mayor/council or 
the mayor/city administrator/council/manager commission.  Within these options, the 
Missouri Municipal League does not provide any further distinctions of the particular 
type of government structure in class 3 municipalities.  However, it could be that the 
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strong mayor/council form of government dominates these types of cities.  As indicated 
in chapter 4, this form of government enables the mayor to appoint and hold 
administrative officials accountable, since the officials are not elected by the voters 
(MML, 2004).  
     Finally, the research found that Black population growth affected the pretextual stop 
outcome when Black populations reached 7%.  However, the significant effect 
diminished as the Black population percentages increased.  While there was a significant 
difference in the Black-to-White pretextual stop rate between the two groups of 
municipalities, a 7% percent threshold, subjectively speaking, does not seem to account 
for much to make such a difference.  This would assume that it does not take a large 
portion of Black residents in the population to cause fear and push more police activity.  
But as Quillian (2006) might suggest, the mere site of a Black person could 
subconsciously trigger old stereotypes including fear of victimization.  Not only could 
one potentially fear for his/her own safety, but altruistic fear, that is fear for the safety of 
others, could also play an important role in the fear factor (Warr, 2000).  There are some 
indications that altruistic fear could sometimes be stronger than self fear (Warr, 2000).  
These subconscious thoughts might cause police to watch Black motorists more carefully.  
The question is, are citizens fearful of such a small Black population, and are police 
acting altruistically for what they perceive to be in the interest of the community?  
Nevertheless, research must continue to attempt to explain these differences.  The data 
found that there were no other significant tipping points except that Blacks became less 
likely than Whites to be searched in populations where Black residents accounted for 
76% or more.  Again, this seemed to point to the community accountability theory as an 
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explanatory variable for searches as officers might be reluctant to detain Black drivers 
further when Black representation in highly populated Black cities is evident.           
     The study set out to illustrate the complexities that make racial profiling accusations 
difficult to prove.  After analyzing various conditions that confound traffic stops, the 
minority group threat hypotheses proved a valuable resource to making a determination 
on whether or not police are conducting race based stops.  Recall in chapter 3 that this 
study would be guided by two viewpoints, the criminological and the economic 
perspectives.  Understanding police behavior toward certain groups was the major focus 
of the criminological perspective.  Its premise was that law enforcement should be 
proportional across groups based on criminal behavior of a given group.  The economic 
perspective was concerned with the equality of outcomes.  It also argued that law 
enforcement should be proportional across racial/ethnic groups depending on their crime 
involvement (Engel, 2008).  To the extent that Blacks were more likely to experience 
pretextual stops at higher rates than Whites, this study contends the following.  With the 
pretextual stop being a legal technique for officers, it is understandable, if police 
efficiency is measured by the number of arrests made, that officers will maximize arrests 
by stopping drivers whom they (police) believe are more likely to have outstanding 
warrants.  To the extent that Black motorists are more likely wanted than White 
motorists, Black drivers place themselves in the position to be subjected to different 
outcomes during traffic stops.  Finding a correlation between Black-to-White pretextual 
stops and traffic violation arrests potentially confirms that encounters between officers 
and Black drivers become awry, and police are poised and ready to arrest when authority 
is perceptually challenged.  While population increases over time appeared consistent 
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with the minority group threat hypothesis up to a certain population percentage point, it 
may not necessarily have been fear that drove the pretextual stop.  For citizens to pressure 
political authorities, citizens have to be able to access authorities to push for mobilization 
to stop perceived threats.  That said, the consistent relationship found might have had 
more to do with the officer‟s motivation to make arrests.  This seemed apparent when 
relative Black population size became large.  The community accountability theory 
appeared to explain the pretextual stop in these circumstances.  Nevertheless, pretextual 
stops appeared to be based on race and have allowed this research to conclude that racial 
profiling is an active part of police behavior in the targeted municipalities.  These 
circumstances seemed to be less prevalent in class 3 cities where police chiefs are likely 
held responsible for rank and file officers.  Researchers are now provided the opportunity 
to examine more closely the type of government rule in various municipalities and 
determine to what extent police behavior is held accountable.     
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
The Data 
     While an explicit theory was used throughout this dissertation, there were limitations 
to the data presented.  Given that only Missouri traffic stop data for year 2002 was used, 
this study cannot sufficiently determine the effect of populations over time as it related to 
pretextual stop rates over time.  The traffic stop data collection efforts were started fairly 
recently.  It would be better to analyze the growth of minority populations within each 
municipality and the increase in pretextual stops and outcomes during this growth.  Time 
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series studies may show that one variable may act on a dependent variable differently at 
different times when studying 1980, 1990, and 2000 data.  Political climate changes, 
which affect fear of crime, could also be a factor over time (Jacobs and Carmichael, 
2001).  Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York, 
there are indications that racial profiling increased against Middle Eastern citizens.  
Results from the 2002 traffic stop data could have been in response to the 9/11 attacks in 
2001, as increased police patrols may have put Black motorists at further risk of being 
targeted.  In other words, a major event change during the period of relative Black 
population growth might flaw the results.     
     Additionally, it would be better to analyze the circumstances surrounding each 
pretextual stop within municipalities.  For instance, the Missouri racial profiling data only 
recorded aggregated information in each municipality.  However, there is no way to cross 
reference each stop and the outcomes of those stops without analyzing each racial 
profiling data form within each city.  Cross referencing would show specific details, such 
as how many minorities did not have outstanding warrants and were not found in 
possession of contraband but were still searched.  It would also show a more valid 
assessment of the connection between pretextual stops and the outcomes.  This study had 
to rely on several assumptions which limit the conclusions, for instance, assumptions 
were made that arrests accompanied mandatory searches and drug dog alert searches.      
     Although the traffic stop data is official data, it comes from self reports by individual 
police accounts of each stop.  Given the nature of self report data (Maxfield and Babbie, 
1997), there could be inconsistencies and possibly improper reporting by officers 
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attempting to hide information.  Officers may report the least intrusive activity in case 
racial profiling allegations are presented.     
     Although some studies report that minority officers are just as likely as White officers 
to treat minority drivers more harshly than White drivers (Buerger and Farrell, 2002), the 
Missouri data would better serve this study if it included the race of the officer on each 
traffic stop.  Having knowledge of the racial makeup of each police department within a 
given municipality might also help, but it does not provide information specific to each 
stop.  On the other hand, White officers dominate the informal networks, which shape the 
police subculture (us vs. them); therefore, the officer‟s race may not be much of a factor 
(Feagin and Bolton, 2004).  Nevertheless, having knowledge of the officer‟s race would 
lend assistance to this study. 
     While this research finds patterns that might imply that racial profiling does exist in 
some circumstances, it still does not definitively determine whether racial motives are the 
driving forces surrounding pretextual stops and traffic outcomes.  Nevertheless, this study 
presents patterns that cannot be ignored by criminal justice practitioners, criminologists, 
and sociologists.   
      
The Methods 
     Outcome tests, particulary when analyzing search hit rates, have been challenged 
because, as Engel (2008) argues, there are underlying assumptions made about police and 
citizen behavior that are not consistent with what is known about decision making during 
police and citizen encounters.  For instance, the search hit rate assumes that police 
discretion is similar across officers.  It does not take into account how some 
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circumstances, such as time of day, location, and the driver‟s behavior might influence an 
officer‟s decision to stop and search a vehicle (Engel, 2008; Ridgeway, 2006).  The same 
can be said for the outcome tests developed in this writing for outstanding warrants, drug 
arrests and traffic violation arrests.  The appropriate numerators and denominators might 
be too simplistic to conclude validly that disparities in outcomes are racially driven 
without accounting for the variations in the behaviors of officers and citizens.  
Nevertheless, outcome tests are gaining recognition and have been considered by some a 
better measurement of racial profiling data than multivariate modeling (Engel, 2008; 
Ridgeway, 2006).     
     This study recognizes the limitations in multivariate regression.  It acknowledges that 
omission of variables that may influence dependent variables is problematic and creates 
specification error when attempting to explain the variances in each model (Engel et al., 
2006).  For instance, neighborhood characteristics might have a significant effect on the 
likelihood that Black motorists will encounter pretextual stops.  However, the existing 
racial profiling data does not provide neighborhood qualities.  Furthermore, multivariate 
regression, in this study, is not able to assess police and citizen attitudes which might 
influence pretextual stops and outcomes  (Ridgeway, 2006). 
 
Generalizability 
     This study is certainly only applicable to the municipalities described.  By testing the 
minority group threat hypothesis, it was imperative that this study used municipalities 
that had a sizable Black population.  However, it recognizes that the Black population 
growth within a municipality may not be the only driving force behind racial profiling.  
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There are numerous cities that have very small, if any, minority populations.  These cities 
may account for a large portion of the racial profiling allegations.  While including more 
cities would provide for better statistical operations, it would diminish the ability to 
validly test the minority threat hypothesis. 
 
Circularity 
     As previously mentioned, this study acknowledges that attempting to explain 
pretextual stops through warrant and traffic violation arrests is flawed when pretextual 
stops explain warrant and traffic violation arrests.  Nevertheless, it is extremely important 
that researchers find methods to uncover the motives behind pretextual stops.    
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Change Racial Profiling Form   
     Some believe the pretextual stop should be banned.  It has allowed racial profiling to 
become more problematic as officers are given the ability to subjectively select drivers 
for further scrutiny beyond the reason stopped (Crawford, 2000).  This study 
acknowledges that the pretextual stop is a valuable tool for police to expose and arrest 
drug traffickers.  However, the pretextual stop must be scrutinized more carefully.  If 
there is genuine concern to eliminate racial profiling, a category on the racial profiling 
form should include whether the officer made the stop pretextually.  With the pretexual 
stop remaining legal, officers with integrity should not resist the opportunity to allow 
their motives to be transparent when making a traffic stop.  If minorities are made aware 
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of an officer‟s intent, minorities could potentially have greater confidence in the police, 
which should decrease racial profiling allegations.  In fact, minority drivers might be 
willing to accept better the consequences of their own actions.     
     As part of Missouri‟s racial profiling initiative, supervisors are required to counsel 
officers who have questionable patterns of stopping minorities.  It might be worth 
reporting the number of times supervisors counsel officers in each agency that reports to 
the Attorney General‟s office.  In fact, the number of times officers are counseled can be 
taken into account when racial profiling statistics indicate a given department has high 
disproportionality indices.  The department would certainly become accountable for their 
officers‟ actions.   
     Another change to the racial profiling form should be to provide separate categories 
that pertain to drugs and alcohol.  Currently, drugs, alcohol, and paraphernalia are 
grouped together in one variable under contraband found.  Drugs and alcohol are also 
grouped together under the category for reasons officers conduct searches.  As previous 
studies have shown that Whites are more likely to violate liquor laws and arguably 
Blacks are more likely to be found with illicit drugs, it seems reasonable to separate the 
two for racial profiling studies to provide more explicit conclusions behind police 
behavior.    
 
Changing the Ability to Arrest for Traffic Violations 
     While it remains legal for officers to arrest an individual for a traffic violation, this 
practice gives officers the opportunity to circumvent the constitution when citizens 
exercise their right to refuse a vehicle search.  Additionally, when citizens question an 
  
136 
 
officer‟s authority, particularly during questionable stops, officers are implicitly allowed 
to retaliate by making an arrest for the traffic violation.  Finding that Black motorists are 
subjected to these practices at higher rates than White motorists, this practice does 
nothing for race relations.  This is certainly a great tool against drug carriers; however, as 
the utilitarian approach would suggest, we must concentrate more on respecting the rights 
of citizens in the absence of probable cause.  In turn, citizens might be more willing to 
assist with apprehending law violators.  
      
Changing the Way Outstanding Warrants are Handled 
     Although traffic tickets accumulate revenue for cities, this would only be beneficial if 
traffic violators pay their fines.  This study has found that Blacks are more likely than 
Whites to have outstanding warrants, which this study assumes comes in large part from 
Blacks‟ failure to pay traffic fines.  That said, it is reasonable to believe that a large 
portion of Blacks who fill the jail cells are there as a result of being arrested for omitting 
to pay traffic fines.  Economic reasons might contribute to their failure to pay.  Blacks, 
who are generally unemployed at higher rates than Whites, might feel that they have 
more time than money and might rather choose to spend time in jails.  Furthermore, 
Blacks might feel defiantly reluctant to contribute their limited finances toward what they 
consider an unjust criminal justice system.  The problem potentially exacerbates when 
Black populations increase.  Arrests for outstanding warrants deplete municipal budgets 
while citizens‟ taxes continue to go toward housing these individuals.   
     By taking a financial approach, cities might save money by requiring individuals with 
outstanding warrants to rid themselves of the warrants by working at various sites where 
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paid employees would have been otherwise deployed.  For instance, if municipalities pay 
employees to clean parks, this could become the responsibility of those with outstanding 
warrants, who should also be required to sign agreements that relieve cities from injury 
liabilities.  Paid employees can be assigned to other essential locations.  By providing this 
incentive, fewer individuals will spend time in jail, and tax funds may be used on other 
services. 
     While some cities participate in amnesty programs that give citizens the opportunity to 
wipe their slate clean of warrants, it can be taken a step further.  Eliminate the ability for 
officers to arrest for outstanding or “failure to appear” warrants after making a traffic 
stop.  Instead, with today‟s technology, issue a citation that restricts a person‟s driving 
privileges until the warrant is removed by that driver‟s payment of the appropriate fines 
or by that driver‟s work as previously explained.  After an individual has been stopped a 
third time and has not taken provisions to remove the warrant, police car computers or 
dispatchers should indicate to officers that this is the third stop and that this driver has not 
satisfied warrant removal obligations.  At that point, officers should have the option to 
make the arrest for the outstanding warrant. 
     With officers having knowledge that they cannot arrest on warrants until these 
requirements are met, officers may be less likely to conduct pretextual stops in hopes to 
make an arrest.  In fact, the burden increases for officers to establish probable cause to 
arrest an individual after a traffic stop.  It will also shift more burdens on drivers to take 
responsibility to avoid these types of arrests.  Furthermore, it will provide racial profiling 
researchers with the ability to make better conclusions about the prevalence of racial 
profiling within communities.  
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Appendix A 
 
COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY HYPOTHESIS: AN ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATION 
 
     While this research focused on minority population growth as a potential explanation 
of racial profiling, it was discovered that smaller minority populations were also 
correlated to differential treatment of Black drivers.  The community accountability 
hypothesis states that the characteristics of a police department, i.e. racial, ethnic, and 
gender make-up, “foster police-minority tensions and promote police violence” (Smith 
and Holmes, 2003: p. 1037).  It proposes that minority representation in police 
departments helps break down barriers between White police and minority citizens.  As 
the street-level behavior of police entails a high degree of discretion and low visibility, 
police are able to use extralegal factors in their decisions to handle whom they consider a 
threat to their well being (Smith and Holmes, 2003).  White police are not held 
accountable for their actions against minorities when influential minorities are not present 
in the community or police agencies (Smith and Holmes, 2003).  The assumption is that 
White officers are more sensitive to minority concerns and likely sensitive to the 
perceptions other minority officers may have on White officer‟s actions (Smith and 
Holmes, 2003).   
     Smith and Holmes (2003) note studies that examine individual level observational 
data of police brutality.  They generally showed that minority recruitment is not related to 
Black‟s attitudes toward police.  They also revealed that the race of an officer had no 
effect on the use of excessive force (2003).  However, they did acknowledge that there 
were few instances of police brutality in the research they conducted.  Several of the 
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studies incorporated citizen observation methods when citizens would accompany police 
on duty, observe police behavior, and record instances of police brutality to researchers 
(Smith and Holmes, 2003).  Officers having knowledge that observers are watching 
might alter an officer‟s behavior, which might have otherwise been more forceful during 
encounters with minority citizens.  This certainly created a problem with the validity of 
Smith‟s and Holmes‟ (2003) study.   
     Smith and Holmes also use structural level analysis to test community accountability 
by relying on official citizen complaints of police brutality (2003).  There is little 
research that support or challenge the validity of the community accountability 
hypothesis; however, Smith and Holmes did analyze previous structural level studies that 
used variables similar to their research.  They found that the structural studies 
contradicted community accountability‟s proposition (2003).  For instance, increased 
numbers of minorities and females on police forces and the presence of citizen review 
boards either had no effect or actually increased the likelihood of citizen excessive force 
complaints (2003).  The contradictions were explained by the likelihood that minorities, 
particularly Blacks, patrolled more dangerous neighborhoods where there were large 
portions of Black citizens and more violent behavior.  Officers are then inclined to use 
more coercive force which might foster greater numbers of complaints (Smith and 
Holmes, 2003).  Also, where citizen review boards exist, citizens are more confident in 
the complaint system and therefore are more inclined to report instances of brutality 
(Smith and Holmes, 2003).  Because of these issues, and after juxtaposing community 
accountability and minority group threat, Smith and Holmes (2003) leaned toward the 
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latter as a better explanation for police excessive force while they acknowledged the 
former‟s lesser explanatory capability.   
     While the community accountability hypothesis focuses on explaining police brutality, 
it is quite likely that it also explains lower levels of police actions such as traffic stops 
and other outcomes.  In fact, disproportionate minority stops might be more pronounced 
in areas where minority representation in the community and police agencies is nearly 
non-existent.  For instance, Dr. James Loewen (2006) reports on how “sundown towns” 
still exist in mostly the Midwestern United States.  A sundown town is a location where 
Blacks are forbidden to travel or even exist.  This unwritten rule disadvantages Blacks to 
the extent that they would very likely be stopped and harassed by the police when 
traveling these locations (Loewen, 2006). 
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Appendix B: 
Racial Profiling form B 
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Appendix C 
DATA FILES DECRIPTION 
 
File by File Description 
File Name:  Missouri Minority Threat Data 
 
File Structure 
File Dimensions:                   Number of Cases: 113 
                                               Number of Variables:  316 
 
Type of File:                          STATA  
 
Variable Description 
Variable List 
Variable Name                                                            Variable Label    
agency                                                  corresponding number assigned in attorney  
 general‟s report 
 
agenname                                             Name of municipal police department 
phone                                                   police department‟s telephone number 
census1                                                total residential driving age population 
whpopulas                 census 2000 total white population 
whresdpop     total white residential driving age population 
blpopulas    census 2000 total black population 
blresdpop      total white residential driving age population 
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bwpopratio      Black-to-White population ratio in corresponding  
 municipality 
totstop     total number of stops  
moving     total number of stops as a result of a moving   
     violation 
 
equipment     total number of stops as a result of equipment 
violations 
 
license     total number of stops as a result of a license 
violations 
 
speed      total number of stops as a result of speeding 
laneviol     total number of stops as a result of a lane violation 
followclose     total number of stops as a result of following to   
     close 
 
failtosig     total number of stops as a result of Filing to signal 
cve     commercial vehicle enforcement  
othervio     total number of stops as a result of other violations  
citation     total number of stops resulting in a citation issued   
warning     total number of stops resulting in a warning issued  
whstops     total number of white drivers stopped 
blstops     total number of black drivers stopped 
under18    total number of drivers under age 18 
age18to29     total number of drivers between ages 18 and 29 
age30to39     total number of drivers between ages 30 and 39 
age40pl        total number of drivers ages 40 and above 
male      total number of male drivers 
female     total number of female drivers 
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interstate     total number of drivers stopped on the interstate 
ushwy      total number of drivers stopped on United States  
                                                            highways 
 
statehwy     total number of drivers stopped on Missouri State  
                                                             highways 
                                              
countyrd     total number of drivers stopped on Missouri county  
                                                             roads 
 
citystreet     total number of drivers stopped on the                      
                                                            corresponding municipal street 
 
location     total number of stops at other locations  
stopsearch     total number of stops resulting in a search  
searchdri     total number of stops resulting in search of driver 
searchprop     total number of stops resulting in search of property 
inventor     total number of searches as part of a vehicle   
                                                            inventory 
 
drugalch     total number of searches with drugs or alcohol  
                                                             found 
 
incident     total number of searches as part of the incident to  
                                                            the arrest 
 
plainview     total number of searches as result of illicit 
                                                            contraband in reasonable suspicion weapon  
 
reason     terry search drugdog  
 
drugdog       drug dog alert search 
 
probable    probable cause search 
 
whitepoverty    total number of whites living in poverty divided by  
                                                            whites in population 
  
blackpoverty     total number of blacks living in poverty divided by  
                                                            blacks in population 
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whitesearch     total number of whites stopped that were  searched  
blacksearch     total number of blacks stopped that were  searched 
blsearind     number of blacks searched divided by blacks  
                                                             stopped  
 
whsearind    number of whites searched divided by whites  
                                                            stopped 
 
btowsearratio     blacks searched divided by whites searched 
btowpoverty     black poverty rate divided by white poverty rate  
violentcrime     violent crime over total population times 1000 (rate) 
proptycrime     property crime over total population times 1000  
                                                            (rate)  
 
totcrime    violent and property crime over total population  
                                                             times 1000 (rate) 
 
popratchange    Black-to-White population rate change from 1990   
                                                            to 2000  
 
blpopchange     raw black population change from 1990 to 2000 
blackwarrant     total number of blacks stopped who were wanted 
whitewarrant     total number of whites stopped who were wanted 
blackconsent     total number of blacks searched who consented 
whiteconsent     total number of whites searched who consented 
blconsind     black consent rate: total number of blacks that   
                                                            consented to search over the number of blacks  
                                                            searched  
 
whconsind     white consent rate: total number of whites that  
                                                            consented to search over the number of whites  
                                                            searched 
 
btowconratio     black consent rate divided by white consent rate 
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blcontrab     total number of blacks searched who had  
                                                            contraband 
 
whcontrab     total number of whites searched who had  
contraband 
 
blcontraind     black contraband rate: total number of blacks with 
                                  contraband over the number of blacks searched  
whcontrabind     white contraband rate: total number of whites with   
        contraband over the number of whites searched  
bwcontratio     black consent rate divided by white consent rate 
blunemployed    total number of blacks unemployed 
whunemployed    total number of whites unemployed 
bunemplind     black unemployment rate: total number of blacks  
unemployed divided by the total number of blacks  
in the population of a given municipality 
 
wunemplind     white unemployment rate: total number of whites   
       unemployed divided by the total number of whites   
                                                            in the pulation of a given municipality 
 
bwunempratio    black unemployment rate divided by white   
                                                            unemployment rate 
 
blincidarr     number of blacks stopped who were taken into  
                                                            custody incident to the arrest 
 
whincidarr     number of whites stopped who were taken into   
                                                            custody incident to the arrest 
 
bincidarrind     black incident to arrest rate: total number of blacks  
                                                            taken into custody incident to the arrest divided by  
                                                            the total number of blacks stopped  
 
wincidarrind     white incident to arrest rate: total number of whites   
                                                             taken into custody incident to the arrest divided by  
                                                             the total number of whites stopped  
 
bwincarratio     black incident to arrest rate divided by white  
                                                            incident to arrest 
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blackincome  black median household income 
whiteincome  white median household income 
btowincome  Black-to-White median household income for year   
                                                     1999 
 
blpretext  total number of pretext stops: blacks stopped for  
                                                            faulty equipment, license violation, following too  
                                                            closely, failing to signal, and lane  violations 
 
whpretext  total number of pretext stops: whites stopped for  
                                                            faulty equipment, license violation, following too   
                                                            closely, failing to signal, and lane  violations 
 
blpretin  black pretext stop rate: black pretext stops divided   
                                                            by black stops 
 
whpretin  white pretext stop rate: black pretext stops divided   
                                                            by black stops 
 
btowpreratio    black pretext stop index divided by white pretext  
                                                             stop index 
 
blspeedind    total number of blacks stopped for speeding divided  
                                                            by total number of blacks stopped  
 
whspeedind     total number of blacks stopped for speeding divided  
                                                            by total number of blacks stopped 
  
btowspdratio  black speed index divided by white speed index  
propvalue  median value for owner occupied housing units 
TotPop  Total Population in each municipality size small,  
                                                            median, or large municipal population size category 
 
size1  dummy variable 1 = large population and 0 = other  
                                                             size  
 
size2  dummy variable 1 = medium population and 0 =   
  other size 
 
size3   dummy variable 1 = small population and 0 = other  
size 
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class   municipal classification type 
Wpropop  proportion of whites in total driving age population  
Wpropstop  proportion of whites stopped from total stops 
Wstopindex  proportion of white driving population divided by  
    proportion white stops 
Bproppop  proportion of Blacks in total driving age population 
Bpropstop  proportion of Blacks stopped from total stops 
Wstopindex  proportion of Black driving population divided by  
    proportion white stops 
BWstopratio  Black-to-White stop rate 
bcontraind  Black contraband hit rate = Black contraband found 
   divided by black searches 
wcontraind  White contraband hit rate = White contraband found 
   divided by black searches 
percblack   percent of total population who is Black 
percwhite  percent of total population who is White 
bwpopperct  Black-to-White population percentage ratio 
nintybpoperc  1990 Black population percentage 
nintywpoperc  1990 White population percentage 
ninetybwperc  1990 Black-to-White population percentage ratio 
perchng1990  Black-to-White population percent ratio change  
from 1990 to 2000 
 
blperchnge  Black population percent change from 1990 to 2000 
bpop40  Dummy variable: 1 = 40 percent or more Blacks  
living in municipality 
 
bpoptwen1  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks   
  are less than 20 percent of the municipal population 
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bpoptwen2  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
 are 20 percent or more of the population 
 
bpopthrt1  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks 
are less than 30 percent of the municipal population 
 
bpopthrt2  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are 30 percent or more of the population 
 
bpop6  Dummy variable: 1 = 6 percent or more Blacks  
living in municipality 
 
bpopsix1  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are less than 6 percent of the municipal population 
 
bpopsix2  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are 6 percent or more of the population 
 
bpop77  Dummy variable: 1 = 77 percent or more Blacks  
living in municipality 
 
bpop771  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are less than 77 percent of the municipal population 
 
bpop772  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks 
are 77 percent or more of the population 
 
bpop76  Dummy variable: 1 = 76 percent or more Blacks  
living in municipality 
 
bpop761  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are less than 76 percent of the municipal population 
 
bpop762  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
are 76 percent or more of the population 
 
bpop75  Dummy variable: 1 = 75 percent or more Blacks  
living in municipality 
 
bpop751  Dummy variabe1e: 1 = municipalities where Blacks 
are less than 75 percent of the municipal population 
 
bpop752  Dummy variable: 1 = municipalities where Blacks  
  are 75 percent or more of the population 
 
totpretxt  total number of pretext stops for Whites and Blacks  
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totsearch  Total number of Blacks and Whites searched 
totarrest  Total number of Blacks and Whites arrested 
blarrestprop  Number of Blacks arrested divided by number of  
total arrests 
 
bldrgarrind  Black drug arrest index: Black drug proportion  
divided by Black arrest proportion 
 
wharrestprop  Number of Whites arrested divided by number of  
total arrests 
 
whdrgarrind  White drug arrest index: Black drug proportion 
divided by White arrest proportion 
 
totdrugarr  Total drug arrest black and white drivers 
whdrgarrprop  number of whites arrested for drugs divided by total  
drug arrests 
 
bldrgarrprop  number of blacks arrested for drugs divided by total  
drug arrests 
 
bwdrgarrindx                                      black drug arrest index divided by white drug  
  arrest index  
 
blarrestindx                                        black arrest proportion divided by proportion  
 blacks stopped 
 
wharrestindx                                      white arrest proportion divided by proportion  
 whites stopped 
 
bwaresind                                          black arrest index divided by white arrest index 
 
totoutwarr                                          total number of outstanding warrant arrests 
 
bloutwprop                                          number of blacks arrested for outstanding warrants   
  divided by total outstanding warrant arrests 
 
whoutwprop                                          number of whites arrested for outstanding warrants 
                                                              divided by total outstanding warrant arrests 
 
blwarindex                                         black warrant arrest proportion divided by  
proportion blacks stopped 
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whwarindex                                       white warrant arrest proportion divided by  
proportion whites stopped 
 
bwwarindex                                        black warrant arrest index divided by white warrant  
arrest index 
 
tottrafarr  total number of traffic violation arrests 
 
bltrafarprop    number of blacks arrested for traffic violation  
divided by total traffic violation arrests 
 
bltrafarindx    black traffic violation arrest proportion divided by  
                                                          proportion blacks stopped 
    
whtrafarprop    number of whites arrested for traffic violation  
divided by total traffic violation arrests 
 
whtrafarindx    white traffic violation arrest proportion divided by  
                                                            proportion whites stopped 
 
bwtrafarindx                                       black traffic violation arrest index divided by white  
traffic violation arrest index 
 
mandsearch  total number of mandatory searches 
 
consent  total number of consent searches 
 
totcondis     total number of contraband found indicators but not  
                                                            necessarily an arrest  
 
drugcondis                                          drug/alcohol/paraphernia contraband discovered 
 
bldiscsear  total number of black discretionary searches 
 
whdiscsear  total number of white discretionary searches 
 
blmandsear  total number of black mandatory searches 
 
whmandsear  total number of white mandatory searches 
 
bldisearprop  black discretionary search divided by total  
discretionary searches 
 
bldissearind             black discretionary search proportion divided by  
                                                          proportion blacks stopped 
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whdisearprop  white discretionary search divided by total  
discretionary searches 
 
whdissearind             white discretionary search proportion divided by  
                                                            proportion whites stopped 
 
blmansearprop  black mandatory search divided by total mandatory  
                                                            searches 
 
blmansearind             black mandatory search proportion divided by  
                                                          proportion blacks stopped 
 
whmanearprop  white mandatory search divided by total mandatory  
                                                            searches 
 
whmansearind             white mandatory search proportion divided by  
                                                            proportion whites stopped 
 
blspeed  total number of blacks stopped for speeding 
 
class 1                                                 dummy variable 1 = class 1 municipality  
 
class 2                                                 dummy variable 1 = class 2 municipality  
 
class 3                                                 dummy variable 1 = class 3 municipality  
 
class 4                                                 dummy variable 1 = class 4 municipality  
 
class 5                                                 dummy variable 1 = class 5 municipality 
 
blcitation                                            total number of blacks issued a citation 
 
blcitprop                                             black citations issued divided by total citations  
issued 
 
whcitation                                           total number of whites issued a citation 
 
whcitprop                                            white citations issued divided by total citations  
issued 
 
whpropstop                                         total whites stopped divided by total stops    
 
blpropstop                                          total blacks stopped divided by total stops   
 
blcitind                                               black citations issued proportion divided by  
                                                          proportion blacks stopped 
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whcitind                                             white citations issued proportion divided by  
                                                          proportion whites stopped 
 
bwcitindex                                         black citation issued index divided by white citation  
    issued index 
 
ratioXchang                                        year 2000 black to white population percentage  
ratio times black to white percentage change from   
 1990 to 2000 
 
prechng                                              black to white pretextual stop ratio times black to  
white percentage change from 1990 to 2000 
 
wharrind                                            white arrest proportion divided by proportion whites  
stopped 
 
blarrind                                              black arrest proportion divided by proportion blacks  
stopped 
 
bwarrind                                             black arrest index divided by white arrest index 
 
arrpret                                                 black to white arrest times black to white pretextual  
stop index 
 
bwararrest                                           total black warrant arrests 
 
bdrgarrest                                            total black drug arrests 
 
bresarst                                                total black arrest for resisting 
 
bpersarst                                             total black arrest for crime against person 
 
bdwi  total black arrest for DWI 
 
bproperty  total black arrest for property crime  
 
btraffic  total black arrest for traffic violation 
 
botherarst  total black arrest for other crime  
 
warrant                                                total white warrant arrests 
 
drug                                                     total white drug arrests 
 
resists                                                  total white arrest for resisting 
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person                                                 total white arrest for crime against person 
 
dwi  total white arrest for DWI 
 
property  total white arrest for property crime  
 
traffic  total white arrest for traffic violation 
 
other  total white arrest for other crime  
 
spdchng  black to white speed stop ratio times black to white   
                                                            percentage change from 1990 to 2000 
 
bwpop20                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  20% or more black residents 
 
bwpoptwen1                                       dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
20% black residents 
 
bwpoptwen2                                       dummy variable 1 = municipality with 20% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop10                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
10% or more black residents 
 
bwpopten1                                          dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than   
10% black residents 
 
bwpopten2                                          dummy variable 1 = municipality with 10% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop8                                               generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
8% or more black residents 
 
bwpopeght1                                        dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 8%  
black residents 
 
bwpopeght2                                        dummy variable 1 = municipality with 8% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop7                                               generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  7% or more black residents 
 
bwpopsev1                                          dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 7%   
  black residents 
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bwpopsev2                                          dummy variable 1 = municipality with 7% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop75                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
75% or more black residents 
 
bwpop751                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
75% black residents 
 
bwpop752                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 75% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop50                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
50% or more black residents 
 
bwpop501                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
50% black residents 
 
bwpop502                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 50% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop95                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  95% or more black residents 
 
bwpop951                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
95% black residents 
 
bwpop952                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 95% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop80                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  80% or more black residents 
 
bwpop801                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
80% black residents 
 
bwpop802                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 80% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpopsxteen                                       generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  16% or more black residents 
 
bwpopsxteen1                                     dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
16% black residents 
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bwpopsxteen2                                     dummy variable 1 = municipality with 16% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop30                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
30% or more black residents 
 
bwpop301                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
30% black residents 
 
bwpop302                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 30% or more   
  black residents 
 
bwpop40                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
40% or more black residents 
 
bwpop401                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
40% black residents 
 
bwpop402                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 40% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop39                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
39% or more black residents 
 
bwpop391                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
39% black residents 
 
bwpop392                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 39% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop42                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  42% or more black residents 
 
bwpop421                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
42% black residents 
 
bwpop422                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 42% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop47                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
47% or more black residents 
 
bwpop471                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
47% black residents 
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bwpop472                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 47% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop48                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
48% or more black residents 
 
bwpop481                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
48% black residents 
 
bwpop482                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 48% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop51                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  51% or more black residents 
 
bwpop511                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
51% black residents 
 
bwpop512                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 51% or more   
  black residents 
 
bwpop76                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
76% or more black residents 
 
bwpop761                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
76% black residents 
 
bwpop762                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 76% or more   
  black residents 
 
bwpop88                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
88% or more black residents 
 
bwpop881                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
88% black residents 
 
bwpop882                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 88% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop92                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
92% or more black residents 
 
bwpop921                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than   
  92% black residents 
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bwpop922                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 92% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop5                                               generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
5% or more black residents 
 
bwpop51                                             dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 5%  
black residents 
 
bwpop52                                             dummy variable 1 = municipality with 5% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop69                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
69% or more black residents 
 
bwpop691                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
69% black residents 
 
bwpop692                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 69% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop6                                               generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
6% or more black residents 
 
bwpop061                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 6%  
black residents 
 
bwpop062                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 6% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop1                                               generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
1% or more black residents 
 
bwpop011                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than 1%  
black residents 
 
bwpop012                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 1% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop77                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
77% or more black residents 
 
bwpop771                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
77% black residents 
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bwpop772                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 77% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop53                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with   
  53% or more black residents 
 
bwpop531                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
53% black residents 
 
bwpop532                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 53% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop61                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
61% or more black residents 
 
bwpop611                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
61% black residents 
 
bwpop612                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 61% or more  
black residents 
 
bwpop70                                             generating dummy variable 1 = municipality with  
70% or more black residents 
 
bwpop701                                           dummy variable 0 = municipality with less than  
70% black residents 
 
bwpop702                                           dummy variable 1 = municipality with 70% or more  
black residents 
 
blconprop  Black consent search divided by total consent  
  search 
 
whconprop  White consent search divided by total consent  
  search 
 
blsearprop  Black total search divided by total search 
 
whsearprop  White total search divided by total search 
 
newbconind  new Black consent search proportion divided by  
    Black search proportion 
 
newwconind  new White consent search proportion divided by  
   White search proportion 
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nwbwconind  new Black consent index divided by new White  
consent index     
 
newbdiscind  new Black low-discretion search proportion divided  
by Black search proportion 
 
newwdiscind  new White low-discretion search proportion divided   
  by White search proportion 
 
nwbwdiscind  new Black low-discretion index divided by new  
White low-discretion index     
 
newbmanind  new Black mandatory search proportion divided  
by Black search proportion 
 
newwmanind  new White mandatory search proportion divided   
  by White search proportion 
 
nwbwmanind  new Black mandatory index divided by new  
White mandatory index     
 
newbwarind  Black warrant arrest proportion divided by Black  
   arrest proportion 
 
newwwarind  White warrant arrest proportion divided by White  
   arrest proportion 
 
nwbwwarind  new Black warrant arrest index divided by new  
White warrant arrest index 
 
nwbdrugarind  Black drug arrest proportion divided by Black  
   arrest proportion 
 
nwwdrugarind  White drug arrest proportion divided by White  
   arrest proportion 
 
nwbwdrgarind  new Black drug arrest index divided by new  
White drug arrest index 
 
newbtrafind  Black traffic violation arrest proportion divided by  
Black arrest proportion 
 
newwtrafind  White traffic violation arrest proportion divided by  
White arrest proportion 
 
nwbwtrafind  new Black traffic violation arrest index divided by  
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new White traffic violation arrest index 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
181 
 
Appendix D 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
              
 btowse~o btowpo~y violen~e btowin~e btowpr~o btowsp~o propva~e TotPop bwpopp~t per~1990 bwdrga~x bwwari~x bwtrfa~x bwcitindex bwarrindx 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 btowseratio|  1.0000 
 btowpoverty| 0.0714     1.0000 
violentcrime| -0.1351    -0.0664   1.0000 
btowincome|  -0.2503    -0.1513  0.0715    1.0000 
btowpreratio| 0.2953     0.1134   0.1948    -0.2093    1.0000 
btowspdratio| -0.2139  -0.0418  -0.2162   0.0966     -0.5316   1.0000 
propvalue|      0.1417     0.1027   -0.2886  -0.1633    0.1958  -0.0277   1.0000 
TotPop|         0.2972     0.0042   0.1692    -0.0758    0.3126  -0.1218   -0.0101  1.0000 
bwpopperct|  -0.2028  -0.1226  0.3507    0.1069     -0.0848  -0.1476   -0.1762  -0.0814   1.0000 
perchnge1990-0.1496 -0.0804  0.1467    0.1098     -0.0770   0.0263   -0.1382  -0.1031   0.2163    1.0000 
bwdrgarrindx|0.2977   0.1386   0.0053   -0.2338     0.2211   -0.0257   0.1620   0.1458   -0.1434   -0.1702   1.0000 
bwwarindex 0.2257     -0.0035  0.0425   -0.1122    0.5079   -0.1840   0.2621    0.0341   -0.0377  -0.0638   0.2823     1.0000 
bwtrfarindx| 0.1829     0.0226   0.0424   -0.1330    0.3504   -0.1800    0.2017   0.1037  -0.0514  -0.0476    0.1994      0.3260    1.0000 
bwcitindex|  0.2688    -0.1552  0.0645   -0.276      0.1168   -0.1097   -0.0959   0.0069    0.0007   0.0030     0.1469     0.0619     0.0508    1.0000 
bwarrindx|   0.5796     0.2193   -0.0698  -0.1932    0.5279   -0.2379    0.2367    0.1740   -0.0987   -0.0802    0.4620    0.4930      0.4214     0.3137    1.0000 
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Appendix E 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS COMMANDS FOR STATA SOFTWARE 
 
Bivariate Regression 
     Command = reg dependent variable independent variable 
Multiple Regression 
     Command = reg dependent variable independent variable independent variable   
Bar graph 
     Command = graph variable variable variable variable, bar 
Create Dummy Variable for Government Type 
     Command =  tabulate variable (government type) 
                           tabulate variable, generate (variable) 
                           describe 
                           list place variable variable1 – variable5  
Create Dummy Variable to Check Differences in Municipal Population Size 
     Command = generate newvariable = 0 if variable < percent 
                          Replace newvariable = 1 if variable > = percent & variable! =. 
                          Tab newvariable, gen (newvariable) 
                          Desc newvairable1-newvariable2 
Two Sample t test   
     Command = reg newvariable variable          
Test for Skewness 
     Command for table = sktest variable  
     Command for graph = graph variable, xlabel ylabel bin (8) norm     
     Command to transform skewed data = boxcox variable, nolog level (95) gen 
(newvariable) 
     Command to graph skewed data = graph newvar, bin (8) ylabel xlabel norm t1 
(transformed data) 
